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ABSTRACT
In the seventeenth century Denmark-Norway joined other
north European states in building forts on the Gold Coast of Africa
and in seeking islands in the Caribbean on which to cultivate tropical
products.

The Danish West India Company, established in 1671,

permanently occupied the uninhabited island of S t . Thomas in 1672.
In 1718 the Danish company settled S t . John, and in 1733 Denmark
purchased S t . Croix from France.

S t . Croix developed into the

principal supplier of raw sugar for Denmark, where sugar refining
became an important industry.

The export of surplus sugar from

Denmark to Baltic countries comprised an important part of the
nation's foreign trade in the second half of the eighteenth century.
I n i t i a l attempts a t using indentured servants from
•• r*r

Scandinavia as agricultural laborers failed, and by the early
eighteenth century African slaves formed the source of labor for
the island's sugar and cotton plantations.

Foreign slavers as well

as Danish ships supplied slaves to the Danish West Indies, though the
Crown frequently sought to r e s t r i c t the trade t o Danish slavers.
The slave trade on Danish vessels thrived when France and England
were a t war, for Danish ships then supplied the French sugar islands
with slaves.

But in peacetime the trade languished.

By the l a t e

1780s the slave trade stood condemned on humanitarian grounds in
the eyes of thoughtful Europeans, including prominent members of the
iv

V

Danish government.
In August 1791 the Danish Crown, a t the request of Finance
Minister Ernst Schimmelmann, appointed a committee of government
officials to investigate the slave trade.

The Committee on the Slave

Trade, guided and dominated by Schimmelmann, decided that the slave
trade should be abolished a f t e r a ten-year transition period.

In

the meantime, the Crown encouraged a rapid increase in the slave
population and urged the planters to improve the treatment of their
slaves in hopes that the labor force would become self-perpetuating by
1803.

Schimmelmann knew that no Caribbean sugar island had yet been

able to sustain i t s slave population without access to the Atlantic
slave trade.

But he and the committee hoped that the planters, faced

with the prospect of abolition, would adopt amelioration out of a
sense of enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t .

The planters, however, maintained

their traditional interest in short-term profits and apparently did
not take the threat of abolition seriously.

Slave deaths continued

to exceed births, and in 1802 the planters asked for a continuation of
the slave trade.
In May 1804 Schimmelmann, with strong support from Johan Philip
Rosenstand-Goiske, a member of the government agency in charge of West
Indian a f f a i r s , got the Council of State t o postpone a decision on the
planters' appeal.

The delay thus obtained proved permanent, and

Denmark became the f i r s t European slave-trading nation t o outlaw the
slave trade.

CHAPTER I
Introduction:

The Danish West Indies and Slave Trade to 1784

Denmark-Norway was the f i r s t European slave-trading power
to abolish i t s slave trade from Africa to i t s possessions in the
Americas and to prohibit i t s subjects from participating in any
aspect of the Atlantic slave trade.

I t did so by means of a royal

edict issued on March 16, 1792, which stated that the trade in slaves
between Danish Guinea and the Danish West Indies was t o cease on
January 1 , 1803.

In the meantime, the slave trade t o the Danish West

Indies was to be encouraged so as to provide the plantations with a
labor force large enough to enable the islands to prosper a f t e r 1802
without reliance on further slave importsJ

Despite opposition in

Copenhagen and in the West Indies, participation in the trade became
illegal for Danish subjects in 1803.
The kingdom of Denmark-Norway began trading with Asia, the
Guinea Coast of Africa, and the West Indies in the seventeenth
century, inspired by the success of the Dutch and the proposals of
Dutch merchants resident in Copenhagen.^

The Danish East India

^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente
samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Forordning
om Negerhandelen, March 16, 1792, p. 2.
^Georg N0rregaard, Guldk.ysten: de danske Etablissementer
i Guinea, Vol. VIII of Vore gamle Tropekolonier, e3. by Johannes
1

Company, established in 1616, grew out of a plan of two Dutch
merchants who arrived in Copenhagen in 1615.3

j n igl8 the company

sent i t s f i r s t expedition t o Ceylon, and in 1620 the Danes took
possession of Tranquebar on the southeast coast of India; for more
than two centuries Tranquebar served as headquarters for Danish
Asian trade.^
Competition with the Swedes, long intense in the Baltic,
encouraged Danish trading ventures to Africa and the New World.
In December 1624 Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden granted a Dutch
merchant the privilege of establishing a Swedish company to conduct
such overseas trade; in January 1625 Christian IV of Denmark (15881648) did the same.^

Nothing came of t h i s Danish project, however,

mainly because of the impoverishment of Denmark resulting from
£

Christian IV*s intervention in the Thirty Years' War.
Only in the early 1650s did Danish efforts a t trade with
Africa and the New World revive.

In 1651 the Glueckstadt Company w<

established a t Glueckstadt, a town on the Elbe founded in 1615 by

Br0ndsted (8 vols., 2d. e d . ; Copenhagen: Fremad, 1966), p. 12. In
the eighteenth century Denmark-Norway, hereafter referred to as
Denmark, also included Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, the
duchy of Schleswig and parts of the duchy of Hoi stein.
3 Gunnar 01 sen, Dansk Ostindien 1616-1732:
de Ostindiske
Kompagniers Handel paa Indien, Vol. V of Vore gamle Tropekolonier,
pp. 3b and 49.
4Ibid.,

pp. 76-78.

^N0rregaard, Guldk.ysten, pp. 19-21.
*\J. 0. Bro-Jorqensen, Dansk Vestindien indtil 1755:
Kolonisation og Kompagnistyre, Vol. I of Vore qamle Tropekolonier,
p. 12.

3
Christian IV as a base f o r trade with western Europe.

A few years

l a t e r the Danes began building forts on the Gold Coast, where they
were t o remain for 200 years. 7

That smaller naval powers such as

Denmark were able to enter the fiercely competitive African trade
was due in large part to the Africans' policy of promoting
competition among as many European states as possible in order to
obtain better trade arrangements.

The chieftains resisted stubbornly

any attempt by a European company to establish a monopoly along a
stretch of the Gold Coast; thus the Danes, English and Dutch
coexisted on the Gulf of Guinea i n Accra, capital of modern Ghana,
competing with one another t o the benefit of the Africans.**

Because

of the risky nature of the West African trade, European merchants
sought protection in chartered trading companies enjoying a national
g
monopoly.
In 1652 the f i r s t Danish ships sailed to the West Indies,
and in 1653 Frederik III (1648-70) chartered a West India Company.
The new company was not awarded a monopoly, but i t received privileges
with regard t o payment of customs duties.

The Danes wished t o

acquire tobacco, sugar, ginger, and indigo in exchange for Icelandic
lamb, dried f i s h , whale oil , and Danish bread and beefJ®

Though as

^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 24-27
O
Kwane Yeboa Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast,
1600-1720: A Study of the African Reaction to European Trade
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 37.
^Robert 0. Collins, Europeans in Africa (New York:
A. Knopf, 1971), p. 28.
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 13-14.

Alfred

4
yet the Danes did not participate in the Atlantic slave trade,
interest in such commerce was expressed by a Copenhagen merchant,
who i n 1653 appealed to the Spanish government for permission to s e l l
slaves t o the Spanish American colonies.^
Trade with the West Indies was interrupted by the war with
Sweden from 1657 t o 1660, but in 1662 a ship was sent out by the
f i r s t Danish West India Company with the task of locating uninhabited
19
islands--of which there were s t i l l many—suitable for occupation."In 1665 the Danish company proposed settling S t . Thomas, a small
(slightly over 33 square miles), mountainous island with an excellent
harbor.

Later that year Danish s e t t l e r s arrived on S t . Thomas, but

this f i r s t colonizing effort f e l l victim t o disease, pirate raids,
a hurricane, and lack of support from the company, which was
desperately short of capital and soon collapsed.

13

By 1671 conditions for creating a larger, stronger West India
Company were improved.

The new king, Christian V (1670-99), was

eager for enterprises which promised glory for himself and his realm;
and his trusted advisor, Peter Schumacher, wished to encourage trade
and industry by government action.

In addition, a Board of Trade

"^Waldemar Westergaard, The Danish West Indies under Company
Rule, 1671-1754; with a Supplementary Chapter, 1755-1917 (New York:
MacMillan Company, 1917), p. 21.
Parry, Trade and Dominion; The European Oversea Empires
in the Eighteenth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol son, 1971),
pp. 42-43. Spain had largely ignored the Lesser Antilles, stretching
from Puerto Rico in a great arc east and south to Trinidad. Other
powers began s e t t l i n g these islands in the seventeenth century, a
process which an enfeebled Spain could not r e s i s t .
^Bro-Jtirgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 17-26.

5
(Kommercekol1 egiurn) headed by the king's energetic half-brother was
created in 1668 to promote commerce.^

Direct involvement of the

royal family, lacking in the case of the f i r s t company, would be
important for the success of any new endeavor in the West Indies,
for i t was the court and high nobility, and not the relatively
small merchant class, which possessed the necessary capital.

15

A new Danish West India Company received i t s charter on
March 11, 1671; i t was authorized to s e t t l e S t . Thomas and other
available areas in the Americas, to defend and administer these
areas, and to exercise a monopoly on trade with them.

The three

directors of the company, a l l of them also members of the Board
of Trade, were appointed by the Crown.

The King invested a large

sum and encouraged others, in particular the wealthier nobles, t o
do the same.

The King further agreed to provide two ships to

be used by the company for three y e a r s . ^
A Danish expedition commanded by Jtfrgen Iversen, a Dane
who had spent several years on S t . Kitts and knew the Caribbean
well, reached St. Thomas in May 1672.

Soon the Danes were joined

by Dutch, English, French, and even Danish planters from nearby
islands—accompanied by their African slaves—seeking on the neutral
Danish island refuge from the effects of the Dutch War (1672-78).
These refugees, already acclimated and experienced in producing

1 4 Westergaard,

15

Danish West Indies, p. 31.

Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 43.

16Ibid.,

pp. 44-46.

6
tropical products, were a c r i t i c a l l y important source of population
growth for the new colony, for of the 324 Danes and Norwegians (who
were mainly convicts, male and female) sent out by the company
between 1672-75, only 64 survived the journey and the dangerous
f i r s t half-year on the island.

Included among the foreign colonists

were small tobacco farmers and artisans driven from the older
islands by the advance of sugar cultivation with i t s accompanying
gang slavery; on S t . Thomas these immigrants planted mainly tobacco
and cotton, crops which required few i f any slaves.

To promote the

rapid development of St. Thomas the company allotted land to
immigrants in exchange for only a nominal rent—at f i r s t usually a
couple of chickens a y e a r . ^
The Glueckstadt Company, no longer able to carry on trade
with the Gold Coast, renounced i t s privileges in 1673.

In 1674 the

West India Company took over the African trade and became the West
India and Guinea Company.

Except for a brief period in the early

1690s, when Danish Guinea and S t . Thomas were leased t o private
merchants, the company governed both the Danish f o r t s on the Gold
Coast and the Danish West Indies until 1 7 5 4 . ^
As sugar cultivation grew in importance on St. Thomas in
the l a s t years of the seventeenth century, the need for laborers
increased dramatically.

17Ibid.,

An attempt to solve the labor problem by

pp. 55ff.

^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 86-87. From 1690-94 S t . Thomas
was run by the Norwegian merchant, Jtfrgen Thorm0hlen.

7
using Danish and Norwegian indentured servants and convicts failed.
Indentured servants were d i f f i c u l t to r e c r u i t , especially a s St. Thomas
acquired a reputation as a graveyard for whites.

Virtually no one

who could make a living in Denmark was willing t o go to St. Thomas
as an indentured servant, so only the poorest, and s i c k l i e s t , signed
contracts.

In the early years of settlement indentured servants

and convicts were treated as brutally as the African slaves—Governor
Iversen (1672-80) beat several to death as
to work hard enough.

punishment for failing

After 1701 convicts were seldom sent to the

island, and a f t e r 1706 the company stopped selling indentured servants
t o planters, for Scandinavian laborers, when they survived a t a l l in
the warm climate, were said t o be capable of doing only about onefourth as much work as black slaves.

1Q

Therefore the Danish colony,

in common with other European colonies in the Caribbean, sought a
solution to the labor problem by importing slaves from Africa, for
which enterprise a Brandenburg slave-trading company had provided
the Danes with a model and a stimulus.
The Brandenburg African Company had established f o r t s on
the Gold Coast in the early 1680s, with the goal of building up
a profitable trade in slaves to Spanish America.

The company needed

a base in the Caribbean and, in 1685, a f t e r failing t o acquire
either St. Vincent or S t . Croix from France, signed with the Danish
West India and Guinea Company a thirty-year accord which granted the
Brandenburgers a s t r i p of land on St. Thomas for a factory and a

^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 50ff, 92-93, 174.

8
plantation and gave them the right to import slaves from the Gold
Coast and export them to European colonies in the Caribbean.

The

Brandenburgers promised t o provide the Danish company with slaves
a t a low price.

This promise was important for St. Thomas, for as

yet there was no regular slave trade conducted by Danish vessels.

20

During the War of the League of Augsburg the Brandenburg
company thrived by smuggling slaves into the English islands,
especially the nearby English Virgin Islands, which, like S t . Thomas,
were experiencing a rapid growth of sugar cultivation with a
corresponding increase in the demand for slaves.

After 1699 the

Brandenburg African Company stopped transporting slaves from Africa
t o the West Indies, perhaps because of the withdrawal of important
Dutch stockholders and a loss of interest in the company by the King,
Frederick I .

The company's factory on S t . Thomas slowly declined

u n t i l , in 1715, the Brandenburgers' treaty with the Danish company
expired, and the Brandenburgers l e f t the island.
In 1696, however, the temporary success of the slave-trading
venture of the Brandenburg company, coupled with the need to assure
St. Thomas an adequate labor supply for i t s expanding sugar planta
tions, had prompted Governor Johan Lorentz to urge the Danish West
India and Guinea Company to begin a regular slave trade of i t s own.
Accordingly, in 1698 a Danish ship carried 280 slaves from the Gold

20c.C. Alberti, "Den danske Slavehandels Historie," N.yt
Historisk Tidsskrift, 2d. s e r i e s , I I I (1850), 206-07;
N0rregarrd, Guldk.ysten, pp. 87ff.
21

Westergaard, Danish West Indies, p. 145.

21

9
Coast to St. Thomas, beginning a regular Atlantic t r a f f i c in slaves
on Danish vessels.

22

The population of St. Thomas numbered about 100 in 1673, and
reached 331 in 1680, including 175 slaves, either brought in by
foreign planters or purchased by Governor Iversen from foreign slave
traders.^
slaves.

By 1691, the population had risen to 1,136 including 751

Of the 101 plantations on S t . Thomas, eighty-seven were

planted in cotton, only five in sugar. But sugar cultivation expanded
rapidly in the 1690s and early 1700s, mainly a t the expense of tobacco
farming, so that forty out of 160 plantations in 1715 were planted
solely in sugar.

The rapid growth of the slave population indicated

the advance of labor-intensive sugar production:

by 1720-21, the

number of slaves reached 4,504; the free population grew much more
slowly, to 524. 2 4

As elsewhere in the West Indies, small planters

were being squeezed out by larger ones using gang slavery t o produce
sugar.

?5

Sugar was a rich man's crop; i t brought large profits once

the i n i t i a l capital investment had been made.

Sugar planters bought

2 2Bro-J0rgensen,

Dansk Vestindien, pp. 162-64. The Danish
East India Company had traded in slaves prior t o t h i s , transporting
them from the southeast coast of India to the slave market a t
Malacca. See 01 sen, Dansk Ostindien, p. 207.
23
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 40-41.
24

Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 171ff. The figures
given for the slave population are minimum ones only, for in 1691 a
head tax, or kopskat, was introduced, which thereafter gave slave
masters a good reason to try to conceal the actual number of slaves
in their possession.
^Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 123ff.

10
out small tobacco farmers and brought in a stream of African slaves
to work the fields and serve as a r t i s a n s , displacing the class of
white laborers and advancing a process which produced a population
sharply divided between a mass of black slaves and a small group of
white planters. 2 6
Though the Danish West India and Guinea Company continued
to engage in the slave trade until the company was dissolved in
1754, profits from the trade were rare.

27

The d i f f i c u l t i e s faced

by the Danish company were similar to those faced by other companies
engaged in the African trade:

losses a t sea, dishonest employees,

the high costs of maintaining f o r t s on the Gold Coast, and high death
rates on i t s slave ships.

Of the twenty ships owned by the company

between 1697-1733, eight were l o s t a t sea. 2 **

Slave deaths on Danish

slave ships in the period 1698-1754 amounted to 25 per cent, with only
about 7,500 slaves out of some 10,000 surviving the t r i p from Africa
to the West Indies. 2 9

Nevertheless, the company continued to transport

slaves to the West Indies, though i t seldom had more than two ships
engaged in the trade a t any time, and i t s activity in the f i r s t two
decades of the eighteenth century served primarily t o supplement the

26J.

H. Parry and P. M. Sherlock, A Short History of the West
Indies (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1956), pp. 66ff.
27
28

N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 149.
Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 151-52.

2 9 N0rregaard,

Guldkysten, p. 146-47. Slave deaths on Danish
ships would have been near the norm of 18 per cent for other European
slave-trading powers were i t not for the loss in 1706 of a Danish
slave ship with 820 slaves on board.

efforts of Dutch interlopers.

Indeed, the company instructed i t s

employees on St. Thomas to encourage interlopers to s e l l slaves in
the Danish colony--thereby disregarding the monopoly on the trade
held by the company—but urged that the company have exclusive right
to buy slaves so that a profit could be made subsequently by selling
the slaves to local planters.

on

From the s t a r t of colonization on St. Thomas, the West India
and Guinea Company had hoped to acquire other islands, and had on
several occasions in the l a t e seventeenth century sent men to live
on the uninhabited island of St. John, about four miles east of S t .
Thomas.
time.

Englishmen from the Leeward Islands drove out the Danes each
Finally, in 1718, when a l l agricultural land on St. Thomas was

in use, a well-armed force of twenty planters, five soldiers, and
sixteen slaves was sent to occupy St. John.

Defying English demands

for their withdrawal, and the threatening v i s i t s of two English
f r i g a t e s , the Danish governor stood firm, and by 1733 there were 109
plantations on the island, with 208 whites and 1,087 slaves working
them.^
Even a f t e r acquiring S t . John, the Danish company lacked an
adequate basis in the West Indies for production of tropical products,
for St. Thomas and S t . John were both very small, only thirty-three
and twenty-one square miles respectively.

In 1733, a t the urging

of the Danish crown, the West India and Guinea Company purchased the

^ A l b e r t i , "Den danske Slavehandel," p. 214.
^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 216-22.

unoccupied French island of S t . Croix for 750,000 1ivres (164,000
rigsdaler), with the Crown providing a large part of the i n i t i a l
payment.

S t . Croix lay forty miles south of S t . Thomas, and with

eighty-four square miles was large enough to become a major center
of sugar production. 3 2
An attempt t o encourage settlement of S t . Croix by Danish
subjects was largely unsuccessful.

From the s t a r t the island was

dominated by immigrant planters from the nearby English islands.
The lures of virgin soil and religious toleration attracted a
number of English Catholic planters from Montserrat, who with their
slaves added about one thousand people to the population of St. Croix
in the f i r s t years a f t e r the Danish takeover. 3 3
St. Croix grew rapidly to become the Danish sugar island
par excellence.

The slave population increased between 1742 and

1755 from 1,906 to 8,897.

At the same time, agricultural production

on St. Thomas was declining a f t e r peaking in the 1720s, when the
slave population there had reached 4,490; by 1754 the number of
slaves on S t . Thomas had fallen to 3,481.

On S t . John, colonized

more recently than S t . Thomas, production continued to expand between
1739 and 1755, with the number of slaves there rising from 1,414
to 2,031. 3 4

32Ibid.,

pp. 240ff.

33

Ibid., pp. 250ff. Religious toleration, though illegal
in Denmark, was practiced on S t . Thomas out of practical necessity
from the e a r l i e s t years of settlement.
34Ibid.,

pp. 269ff.

13
Despite acquisition of S t . Croix, the West India and
Guinea Company continued to be troubled by the high costs of
administering and defending i t s possessions.

By mid-century there

was growing opposition in Denmark t o continuing the special privileges
enjoyed by the company, as these increasingly were viewed as harmful
t o economic growth.

The price of sugar in Denmark, for one thing,

was 30 per cent above the price a t H a m b u r g . I n 1749 the Board of
Trade decided that the company's near-monopoly over the sugar-refining
industry in Denmark hindered further development, and from 1750 a
number of new sugar refineries were given permission t o begin
o p e r a t i o n . O n top of this setback for the company came the loss
of three ships a t sea in 1751-52, and in 1753 a slave revolt on
another ship caused heavy financial loss.

In that same year the

S t . Croix Burger Council (the planters), furious a t new trade
restrictions aimed a t strengthening the company's trade monopoly,

07

urged Frederik V (1746-66) t o take over the Danish West Indies.
In May 1754 the Board of Trade recommended that the Crown
buy out the company.

The president of the company was Adam Gottlob

P.O. Sveistrup and Richard Willerslev, Den danske
Sukkerhandels oq Sukkerproduktions Historie (Copenhagen: Nordisk
Forlag, 1945), pp. 31-32.
Ibid., pp. 41ff. Prior to this there had been only a
refinery in Schleswig and one in Copenhagen to provide some competi
tion for the big refinery owned by the company in Copenhagen.
07
I t was trade restrictions more than anything else which
angered European colonists throughout the Americas. See D. K.
Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the
Eighteenth Century (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966), p. 88.
^Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 238-39.

14

von Moltke, the king's favorite; he accepted the Crown's offer to
pay the shareholders the par value of their stock (500 rigsdaler
per share) and assume a l l debts owed by and to the company. 39

Since

shares in the company had sold for only 300 rigsdaler in the years
immediately preceding the s a l e , the shareholders did very w e l l . ^
From the l a t e seventeenth century the main reason for
maintaining Danish f o r t s on the Gold Coast had been t o supply
slaves t o the Danish West Indies; trade in gold and ivory was
not extensive enough t o justify the continued expense of maintaining
the Danish f o r t s .

Yet i t probably would have been cheaper t o buy

slaves in the West Indies from the Dutch and the English.

A slave

trade on Danish ships was justifiable only as a means of guaranteeing
a sufficient labor supply to the Danish company's sugar islands in
case ships of the other maritime powers were for some reason unable
to meet the demand.^
Altogether, approximately 15,800 slaves were imported into
the Danish West Indies between 1687-1754.

After 1715 Danish vessels

provided most of the slaves sold in the Danish islands:

in the period

1739-54, for instance, only Danish slave ships supplied the islands,
landing about 3,675 slaves there in twenty-one voyages.^
In 1755, when the Crown took over the Danish West Indies

39Ibid.,

p. 240.

^Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 280-81.

^N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 154.
AO

Westergaard, Danish West Indies, pp. 320ff.
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and the forts on the Gold Coast, trade with the former company
possessions was opened to a l l Danish subjects.

But the entire

export of the islands was to go to Denmark, and only Danish
products, except when such were unavailable—which was often
enough—were t o be imported by the i s l a n d s . ^
The end of the restrictive rule of the West India and
Guinea Company encouraged a major expansion of the slave trade to
the Danish West Indies, in particular from 1755-77 and from
1792-1803.

Danish slavers took advantage of the colonial wars of

the second half of the eighteenth century t o s e l l slaves to the
American colonies of the warring powers, especially those of France.^
To govern the islands a f t e r the Crown took over, a centralized
administration was established.

A governor-general residing on S t .

Croix was the top executive official in the islands, with a
commander (kommandant) on St. Thomas looking after a f f a i r s there
and on St. John.

A miniature bureaucracy grew up, consisting of

warehouse managers, bookkeepers, customs agents, weigh-masters, and
surveyors.

Many of the men who staffed these positions had served

e a r l i e r in Africa and India; a class of Danish colonial officials
was making i t s appearance.

A new government agency was created in

1760 in Copenhagen to take charge of West Indian a f f a i r s , the West

^ P . P. Sveistrup, Bidraq t i l de tidliqere Dansk-Vestindiske
0ers 0konomiske Historie med saerlig Henblik paa Sukkerproduktion
og Sukkerhandel (Copenhagen: Nordisk Foriag, 1942), p. 91.
^"Udtog af Forestillingen t i l Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens
Afskaffelse," Minerva, Copenhagen, April 1792, p. 53.
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India-Guinea Treasury and General Customs Department (Vestindiskquineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer), usually referred to as the
General Customs Department (Generaltoldkammer).

I t had far-reaching

power over the Danish West I n d i e s . ^
In 1764, in an attempt t o increase the slave trade to
S t . Croix, the right to participate in the slave trade to the Danish
West Indies was extended t o include foreigners, who thenceforth
were allowed t o s e l l slaves in the Danish colonies in exchange for
sugar and cotton, a privilege clearly in conflict with the prevailing
mercantilist view that favored confining shipment of colonial raw
materials to the home country.

As an additional stimulus to the

slave trade, no customs duty was t o be paid on slaves brought directly
from Danish Guinea t o the Danish West Indies in Danish ships.

Danish

slave ships carrying slaves not purchased in Danish Guinea, as well
as a l l foreign ships regardless of the origin of their slaves, had
to pay the duty.
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In 1766 the Danish forts on the Gold Coast were assigned
to a new slave-trading company, the Royal Chartered Danish-Guinea
Company (det kgl. oktroyerede danske guineiske Kompaqni), better
known as Bargum's Trading Association (det Bargumske Handelssocietet).
This company sent more than 3,000 slaves to the West Indies from
1767 to 1776 and sold 1,873 slaves to French slavers between 1770

45jens Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, 1755-1848; Vestindiens
Storhedstid. Vore gamle Tropekolonier, I I , ed. by Johannes
Br0ndsted (2d. ed; Copenhagen: Fremad, 1966), pp. l l f f .
^ A l b e r t i , "Den danske Slavehandels Historie," pp. 220-22.

and 1773. ^

st.

Croix imported more than 6,000 slaves from Africa

between 1767-77; a great many of these slaves must have been brought
in on foreign vessels.^®

Bargum's Trading Association encountered

problems in the mid-1770s, and in 1776 the Crown resumed control
over the forts in Danish Guinea.
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The slave population on St. Croix grew from 8,897 in 1755
to 15,699 in 1765 and to 23,834 in 1775.

On S t . Thomas the slave

population increased from 3,481 in 1754 to 3,979 in 1775; on St.
John the number of slaves grew from 2,031 in 1755 to 2,355 in 1775.
After 1775 a slight decline occurred until the early 1790s; in 1792,
the year the abolition edict was promulgated, the slave population
on St. Croix was 22,240.5®
All increases were due to imports of slaves from outside
the islands, for as elsewhere in the West Indies, the slaves' death
rate was consistently higher than their birth r a t e .
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From 1767 t o

1777, approximately 1,160 slaves were imported and retained each year
on St. Croix.

These slaves came both from Africa and from other

^Ntfrregaard, Guldkysten, pp. 193ff.
48
Svend Green-Pedersen, "The Scope and Structure of the
Danish Negro Slave Trade," Scandinavian Economic History Review,
XIX, No. 2 (1971), 171.
dQ
^ N0rregaard, Guldkysten, p. 205.
50

Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave
Trade," pp. 150ff.
51 Patrick Richardson, Empire and Slavery (London: Longmans,
Green and Co., Ltd., 1968), p. 12. For instance, on Barbados
between 1712 and 1768, the slave population increased a t an annual
rate of only 465, despite the importation of an annual average of
3,570 slaves.

islands in the West Indies, in particular from the British Leeward
Islands.
slaves.

Yet there was an average yearly increase of only about 660
From this i t appears that S t . Croix, as other West Indian

sugar islands, had an excess of deaths over births; for S t . Croix i t
was about 500 a year. 5 2

Without a continued supply of slaves, the

slave population, so long as i t s living conditions were not improved,
would decline.
The prosperity of the Danish West Indies as plantation
colonies always depended on the amount of r a i n f a l l .
frequent, rainfall irregular and violent.

Droughts were

In the decade 1828-38,

the average annual rainfall on St. Thomas was forty-three inches,
not a large amount for an island in the tropics.

CO

Once the original

forests had been destroyed, erosion became a serious problem as
torrential rains washed away much of the topsoil.

On none of the

islands was the soil especially rich, and overuse, a situation
aggravated by the prevalence of monoculture, soon began to exhaust
it.5^

St. Thomas, however, possessed perhaps the best harbor in the

Lesser Antilles, a fact which, coupled with favorable legislation,
made i t a major Caribbean trading center in the second half of the
eighteenth century. 5 5

5 2 Green-Pedersen,

"The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave

Trade," pp. 155-56.
5 ^Westergaard,

54

Danish West Indies, p. 5.

Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 269.
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Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers flkonomiske Historie,
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After 1764 St. Thomas and S t . John were separated economically
from St. Croix; legislation thenceforth aimed a t making S t . Thomas
a t r a n s i t trade center, while St. Croix was to concentrate on sugar
production for the Danish market.

S t . Thomas and St. John were made

into free-trade areas, with foreign merchants allowed to s e t t l e there
and conduct trade with the Americas and, after 1767, with Europe as
well, though Danish ships in the European trade enjoyed preferential
customs d u t i e s . E s p e c i a l l y during wartime S t . Thomas was an
important center of the Caribbean t r a n s i t slave trade. 5 7
The slave trade to the Danish West Indies declined after
1777 as an edict of that year prohibited importation of slaves into
the islands aboard foreign ships and again required that a l l sugar
exported from the islands be sent t o Denmark. 5 8

Furthermore, only

ships built in Denmark and operated by Danish subjects resident in
Europe could engage in the slave trade.

Crews were t o be Danish

whenever possible, and captains and f i r s t mates had to be Danish in
every instance.

Also, customs duties were imposed on slaves imported

into the Danish islands:

four riqsdaler for an adult slave, two

for an adolescent, and one for a child.
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cq

Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 64.
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Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave
Trade," p. 158.
5 8 These

restrictions were motivated primarily by a desire to
bolster the foreign commerce of Copenhagen and to hinder the illegal
export of sugar from the Danish West Indies t o Amsterdam.
CQ

Alberti, "Den danske Slavehandelpp. 226ff.

Treatment of slaves in the sense of day-to-day living
conditions in the second half of the eighteenth century was apparently
as harsh in the Danish islands as elsewhere in the West Indies; the
slaves were constantly undernourished and were quite simply worked
to death.

They could be easily replaced by means of the Atlantic

slave trade:

"So long as the slave trade remained open, slaves

were greatly abused in a l l [slave] systems."®®
At mid-century a typical S t . Croix plantation of 150 acres
was worked by about 48 slaves.

fil

Their working day was long, then

and l a t e r in the century as well, beginning a t 5 a.m. and lasting,
with a r e s t period during midday, until 6 or 7 p.m.
harvest season they worked even longer.

During the

The slaves were given

Sunday off so that they could tend their gardens and v i s i t the
towns t o s e l l produce a t the Sunday market.®^

During the second

half of the eighteenth century, as land prices rose, the slaves'
nutritional standards declined, for planters tended to enlarge
the area planted in sugar a t the expense of the slaves' garden plots
CO

and to supply more of the slaves' food themselves.

Around 1790

fiO
Eugene D. Genovese, "The Treatment of Slaves in Different
Countries: Problems in the Application of the Comparative Method,"
in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Laura Foner and Eugene D. Genovese
(Englewood C l i f f s , N. J . : Prentice-Hall, I n c . , 1969), p. 208.
61 Richard Haagensen, Beskrivelse over Eylandet S t . Croix i
Amerika i Vest-Indien, (Copenhagen, 1758), p. 32.
^Hans West, Bidrag t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, med en
kort udsigt oyer S t . Thomas, St. Jean, Tortola, Spanish Town, og
Crabeneiland (Copenhagen, 1793), pp. 69-71, p. 77.
^^Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 140.

21
planters usually gave their slaves ten to twelve pots of meal from
North America twice a week and some salted herring. 6 ^

Undoubtedly,

during the boom periods, plantation slaves on the Danish islands
were exploited more than e a r l i e r .

65

The tendency for slaves t o suffer most during periods of
rapid economic growth was a characteristic of New World slavery
in general—for example, in Brazil, during the boom of the f i r s t
half of the eighteenth century, planters in their rush to maximize
production found i t most profitable t o work t h e i r slaves to death
and replace them by means of the Atlantic slave trade.® 6

"Whenever

slaves were worked under boom conditions, as in the West Indies in
the mid-eighteenth century and the Brazilian coffee plantations in
the nineteenth, the institution was one of grinding attrition."67
The planter class in the Danish West Indies was dominated
by men of English and Dutch descent, whose treatment of their slaves
was unlikely to be affected by living under the Danish f l a g ,
especially since the Danish government did not attempt to protect
the slaves from arbitrary and cruel treatment by their masters.

A

slave code promulgated in 1733 by Governor Philip Gardelin, a French

6 ^West,

Bidrag t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 72.

Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 161.
6 6 C.R.

Boxer, The Golden Age of Brazil, 1695-1750: Growing
Pains of a Colonial Society (Berkeliy: University of California
Press, 1962), pp. 7-9.
^David Brion Davis, "The Comparative Approach to American
History: Slavery," in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Foner and
Genovese, p. 67.
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Creole, provided for barbaric punishments, including the provision
that any slave who threatened a white or swore a t a white could be
pinched three times with red-hot iron tongs and thereafter hanged,
i f the white so desired, or lose a hand.

Testimony of a reputable

white would suffice against any slave in court.

The aim of this

slave code, which was being used as a basis for punishing slaves as
l a t e as 1791, was to terrorize the slaves into obedience.

Captured

rebel slaves were burned alive, or had their backs broken prior
to being placed on a platform to die slowly in public as a warning
to o t h e r s . ^
A slave code drawn up by the Board of Trade in 1755 was
never used, or even made public.

The governor decided i t would

create too much controversy and undermine the good relationship
the Danish government wished t o have with the planters, for the
code asserted that the slave masters had duties towards their slavesi t prescribed basic rations of food and clothing owed the slaves-and forbade slaveowners to k i l l a slave a r b i t r a r i l y or t o separate
married slaves.
Fears of a slave revolt were natural in view of the
numerical preponderance of the slaves and the treatment to which
they were subjected.

On St. John development a f t e r 1718 was rapid,

and by 1733 there were 109 plantations on the island, worked by

6®Georg H(6st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas oq dens
Gouverneurer, optegnede der paa Landet fra 1769 indtil 1776,
(Copenhagen: Nicolaus M011er og S0n, 1791), pp. 85-88. SeeAppendix I
fiQ
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 146-48.
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1,087 slaves.

Only 208 whites were present.

The garrison consisted of

eight Danish soldiers in a tiny hi 11-top f o r t , and these was no town
in which whites could gather for protection.

The rapid growth of

the slave population on the island resulted from a relatively high
percentage of recently enslaved Africans, who were normally more
inclined to rebel than were slaves who had either been born in
the Americas or who had lived there as slaves for a number of
years.
In November 1733 a major slave revolt began on S t . John.
Circumstances surrounding the revolt corresponded in several important
ways with those present on Jamaica and thought to be main factors in
the l a t t e r island's unusually numerous instances of slave revolt:
1) there was a high r a t i o of slaves to whites; 2) a high r a t i o of
African-born to native-born slaves; 3) rebel leadership was provided
by former warriors from m i l i t a r i s t i c African t r i b e s ; 4) absenteeism
(many owners of plantations on St. John spent most of t h e i r time
a t Charlotte Amalia on S t . Thomas) was a serious problem, weakening
the a b i l i t y of the whites to control their slaves; 5) food shortages
or the threat of them convinced the slaves their customary rights
were being violated; and 6) a mountainous terrain offered hiding
places for rebel slaves and inhibited the military efforts of the
whites.

On both Jamaica and S t . John the rebelling slaves were

weakened by the deep antipathy which divided African from native-born

7OBro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 222ff.
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slaves. 7 1

Though 146 slaves joined the revolt, many others

fought alongside their white masters.

Only with the help of 228

French soldiers from Martinique were the l a s t of the rebel slaves
hunted down, in l a t e May 1734, a f t e r forty-four plantations had
been destroyed.

Recovery was surprisingly rapid, however, and by

1739 St. John had 1,414 slaves while the number of adult white males
was actually below what i t had been in 1733.
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The racism prevalent in other West Indian slave societies
was found in the Danish islands as well and served to rationalize
slavery.

Richard Haagensen, a Dane who was employed by the West

India and Guinea Company on S t . Croix in the mid-eighteenth century,
wrote that the blacks were created for enslavement and worked happily
in the f i e l d s , singing as they labored.

"They are a l l evil by nature,

and l i t t l e that i s good can be found in them; indeed, i f I dare say
so, I truly believe that t h e i r black skin indicates they are evil
and that they are destined for slavery, so that they should not have
any freedom."

The slave revolt on S t . John was a frightening memory,

an event which demonstrated the cruelty of the slaves:

i t was "a

horrible rebellion which cannot but be constantly in our thoughts."
Harsh penalties are a necessity to deal with rebellious slaves, and
" i t i s necessary t o keep the slaves constantly a t work so that they
will have neither the time nor the energy to plot rebellion." 7 "^

^Orlando Patterson, The Sociology of Slavery; An Analysis
of the Origins, Development and Structure of Negro Slave Society in
Jamaica. (Rutherford: Fairleiqh Dickenson University Press, 1967),
pp. 274ff.
7 2Bro-J0rgensen,
7 3hlaagensen,

Dansk Vestindien, pp. 230-34.

Beskrivelse over S t . Croix, pp. 50-53.
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Hans West, a teacher on St. Croix in the l a t t e r part of the
eighteenth century, believed that the black skin of the Africans
equipped them well for labor under the tropical sun; indeed, "they
can be seen sleeping under the sun a t midday."

In addition to

having a foul odor, the slaves are physically inferior to northern
Europeans:

"The blacks lack the strong muscles, the broad shoulders,

and the appearance which demonstrates nordic s t r e n g t h . T h e slaves
are more fortunate than the poor in Denmark, for they need not worry
about obtaining t h e i r daily bread nor about what the future will
bring:

"no fear about the problems of feeble old age disturbs this

easily satisfied creature (denne njdisomheds s#n)." West ignored the
f a c t that slaves were allowed to starve when food was scarce and
could be freed t o subsist as beggars when they became too old to
work.

He argued that slaves actually were freer than many wealthy

whites who were slaves of fashion.

So content were the slaves,

according to West, that they soon came to prefer l i f e on S t . Croix
to l i f e in their native Africa and did not want to return home.
Yet i t was important, he added, to avoid letting the slaves think
their condition oppressive, for such thoughts could lead to a
dangerous s i t u a t i o n . ^
A more sympathetic and understanding view of the slaves was
held by J . C. Schmidt, a Norwegian doctor and administrator on the
plantations owned by the Schimmelmann family trust (det Schimmelmannske

7\lest,
75Ibid.,

Bidraq t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, pp. 25-26.
pp. 84-89, p. 104.

fideikommis), Schmidt knew the language spoken by the slaves and was
a careful observer.

He wrote:

They [the slaves] are far from being stupid or simple. I have
overheard them many times in the evening on the plantations
conducting very rational conversations and lines of argument
concerning the behavior and moral character of the whites;
the slaves are reserved and pretend to be very simple. They
are not vengeful, . . . and they must be tyrannized for a
long time before they consider rebel ling.7°
Another sympathetic eyewitness was the Moravian missionary
Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp, who lived in the Danish West
Indies in 1767-68.

According to him, "Unalterable necessity and

coercion make the slaves pliant [gesmeidig] so that they gradually
assume those slavish manners, some of which s t i l l cling to them
when they have obtained their freedom."^
Paul Erdmann I s e r t , a physician and amateur botanist born
in Brandenburg in 1756, lived in Danish Guinea from 1783 to 1786
and traveled to the interior of Africa, where he visited with
Africans in their villages and studied the fauna and flora.

Isert

served as a doctor under Governor Jens Adolph Ki0ge during the
l a t t e r ' s military campaigns against rebellious tribesmen along the
Volta R i v e r . ^

On October 7 , 1786, I s e r t , returning to Europe by

the only available means, sailed for S t . Croix on the Danish slave
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J . C. Schmidt, "Blandede Anmaerkninger, samlede paa og over
Eilandet S t . Kroix i Amerika," Samleren, No. 39, 1788, p. 232.
77

Christian Georg Andreas Oldendorp, Geschichte der Mission
der evangelischen Brdder auf den caraibischen Inseln S. Thomas,
S. Croix und S. Jan, (2 vols; Barby: 1777) I , p. 413.
^Thorkild Hansen, Slavernes 0er (Copenhagen:
1970), p. 247.

Gyldendal,
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ship "Christiansborg" under Captain Jens Jensen Berg.
36 crewmen and 452 slaves on board.

There were

On the second day a t sea there

was a slave insurrection during which I s e r t was seriously wounded
(see Appendix I I ) .

He had recovered by the time the "Christiansborg"

reached St. Croix two months l a t e r and spent three months on the
island, becoming a b i t t e r opponent of the slave trade and slavery.79
Isert was one of the few Europeans who had seen something
of the Africa that lay beyond the slave stations on the coast; he
was horrified by the contrast between the free blacks he had seen
in Africa'and their enslaved brethren on S t . Croix.
The atrocious t o i l and the beatings in conjunction with
a wretched d i e t soon combine either to kill the slave or else
leave him completely deformed, he who was once so well built.
Oh, what were you before? And what are you now? These sad
questions I have often asked myself when observing a gang of
these wretches with their driver. "
In sharp contrast to the portrait of the fortunate slave
drawn by West, Isert wrote that the slaves were worked very hard:
The normal treatment of these wretches in this region,
especially of those engaged in field labor, i s beyond a l l
that i s human. I saw--0h! that I had never seen it!—I saw
how as punishment for small, often imaginary transgressions
slaves are bound t o a stake in public and have their flesh
slashed apart by a whip! The backs of most of them bear for
l i f e the bloody evidence of their whippings. I t i s not always
enough merely to cut up a slave's skin, oh no, that would
involve insufficient suffering; one must attempt to tickle
him afterwards as well. Therefore the slave's wounds are

79

Paul Erdmann I s e r t , Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaisc.hen
Inseln in Columbien, in Briefen an seine Freunden beschreiben
(Copenhagen, 1788), p. 305.
^ I b i d . , p. 336. Note: All translations, unless otherwise
specified, have been made by the author.
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rubbed with Spanish pepper and s a l t . And what was the crime
which had earned the poor culprit such deathly pain? "The dog
has run amy'." roars the infuriated overseer. "Put an iron
collar with a pair of prongs on him so that one can recognize
him."
I once saw on a slave woman a singular device for weaning
a slave away from rum drinking, which in the slave's misery
i s the only pleasure he knows. She had over her entire head
a thin, metal mask, which was closed under her throat with
a lock. There were openings for the eyes and small openings
for the nose to l e t in a i r , but the slave woman could not
without permission, that i s , without having the mask unlocked,
eat or drink anything a t a l l . She was constantly to wear this
muzzle, day and n i g h t . 8 1 Oh, that this invention never reaches
northern Europe] for i f i t should, I fear a l l the houses would
swarm with such masked persons. Of course the north Europeans
would also wear these ornaments with greater dignity than do
the unhappy slaves.'82
Isert wrote that the slaves had t o work from before sunrise
until a f t e r sunset.

The bombas (black slave-drivers) were always

present and were quick t o use their whips.
A black slave has absolutely no rights. For no reason a t
all he can be clubbed half to death by a white to whom he i s
of no concern, and he may not hinder the white in the l e a s t .
If the slave were even t o raise his hand against the white, he
would incontestably f o r f e i t his l i f e . In f a c t , such a s t r i c t
code of justice i s necessary in order that the slaves be unable
to obtain time t o h i t upon the natural idea of rebelling—
various horrible examples of which one already has in the
Americas--but on the contrary be kept constantly sweating under
the yoke of tyranny.
But, say the defenders of slavery, the blacks are obstinate,
rotten people, addicted to thievery, t o riotous behavior and a l l

8 This was a common way of punishing slaves in Brazil, where
the physical treatment of slaves was probably as harsh as in the
West Indian sugar islands. But placing metal masks on slaves was
apparently unknown in the United States. See Carl N. Degler,
Neither White Nor Black; Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and
the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1971), p. 70.

I s e r t , Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln,
pp. 332-35.
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the vices which arise out here. And have we not here on
S t . Croix slaves who, i f they were asked whether they would
like to return to t h e i r fatherland, would answer no? To
these defenders of slavery I want nothing more than to answer
that i f they want to be converted from their beliefs, they can
take the trouble to travel to the interior of Africa, t o see
whether they will not find everywhere there signs of innocence
and the most honest people imaginable. Major vices, such as
murder and thievery, are almost unknown. These agents of
Belial rule only in places where the lure of European products
has reached thus f a r . Ach.' I fear the greater part of Africa
will soon be tainted. I t i s possible that a slave who i s used
here on S t . Croix as a chamber servant would have no desire to
return again to his fatherland, for things are tolerable for
him here and he i s uncertain whether, once back in Africa, he
would not be sold again to European slavers, in which case he
perhaps would not receive as good a job as he now has. But
ask the legions of field slaves what they would answer, i f they
knew beforehand that one was serious and really wanted to
return them to Africa. Yet what good does i t do that I join my
complaints about this most unnatural and unjust t r a f f i c with
the groans of brave philosophers about the great irresolvable
burden of the Europeans, to have partly wiped out or ruined
two entire continents of people!83
West, whose views on West Indian slavery were different from
I s e r t ' s , criticized I s e r t for making exaggerated judgments based on
insufficient experience in the West Indies and said I s e r t ' s writing
OA

"gives evidence of haste." 0

West showed pettiness by adding that

I s e r t erred in writing that carrots are grown on S t . Thomas, when in
fact everyone knows they are imported from North America.

"Thus one

learns anew, how easy i t i s t o make a mistake, when one describes the
nature of a region from preconceived views (af e t daekket

Bord)."85

Rapid growth of the slave population on S t . Croix a f t e r the
island's acquisition by the Danish company in 1733 led to fears of

^^Ibid., pp. 336-38.
^West, Bidrag t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 96.
8 5 Ibid..,

p. 333.

a revolt there;

nevertheless, the garrison remained small:

V.

in 1749 i t consisted of only fourteen soldiers, who were seldom
in condition to fight due to t h e i r t a s t e for "kill devil," the fresh
rum produced in the West Indies.

The percentage of whites in the

population of S t . Croix declined steadily as the number of slaves
rose; in 1755 whites comprised 13 per cent, in 1775 8 per cent, and
in 1803 slightly more than 6 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n . A plot
to i n i t i a t e a slave rising a t Christmas, 1759, was uncovered a few
weeks in advance; the suspected leader was the exiled son of a
slave executed on Antigua in 1736 for plotting a revolt, and was
07
described as intelligent and able to read and write.
Attempts to deal with the problem of runaway slaves were
largely unsuccessful.

There was a steady flow of runaways from the

Danish West Indies to Puerto Rico, some forty miles west of S t .
Thomas.

By 1745 an estimated 300 slaves had escaped from the Danish

islands to Puerto Rico. 8 8

Once in Puerto Rico a slave could easily

hide in the mountains, or else could obtain freedom by working a
year for the government and becoming a Catholic.

"Throughout the

eighteenth century Puerto Rico followed the practice of giving
asylum to fugitive slaves from non-Spanish islands, with very l i t t l e
variation from the principle t h a t , once they had embraced the Roman

Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave
Trade," p. 150.
8 7 Vibaek,

Dansk Vestindien, p. 156.

8 8 Bro-J0rgensen,

Dansk Vestindien, p. 224.
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Catholic religion, they were not t o be returned."®^

In 1767 the

governor of the Danish islands signed an agreement with his counter
part on Puerto Rico calling for mutual return of runaways, but the
measure was not enforced.

on

Runaways could also hide in the mountains in the north
western part of St. Croix.

Forty-eight free colored were recruited

from St. Thomas to hunt runaway slaves on S t . Croix a t mid-century,
but the runaways were in close touch with the plantation slaves and
were usually able to avoid capture.^
Though there were no laws in the Danish West Indies restricting
the power of the masters over their slaves and no legal rights for
slaves, they did enjoy certain de facto rights.

There was general

recognition, for instance, of the right of a slave t o marry as he
pleased, t o own property acquired by selling produce raised on the
small garden plots s e t aside for slaves t o grow food, and t o purchase
his freedom.
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Manumission, accomplished when a slave purchased his
freedom or was freed by his master, often in the l a t t e r ' s w i l l , was
sufficiently common to have created by the l a t e eighteenth century
a growing population of free colored in the towns; in Christiansted

89e1 sa Goveia, "The West Indian Slave Laws in the Eighteenth
Century," in Slavery in the New World, ed. by Foner and Genovese,
p. 116.
9 O H0st,

91
92

Efterretninqer om 0en Sanct Thomas, p. 159.

Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 275.
Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 146.
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on St. Croix there were approximately 800 free colored in 1790 out
of a total population of about 4,800.
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Though they were f r e e ,

they were not held in esteem by the whites; an ordinance of 1747 had
attempted to keep the free colored in a segregated part of
Christiansted. 9 ^

West thought "their freedom i s unfortunate for

themselves and for the society in which they live." 9 ^

Yet some of

them occupied significant positions in the local economy.

For

instance, nearly a l l of the sailors who manned the sloops and
schooners engaged in the inter-island trade were free colored; some
of them rose to become captains. 9 **
White hostility towards the free colored could be intense,
however, as shown by an unsigned, undated l e t t e r , written in Danish
interspersed with French, English, and Latin by a town b a i l i f f on
St. Croix and sent to a committee which in 1792 was assigned the
task of drawing up a new slave code for the Danish West Indies.

9 3 West,
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The

Bidrag t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 58.

Bro-J0rgensen, Dansk Vestindien, p. 257.

West, Bidrag t i l Beskrivelse over Ste. Croix, p. 59.
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Johan Peter Nissen, Reminiscenses of a 46 Years' Residence
in the Island of St. Thomas in the West Indies (Nazareth, Pa.:
Senseman and Co., 1838), p. 58. A mulatto captain named Iserum won
fame for his s k i l l s as a navigator, though he had never received any
training: he once supposedly sailed straight to Trinidad a f t e r
having been told only that the island lay somewhere south of Grenada,
where he had been before. H0st provides a l i s t of free colored on
St. Thomas in 1772, a t which time most were employed as carpenters,
t a i l o r s , construction workers, fishermen, s a i l o r s , and shoemakers;
two were planters. See H0st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas,
p. 170.

writer argued that slavery was not so much an economic as a social
necessity; i t was better for everyone that blacks were enslaved, and
manumission should be outlawed:

" I t ought to be t o t a l l y forbidden

for a white under any circumstances to free a slave and especially
a female slave without suffering the maximum capital loss," for the
free-colored are a "corrupt, pernicious race of vipers that a t the
very least ought to be reduced in numbers i f not extirpated (au
moins e t r e Diminuee sinon extirpee)."

The Danish government should

take note of what happened when the French National Assembly attempted
to ignore "the natural difference between blacks and whites" by
granting equality to the free colored on S t . Domingue, an event which
had disastrous consequences.
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I s e r t , describing a gruesome torture inflicted by a free
colored-woman on her female house slave, said the free colored were
even more barbaric than the whites in their treatment of slaves.
He referred to the free colored sarcastically as "that glorious
breed, the free mulattoes!

(die herliche Brut, die Freymulattenl)

or the cross (Mitteldinge) between Europeans and

Negroes.
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Until 1732 there was no systematic attempt to convert the
slaves in the Danish West Indies to Christianity.

In that year

Count Zinzendorf, leader of the Church of the United Brethren, or

07

Danish State Archives, Copenhagen, Vestindisk-guineisk
Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse.
Anonymous l e t t e r from St. Croix to the committee established in
1792 t o draw up a new slave code for the Danish West Indies.
^ I s e r t , Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln,
p. 333.

Moravians, launched a mission to convert the slaves in the Danish
islands.

Zinzendorf had been introduced to a Negro slave living

in Copenhagen and, inspired by the slave's t a l e of how much his
fellows in the West Indies would appreciate an opportunity t o
become Christians, decided to turn the evangelistic fervor of
the Moravians towards the goal
Danish West Indies.

of converting the slaves in the
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The Moravians gradually overcame the suspicions of the
planters and won general support for t h e i r mission—the planters
came to realize that the purely religious teaching of the missionaries
posed no threat to them; indeed, Christian slaves proved more obedient
and trustworthy than their pagan f e l l o w s . ^

By the end of the

eighteenth century there were two mission stations on each of the
three inhabited Danish islands, with the Moravians using slave labor
to operate their own plantations in order t o cover their expenses.
So accepted had the Moravians become that one of their Creole converts
became governor of the Danish West Indies in 1 7 9 6 . ^

Wherever the

missionaries established themselves in the West Indies in the
eighteenth century, they concentrated on religious instruction of

99h. Lawaetz, Brgidremenighedens Mission: Dansk-Vestindien,
1769-1848 (Copenhagen: J . Cohens Bogtryckkerier, 1902), pp. 20ff.
^ 0 0 01dendorp, Geschichte der Mission der evangelischen BrOder,
p. 5 of preface; I . K. Hegner, Fortsaettelse af David Cranzes Brfldres
Historie (Copenhagen, 1792), p. 97. Count Zinzendorf, on a v i s i t t o
S t . Thomas, argued that enslavement of Africans was divinely
sanctioned and cited the Bible to i l l u s t r a t e his view. See J . E.
Hutton, A History of Moravian Missions (London: Moravian Publication
Office, 1922), p. 44.
^Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 209ff.
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the slaves and saw no alternative but to accept the existing social
order.

in?
c
The mission of the Danish Lutheran Church, which lasted

from 1755 to 1799, accomplished l i t t l e other than to publish some
religious l i t e r a t u r e in the language of the slaves, creole Dutch
(hollandske kreolsk or bastardhollandsk), which was a simplified
Dutch with some African elements, used by the slaves t o communicate
among themselves and with t h e i r masters.

The language originated

on St. Thomas around 1700 and was largely replaced by English by
about the turn of the next century.
i t gradually disappeared.

During the nineteenth century
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Though relatively small and weak, Denmark, by virtue of
i t s possession of colonies in Africa and the West Indies, was able
to join with the larger European colonial powers in profiting from
the South Atlantic System, "a complex economic organism centered on
the production in the Americas of tropical staples for consumption
in Europe, and grown by the labor of Africans. 1 , 1 0 4

During the period

of company rule, sugar and cotton remained the chief exports of the
Danish West Indies.

These products were purchased from the planters

^ E l s a Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands
a t the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1965), pp. 272ff. The Moravians also established highly
successful missions in the British Leeward Islands a t Antigua (1756)
and St. Kitts (1774).
1 0 3 Vibaek,

1 f)4
(Madison:

Dansk Vestindien, pp. 195ff.

Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade; A Census
University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), p. 3.
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by the company factor and sold in Copenhagen.

In keeping with the

dominant economic ideas of the time, no sugar refining was permitted
in the islands, that task being reserved for Denmark, where the
company's sugar refinery enjoyed a very strong

p o s i t i o n . ^

In the years a f t e r 1754 sugar refining became the most
important industrial activity in Copenhagen.

In 1770 there were

twelve refineries there, producing sugar and syrup worth 760,000
rigsdaler.^

There were eleven refineries in other parts of the

, 107
monarchy.
Denmark supplied the islands primarily with luxury goods,
food, tools, and equipment for sugar production; the Gold Coast
exported slaves to the islands; North America sent timber and food;
Spanish America, agricultural animals and building equipment.^8
After the government took over the islands in 1754, i t sought t o
use the West Indies as sources of raw materials for Danish industry
and to reserve them as a market for Danish products J
The wars of the second half of the eighteenth century proved
highly beneficial t o Danish foreign trade and shipping, as Danish
merchants took advantage of t h e i r country's neutral status t o supply

^ 0 5 Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers {Jkonomiske Historie,
pp. 91-92.
106

Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 73.

^ 0 7 Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 75.
108
Sveistrup, De Dansk-Vestindiske 0ers tfkonomiske Historie,
p. 97.
109
Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 60.
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the West Indian colonies of the warring powers, in particular the
French and, t o a lesser extent, the Dutch islands.^®

The man who

laid the foundations for this so-called golden age of Danish commerce
was Johan Hartvig Ernst Bernstorff, foreign minister in the reign
of Frederik V; Bernstorff stressed the importance of overseas trade
combined with a policy of n e u t r a l i t y . ^

During the Seven Years'

War the number of ships sailing from .Copenhagen to the West Indies
increased rapidly from a yearly average of 4.2 in the period 1751-55
112
to 13.5 from 1756-60, and reached 23.2 from 1761-65.
During the
War of the American Revolution Danish foreign trade again experienced
a major boom:

in 1780, 90 Danish ships sailed to the West Indies;

in 1781, 135; and. in 1782, 226.

Copenhagen was the most important

port in the Danish monarchy—in 1780, 70 per cent of the ships
bound for the West Indies sailed from i t , and in 1782, 50 per cent.
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Imports from the West Indies into Copenhagen in 1782-83 reached
4,498,259 riqsdaler, surpassing those from Europe (2,323,290) for the
first time.^4

iTOjens Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t 1784-1830, Vol. X of Danmarks
Historie, ed. by John Danstrup and Hal Koch (14 v o l s . ; Copenhagen:
Politikens Forlag, 1964), p. 161.
l^Marius Vibaek, Den danske Handels Historie (Copenhagen:
Nordisk Forlag, 1932), p. 223.
^Sveistrup,

De dansk Vestindiske 0ers 0konomiske Historie,

p. 93.
1 1 3 01e

Feldbaek, Dansk Neutralitetspolitik under Krigen
1778-1783 (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1971), p. 191.
. l ^ s v e i s t r u p and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 50.
Imports from Asia remained f a r greater than from either of the former.

As the only Baltic s t a t e with significant tropical colonies,
Denmark enjoyed a great advantage over her neighbors.
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Sugar

from the Danish West Indies was available in such quantity that i t
became an important part of Denmark's exports t o the Baltic area,
as well as supplying a l l of Denmark's needs.

In 1778, exports of

syrup, refined sugar, and muscavado (brown sugar, from the
Portuguese menos, l e s s , arid acabado, finished^®) amounted t o
65.7 per cent of total exports from Copenhagen; in 1784, the figure
was 50.3 per cent.

The most important Baltic markets for Danish

sugar were Prussia, Sweden, and Russia.

In 1778 and 1784, sugar

products accounted for 68.4 and 45.8 per cent of total exports from
Copenhagen to Prussia; 50.4 and 63.8 per cent of total exports from
Copenhagen to Sweden; and 20.2 and 58.4 per cent of total exports
from Copenhagen to Russia.

Among industrial exports from Copenhagen

in 1778 and 1784, refined sugar and syrup accounted for between 80
and 90 per cent of the t o t a l .

Export of sugar, including muscavado,

was of overwhelming importance for Denmark's balance of t r a d e . ^
Sugar made the Danish West Indies an important source of
wealth for Denmark, and i t was reasonable to assume that the govern-

^^Sweden acquired the tiny island of S t . Bartholomew from
France in 1784, but with i t s small population of 950, over half of
whom were white, and a size of only eight square miles, S t .
Bartholomew never became more than a small trading station. See
Sten Carlsson, Svensk historia (2d. e d . ; Stockholm: Svenska
Bokftirlaget/Bonniers, 1964), I I , 222-23.

n fiNoel

Deerr, The History of Sugar (2 vols.; London:
Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1949), 1 , 109.
^ S v e i s t r u p and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel,
pp. 122-26.

merit would continue to encourage the production of raw sugar in
the islands.

In 1784 the Danish islands were thriving colonies,

but they were dependent on the labor of Negro slaves, who were so
4)
exploited and mistreated that t h e i r numbers could be maintained
only by means of the slave trade.

There was no indication that in

just eight years the Danish government would condemn the slave
trade and s e t a deadline for ending i t .

CHAPTER I I
Ernst Schimmelmann and the Prelude to Abolition
The decision to abolish the Danish slave trade was
facilitated by the oligarchic nature of Danish absolutism in the
late eighteenth century and by the presence within the ruling e l i t e
in the period after 1784 of men who favored a broad range of reforms.
The men in power a f t e r 1784 inaugurated an era of reform which has
been called "perhaps the happiest period" in Danish hi s t o r y J
King Christian VII (1766-1808) was mentally i l l during
a l l but the very f i r s t years of his reign.

This circumstance

enabled f i r s t Johan Friedrich Struensee, from 1770 to 1772, and
thereafter the king's stepmother, Juliana Maria, second wife of
Frederik V, to rule Denmark through the King, who merely signed
O
documents placed before him.
For twelve years following the over
throw of Struensee, Juliana Maria and her favorite, Ove H0eghGuldberg, a doctrinnaire conservative, ruled Denmark.

This so-called

Guldberg regime revoked most of the reforms inaugurated by Struensee,

^Vibaek, Reform og F a l l i t , 1784-1830, Vol. X of Danmarks
Historie, p. 35.
^Svend Cedergren Bech, Oplysning og Tolerance, 1721-1784,
Vol. IX of Danmarks Historie, ed. by John Danstrup and Hal Koch
(14 vols.; Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1965), pp. 408ff.
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including freedom of the press.

I t also ended recent moves toward

improving the position of the peasants, and in general represented
an attitude hostile to the ideas of refqrm which Struensee had
sought to apply to Danish society.

3

The young Crown Prince, Frederik, son of Christian VII,
was sixteen in 1784.

Outraged a t the insults he had suffered a t

the hands of the ruling clique, Frederik gave his support t o
organizing a conspiracy to overthrow theGuldberg regime; prominent
among the conspirators was the nephew of J . H. E. Bernstorff,
Count Andreas Peter Bernstorff, who had been removed from his
position as foreign minister by Guldberg a few years before.

On

April 14, 1784, the Crown Prince, a t a meeting of the Council of
State (Statsraadet),

got the king to sign a document ordering an

end to the Guldberg regime.^

Thenceforth every royal order was to

be signed by both the King and the Crown Prince.

By weakening the

power of the King, this measure actually violated the King's Law
(Kongeloven) of 1665, which was the legal basis for Danish absolutism,
and which had no provision for removing a king in case of insanity.^
The new regime sought to modernize Danish society and apply
to Denmark some of the social and economic ideas of the enlightenment.

3Ibid.,

pp. 492ff.

^Vibaek, Reform oq F a l l i t , pp. 21ff.
^Edvard Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie f r a den store nordiske
Krigs slutninq t i l Rigernes Adskillelse, 1720-1814 (7 vols.l
Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1896-1909). Vol. VI, Part I : Styrelse
og Reformer, 1784-1791, pp. 1-2.
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A small group of reform-minded ministers actually governed the
country with the consent of Crown Prince Frederik until Bernstorff's
death in 1797, a f t e r which the Crown Prince increasingly took power
into his own hands.^

The leading ministers were well-educated,

cosmopolitan men who opposed arbitrary governmental interference
in the lives of the people; they were certainly not modern democrats
and favored a tolerant, aristocratic rule.

For them the ideal type

of government was that of England.^
Denmark had been a strongly centralized s t a t e since 1661,
under the rule of an absolute monarch.

In i t s efforts to achieve

reform the Danish central government, unlike the governments of other
monarchies such as France and Austria, did not have to contend with
dangerous opposition from powerful privileged bodies such as
parlements and provincial assemblies; the Danish nobility posed no
O
threat to the monarchy.
Yet the government, when devising important
laws affecting Danish society, did have to consider the views of
the public.

The days when, as under the early absolute monarchy, the
q
government could pretend to ignore public sentiment were past.
Freedom of the press was once again in effect a f t e r 1786,

®Aage F r i i s , Axel Linvald, and M. Mackeprang, e d . , Schultz
Danmarkshistorie; vort folks Historie qennem Tiderne (6 v o l s . ;
Copenhagen: J . H. Schultz Forlag, 1941-43), Vol. IV, Part I ,
Opl.ysningens Tidsalder, by Axel Linvald, p. 10.
?Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t , pp. 35-36.
O
Linvald, Schultz Danmarks Historie, IV, Part 1 , p. 10.
g
Holm, Danmark-Norges Histories VI, Part 1 , p. 85.
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when the police were forbidden to interfere with the journals.
Between 1770, when press freedom was f i r s t permitted under Struensee,
and 1800, 116 new journals were s t a r t e d Y o u n g e r reformers
such as Count Ernst Schimmelmann (1747-1831) and Count Christian
Ditlev Reventlow wanted to use the press t o e n l i s t public support
for t h e i r views in their struggle with conservatives in the govern
ment.

They could hope t o obtain the backing of the public because

support for reform was widespread in Copenhagen in the years a f t e r
1784. 1 1
The three leading ministers were Bernstorff, Reventlow,
and Schimmelmann.

Each was born t o great wealth and educated for

a career in government, and they were closely connected by friendshp
and marriage.

Although there was resentment a t their German back

ground, they were p a t r i o t s with a genuine desire t o serve

Denmark.^

Bernstorff was foreign minister and the dominant figure in the Council
of State, where final decisions were made on the recommendations of
the departments; that Bernstorff was held in awe by Crown Prince
Frederik was an important reason for the power which he, along with
Reventlow and Schimmelmann, was able to

exercise.^

Reventlow was

head of the Treasury Department (Rentekammeret) and a member of the
Board of Trade; he i s best known as the architect of the great

^Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t , pp. 186-87.
^Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part 1 , pp. 42-43, 88.
^Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t , pp. 34ff.
13
Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I , p. 4.

agricultural reforms which included the decree of 1788 liberating
peasants from the StavnsbaandSchimmelmann held the t i t l e of
Finance Minister and was head of the Board of Trade and of the
Board of Finance; he was primarily responsible for the decree of
1792 on the abolition of the slave trade.
I t was Schimmelmann and Christian Ditlev Reventlow "who
took the i n i t i a t i v e in by far the greatest number of governmental
decisions concerning Denmark's internal development and conditions
which characterized the l a s t sixteen years of the eighteenth century."^
Schimmelmann's reformist inclinations can be seen from a l e t t e r he
wrote to Reventlow on June 28, 1788, eight days a f t e r the decree
abolishing the Stavnsbaand had been issued:
How I hope, dear Reventlow, that your desires may be
f u l f i l l e d for both of us, that we may exert a l l of our strength
in order t o advance the good cause. S t i l l there i s much l e f t
to do; our efforts must be devoted both to getting men who
share our goals to join with us, and to promoting the spread of
that s p i r i t which guides us, so that i t can become ever more
common. Only then can we hope to see great and swift resultsJ6

l^The Stavnsbaand had been initiated in 1733; i t forced male
peasants from childhood to middle age to remain on the estate where
they had been raised. The official reasoning behind the Stavnsbaand
was the need to guarantee that each d i s t r i c t could supply a sufficient
number of soldiers; in fact the Stavnsbaand became a means of
insuring that the estate owners had a large enough labor supply. A
gradual abolition of the Stavnsbaand was decreed on June 20, 1788;
freed instantly were male peasants under 14 and over 36 years of age.
For those in between, the Stavnsbaand was to continue in effect for
another twelve years.
^Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I , p. 46.
1 fi
Louis Bobe", Efterladte papirer fra den Reventlowske
Familiekreds i Tidsrummet 1770-1827 (10 vols.; Copenhaqen: Lehm &
Stage, 1895-1931), IV, 31-32.
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Bernstorff served as the great spokesman in the Council
of State for the reforms Reventlow and Schimmelmann sought.
Without Bernstorff's assistance the l a t t e r two could never have
overcome the opposition of conservative members of the government,
for they depended on Bernstorff's a b i l i t y to influence the young
Crown P r i n c e . ^
Schimmelmann, born in Dresden, had moved t o Denmark with
his father, Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann, when the l a t t e r ' s success
as a merchant in Hamburg brought him t o the attention of the Danish
government in 1761.

At that time the elder Schimmelmann's wealth

was estimated a t 1,250,000 rigsdaler J 8
Danish finances were in a deplorable condition, and i t
was believed that a man of Schimmelmann's a b i l i t y and reputation
could obtain favorable loans abroad f o r the s t a t e .
in charge of the effort to reduce the debt.

He was placed

To accomplish t h i s

task he resorted to the sale of crown property J 9

Exploiting his

position for his own personal gain, the elder Schimmelmann in 1763
purchased the four plantations in the West Indies and the sugar
refinery in Copenhagen which the Crown had taken over from the West
India and Guinea Company in 1755.

For them he paid, in eight annual,

interest-free installments, 400,000 rigsdaler, a low price for such

1 7 Holm,

Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I , p. 47.

0. Bro-J0rgensen, Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann: en Studie
i Skatmesterens Fortid (Copenhagen: Fremad, 1970), p. 197.
^Bech, Opl.ysninq oq Tolerance, Vol. IX in Danmarks Historie,
pp. 399-400.

valuable properties.

The plantations and sugar refinery became an

important part of the Schimmelmann family

holdings.

20

Ernst Schimmelmann, who was well-educated and t r i l i n g u a l ,
rose rapidly in the Danish government under the patronage of his
father.

Made a member of the Board of Trade in 1773, he became

head of that department and a member of the Board of Finance three
years l a t e r .

Following the overthrow of the Guldberg Regime in

1784, he became head of the Board of Finance and received the t i t l e
of Finance Minister.

In 1788 he obtained a seat in the Council of

State, where he was an a l l y of Bernstorff and a proponent of reform.^
Schimmelmann's f i r s t wife died five years a f t e r they were
married.

In 1782 he married Charlotte Schubart, an i n t e l l i g e n t ,

well-educated woman, s i s t e r of the wife of Ludwig Reventlow, who
was the brother of Christian Ditlev Reventlow and himself an
important figure in Danish government a f t e r 1784.^
Countess Charlotte Schimmelmann became the leading hostess
in the social world of the intellectual and governmental e l i t e in
Copenhagen.

At her salon poets, diplomats, intellectuals, and

prominent figures in the government discussed philosophy and politics
in an atmosphere receptive to the l a t e s t ideas and fashions.

So many

foreigners were present a t these salons that a guest could get the

Of)

Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, p. 8.

pi

C. F. Bricka, e d . , Dansk Bioqrafisk Lexikon, t i l l i q e
omfattende Norqe for Tidsrummet 1537-1814 (20 vols.; Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1887-1906), XV, 132-133.
^Vibaek, Reform oq Fall i t , pp. 53-54.
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impression of being in Germany or France rather than in Denmark.

23

The elder Schimmelmann died in 1782, leaving an inheritance
of three million r i g s d a l e r . ^

The plantations, sugar refineries,

and an arms factory were placed under a t r u s t (fideikommis) in
which Ernst Schimmelmann was the main partner. The most valuable
properties of the Schimmelmann family were the plantations on
St. Croix, which in 1779 were valued a t 850,000 rigsdaler, and two
sugar refineries in Copenhagen then valued a t 145,000 rigsdaler.

25

The Schimmelmann plantations and sugar refineries were very
profitable enterprises.
sold in Norway:

Much of the sugar from the refineries was

in 1793, when total sugar sales of the Schimmelmann

refineries amounted to 334,000 rigsdaler, 240,000 were from sales in
Norway.

Profits that year from the sugar refineries totaled 62,552

^Holm, Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part 2, Forskjellige
Samfundsforhold og indre Tilstande, 1784-1799. p. 373"] Schimmelmann
gave financial support t o many Danish and foreign intellectuals,
such as the Danish poets Jens Baggesen and Adam Oehlenschlaeger,
and the German writer Johann Friedrich von Schiller. Schimmelmann
and the Duke of Augustenborg wrote to Schiller: "Accept t h i s o f f e r ,
noble man! Do not l e t our t i t l e s lead you to decline i t . We know
no other sign of greatness than to be human beings, citizens of
the great republic whose borders include more than the l i f e of
one generation, more than this planet. We are only human beings,
your brothers, not vain men of high rank." Cited in Vibaek, Reform
oq Fall i t , p. 55.
OA
Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t , p. 50. Danish rigsdaler prior
t o 1813 were valued a t 390 t o 375 English grains fine s i l v e r , which
was somewhat greater, for instance, than the value of the German
Convention thaler in the second half of the eighteenth century. See
Alexander Del Mar, A History of the Monetary Systems of France and
Other European States (New York: The Cambridge Encyclopedia Co.,
1903), pp. 301, 352-53, 358-59.
Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 114.
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rigsdaler; from the sugar plantations, 171,132.

p/r

The number of

slaves on Schimmelmann's St. Croix plantations remained f a i r l y
constant from 1773 to 1782 a t about 9 6 0 . ^
The Schimmelmann estate also included an armaments factory
a t Hellebaek, landed estates in Jutland and on Zealand, and a
palatial home in Copenhagen.

After his f a t h e r ' s death Ernst

Schimmelmann purchased a copper-works, an industrial establishment
in Jutland which produced bricks, earthenware, and soap, and halfownership in a paper mill.
Schimmelmann was also deeply involved in overseas trading
ventures as a director of major trading companies in which he had
large investments.

During the War of the American Revolution, when

Danish West Indian trade expanded rapidly by taking advantage of
Danish neutrality and the temporary inability of Britain to enforce
the Rule of 1756, the government supported the creation of chartered
trading companies which were largely controlled by and heavily
dependent on the Crown.^

The largest of these companies was the

^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen. Ernst Schimmelmanns
Privat Arkiv, Pk. 72, Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer 1782-1800,
Vortrag zur Generalversammlung, May 1794, p. 4.
2 7 Danish

State Archives, Copenhagen. Vestindisk-guineisk
Rente samt General to!dkammer, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen
t i l Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse samt Efterretninger
om Negerhandelen i Vestindien , Tabelle (lber die Neger auf den zum
Gr&flich v. Schimmelmannschen Familien Fideicommis gehtJrenden
Plantagen auf St. Croix.
20
29

Vibaek, Reform og Fall i t , pp. 51-52.
Feldbaek, DanskNeutralitetspolitikpp. 53ff.

Royal West India Company (Kongeligt Vestindisk Handelsselskab)
created in 1778.

Of the six directors of the company, five were

members of the government, including both Heinrich Carl Schimmelmann
and Ernst Schimmelmann; the l a t t e r became chairman of the board
(f0rste direkt0r) and invested 20,000 rigsdaler in the company.
The company's requests for assistance from the government were
usually sympathetically received.

30

The West India Company was granted the right t o customs
duties and anchorage and weighing fees on S t . Thomas and S t . John
in return for a yearly payment of 16,000 rigsdaler.

Most important,

however, the company was to receive the income from import duties
and excise taxes on coffee imported into the Danish monarchy in
return for an annual payment of 20,000 rigsdaler.

The Crown also

favored the company by granting i t interest-free loans and free use
of a warehouse on St. Thomas, and by promoting sales of company
stock.

Unlike the former West India and Guinea Company, i t had no

monopoly on the trade with the West Indies; nor did the share
holders have any say in the policies of the company or in the
selection of i t s d i r e c t o r s . ^
Schimmelmann was also chairman of the board of the
Baltic-Guinea Company (0sters0isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab),
established in 1781.

This company represented an attempt t o connect

30

P. P. Sveistrup, "Det Kongelige Danske oktroyerede
Vestindiske Handelsselskab, 1778-85; en drifts0konomisk Unders0gelse,
Historisk Tidsskrift, 10th s e r i e s , VI (1942-44), 389ff.
^ I b i d . , pp. 387-88.

the Baltic trade with the African trade; i t received a monopoly
on trade with the Gold Coast, which meant i t was to be heavily
involved in the slave trade.

To help the company maintain the

f o r t s on the Gold Coast, the Crown gave the company a yearly sum
of 25,000 rigsdaler.

The company also benefited from export

premiums on Danish goods traded on the Gold Coast in exchange for
slaves, gold, and ivory.

The board of directors was selected by

the Crown from the ranks of the government bureaucracy, and
shareholders were without influence on company policy.

The Crown

gave the Baltic-Guinea Company thirty-seven ships formerly used in
the Greenland and Guinea trade, as well as warehouses and a shipyard
in Copenhagen. 3 ^
In 1783, with the end of the War of the American Revolution,
the circumstances which had helped create a boom in Danish overseas
commerce ended.

The harbor a t S t . Thomas, which a f t e r the English

attack on S t . Eustatius in 1781 had been the most important entrepot
in the West Indies, often containing between three and four hundred
ships, in the spring of 1785 was visited by only five ships.

Income

from customs duties in Copenhagen f e l l from 731,689 rigsdaler in
1783 to 490,505 in 1787.

Exports from Copenhagen f e l l from 1,503,032

rigsdaler in 1784 to 1,064,057 in 1785, and to 609,937 rigsdaler
in 1790. 3 3
op

Knud Klem, "Det kgl. oktr. 0sters0isk-Guineiske
Handelsselskab," Handels-og S0fartsmuseets Aarbflger. 1970, p. 16,
18, 12. Among the ships that were to be used in the slave trade was
the "Baron Ernst von Schimmelmann."
3 3 Holm,

Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I , p. 166.

The great Danish overseas trading companies created during
the war were doomed with the return of peace.

The profitable trade

with the French West Indies ended in February 1783 when France
banned trade by foreign vessels with the French colonies.

Other

countries soon restored pre-war trade restrictions, thereby dealing
a fatal blow t o both the Danish West India Company and the BalticGuinea Company. 34

The Crown had been primarily responsible for

the creation of these companies and had induced several thousand
families to invest in them; i t was now urged by the Board of Trade
to do everything in i t s power t o help the companies overcome t h e i r
difficulties.35
In 1785 the directors of the West India Company asked the
Crown t o buy up the company's stock a t 300 rigsdaler per share,
three times the original price, and said the government could
operate the company a t a p r o f i t , something the directors had given
up all hope of doing themselves.

The Board of Trade and the

Board of Finance agreed to pay the shareholders 260 rigsdaler
per share, despite the admitted fact that the shares then had a
market value of only 60 rigsdaler each.

The Crown's generosity

was probably due to Schimmelmann's position as a major shareholder
and chairman of the board; as head of the Board of Trade and the
Board of Finance, he was in a position to reward himself with
s t a t e funds.

Schimmelmann was not so self-denying as t o refuse to

•^Sveistrup, "Det Vestindiske Handelsselskab," p. 412.
3 5 Holm,

Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I , p. 153.

.

.

.
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make money a t the expense of the s t a t e and the taxpayers.

From

the sale of his stock in the company a t 260 rigsdaler, his
remuneration as chairman of the board, and the dividends he earned
on his stock during the boom, Schimmelmann enriched himself by
50,000 rigsdaler more than he could have earned by investing his
money in a bank a t normal interest.

Other government o f f i c i a l s

profited, too, though not as much as Schimmelmann.
The Baltic-Guinea Company also had problems when the war
ended.

In an attempt to improve the company's situation, the Crown

in 1786 cancelled 1,150,000 rigsdaler of the comapny's debt t o
the s t a t e , and gave the company 400,000 rigsdaler.

37

S t i l l the

company's prospects were poor.
Schimmelmann, seeking a solution to the problems of the
Baltic-Guinea Company, in 1786 sent D. G. Moldenhawer, a professor
of theology a t the University of Copenhagen, on a secret mission t o
Spain with the primary goal of obtaining for the Danish company the
right t o sell slaves in the Spanish American colonies.

Moldenhawer

was also to attempt to trade some of the Danish African f o r t s for
Spanish recognition of Denmark's right t o occupy the uninhabited but

•^Sveistrup, "Det Vestindiske Handelsselskab," pp. 422ff.
Ernst Schimmelmann lacked his father's all-consuming interest in
business and has often been viewed as a poor businessman. See Axel
Linvald, Kronprins Frederik og hans Regering, 1797-1807 (Copenhagen:
G. E. C. Gads Foriag, 1923), p. 349. I t would seem more accurate
to regard him as a man highly adept a t making money, not least by
using his position in the government to promote his own financial
well-being.
37|<lem, "Det 0sters0isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab," p. 41.

f e r t i l e Crab Island off the coast of Puerto Rico.

op

Nothing

came of Moldenhawer's negotiations with Count Floridablanca, however;
Spain could purchase slaves cheaper from the English and did not
want to abandon i t s claim to Crab Island.
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Schimmelmann finally arranged to have the greatest merchant
in Denmark, Frederic de Coninck, take over the trade of the BalticGuinea Company; de Coninck believed he could make a profit where
the company could not.

Accordingly, the government bought up the

stock of the Baltic-Guinea Company a t seventy rigsdaler per share,
well below the original price of 100 but nearly twice the current
value.40

The government then signed a contract with de Coninck,

granting him the former company's possessions and a monopoly on
trade with Danish Guinea, in return for his payment of a sum well
under that which the government i t s e l f had paid for the shares of the
Baltic-Guinea Company; a l l together the government l o s t more than
two million rigsdaler on the Baltic-Guinea Company.^

Schimmelmann

secretly acquired 24,000 rigsdaler worth of stock in de Coninck's
new slave-trading venture.

Schimmelmann probably received this stock

OO

E. Gigas, "En theologisk Professors diplomatiske Mission,"
Historisk Tidsskrift, 8th s e r i e s , I (1907-08), 185ff.
39Ibid.,

p. 227.

^Klem, "Det 0stersj6isk-Guineiske Handelsselskab," p. 44
and p. 48.
4 1 Holm,

Danmark-Norges Historie, VI, Part I , pp. 156-57.
The contract said that de Coninck would continue the Guinea trade
for twenty-eight years, with the regulations governing the trade
under the Baltic-Guinea Company to continue a t least for the time
being.
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as a g i f t from de Coninck in appreciation for assistance t o
de Coninck in completing the transaction.

AO

The Danish government had been concerned not only by the
poor performance of the Baltic-Guinea Company but by the tendency
of the slave population on S t . Croix to decline.

Between 1780

and 1790 the number of slaves on S t . Croix f e l l from 22,687 t o
22,119. 4 3

The number of slaves sold was not sufficient t o maintain

the slave population.
From 1778 to 1789 the overwhelming majority of slaves
transported by Danish slavers from Africa to the. Americas were sold
in foreign colonies rather than in the Danish islands.

Danes bought

17,113 slaves in Africa, an average of 1,426 per year.

Of these,

12,062 were bought a t the Danish f o r t s on the Gold Coast; but only
6,229 slaves were sold by Danish slave ships in the Danish West
Indies.

In 1784 and 1785 there were eight Danish ships involved in

the slave trade; these were the peak years, corresponding t o the
end of the War of the American Revolution. 4 4
t o St. Croix came directly from Africa.

Not a l l slaves brought

At Frederiksted, the town

on the western end of the island, slaves were imported from other
parts of the Caribbean, especially from the English Leeward Islands. 4 5
AO

Julius Schovelin, Den danske Handelsempire; Forhold og
Personer i det 18 Aarhundredes sidste Halvdel (2 vols.; Copenhagen:
Nordiske Forlag, 1899), I I , 135,
4 3 "Forestillingen

angaaende Negerhandelens Afskaffelse,"
Minerva, April 1792, p. 64.
44Ibid.,

pp. 53-54. See Appendix I I I .
45
Green-Pedersen, "The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave
Trade," p. 155.
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Foreigners were allowed to s e l l slaves a t St. Thomas by
an edict of 1785 which was intended to help that island become
a center of the t r a n s i t slave trade.

In 1785-1786, and 1789-1790,

only about 25 per cent of the slaves brought to S t . Thomas were
retained for labor there and on S t . John; the r e s t were exported
t o other colonies in the Caribbean, in particular to Cuba, Puerto
Rico, and Santo Domingo.

Slaves from the Dutch, English, and

French Lesser Antilles were also funneled through S t . Thomas for
AC

sale to the Spanish islands in the Greater Antilles.
On April 28, 1787, the Board of Finance sent to the General
Customs Department for i t s consideration some proposals for improving
the slave trade.

The l a t t e r department decided to obtain suggestions

from the government of the Danish West Indies and on May 15 sent
the Finance Department's l e t t e r on to S t . Croix.

The sixteen-page

report sent back to Copenhagen by the government on S t . Croix, dated
October 15, 1787, contained introductory remarks which, surprisingly,
condemned the slave trade and slavery:
So long as the black color, despite philosophy, i s the mark
of servitude on many thousands of people, so long as one
continues to believe that the West Indian colonies can be
cultivated only by slaves, so long as people can be exchanged
for gold and s i l v e r , and so long as the European nations
compete t o see who shall enjoy the greatest advantage in t h i s
unnatural trade and who shall be most successful a t increasing
the number of slaves, so long as these conditions e x i s t , a
sensitive business expert [en f01som Handelsk.yndig] must s t i f l e
every cry of freedom and sympathy in his bosom. He must consider
himself to represent a s t a t e , and s t a t e s , as we know, are aware
of no more important law than to seek to become richer than

4 6 jjbjd^.,

pp. 162ff.
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their neighbor . . . .
In the European balance Denmark i s not rich enough (nor
does i t s example seem likely to be strong enough) to be able
to free a l l the slaves from t h e i r bonds wherever the Danish
flag f l i e s , and to cause a revolution in the Guinea trade.
That honor seems to be reserved f o r a richer nation and a
more favorable era. We therefore should now, as instructed,
furnish our views concerning means by which the slave trade
can be made most profitable for Denmark and the Danish colonies,
and forget the disagreeable aspects involved in such an
investigation. However, surrounded as we are by enslaved
blacks, we find consolation in the thought of beinq able t o
contribute to making t h e i r circumstances bearable. 2 "
These words of sympathy for the slaves and of d i s t a s t e for
the "unnatural trade" are a l l the more remarkable in view of the
l a t e r role which their primary author, Governor-General Ernst Frederik
von Walterstorff, was to play as a leading spokesman for those wishing
t o resume the slave trade after i t s cessation in January 1803.

In

1787 Walterstorff, who had married into the planter class on S t . Croix,
probably f e l t that an expression of humanitarian sentiment would
favorably impress his superiors in the Danish government without
actually leading t o anything that would endanger the prosperity of
the planters.

Yet his criticism of the slave trade and slavery could

only have been encouraging to those high o f f i c i a l s in Copenhagen who
favored abolition.
The report was unsympathetic towards the Baltic-Guinea

^Danish State Archives, Copenhagen. Vestindisk-guineisk
Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse.
Bemaerkninger ved den, Regieringen, igiennem det kongelige vestindiske
Kammer h. d. 15de Maii 1787, tilsendte Extract af det kongl:
Finants-Collegii Skrivelse d.d. 28de April e . a . , angaaende Slavehandelen, og den sikkerste Maade, ievnligen directe a t forsyne Ste.
Crux med de forn0dne Negre (Report of the government of the Danish
West Indies on the slave trade and the best way of guaranteeing
S t . Croix a regular supply of slaves), October 15, 1787.
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Company.

I t argued that the company had not supplied S t . Croix

with enough slaves and had sold slaves on other islands where prices
were h i g h e r . ^
The report noted the complaints made by the Baltic-Guinea
Company that prices for slaves were too low on St. Croix to make
the slave trade to the Danish islands profitable.

The report

then suggested that prices in the French islands had been unusually
high during the f i r s t years of the 1780s due t o the influence of
the War of the American Revolution, "when the French islands had
virtually no supply of slaves, except what the Danish Guinea Company
and Portuguese ships could supply them, which meant that prices for
slaves had t o be higher in the French colonies, where there were
more buyers [than in the Danish islands]."

Other reasons were given

for the greater profitability of slave-trading to the French islands
(see Appendix VI), but the report argued that the Baltic-Guinea Company
could sell slaves to the Danish islands a t a considerable profit i f
only the company followed certain basic rules of commerce listed in
the report and said t o be of great importance for success especially
in the slave trade.

The colonial government calculated the average

price a t which slaves were sold on S t . Croix between 1778-1787 a t
214 riqsdaler and estimated the total cost of bringing each slave
to St. Croix a t 94 riqsdaler i f purchased with rum, and 140 riqsdaler

^The company was not required to sell i t s slaves in the
Danish islands, yet i t s monopoly on trade with the Danish Guinea f o r t s
made i t virtually impossible for private Danish merchants t o
participate in the slave trade.
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i f purchased with European merchandise.

Therefore the company

should have earned excellent profits from the slave trade to S t .
Croix.
The government of the West Indies wrote that instructions
received from the Management of the Royal Guinea Trade (den
kongelige Guineiske Handels Direktion) in Copenhagen in 1781 had
resulted in the sale of only the weakest and s i c k l i e s t slaves
(Udskudsvarer) on St. Croix while the better half of each slave
cargo was sent on to St. Thomas for sale to foreigners.^®

These

instructions, the report said, had given r i s e to a hatred among the
planters towards the Baltic-Guinea Company, for they had thought that
the company was designed to supply S t . Croix frequently with healthy
slaves.

The report said the average price of 214 rigsdaler per

slave sold on St. Croix was rather low, considering the risks
involved in the slave trade; i t insisted that this low price was
not caused by specific local conditions on S t . Croix but rather by
abundant "bad luck" [Uheld] and the poor condition of slaves offered
for sale on the island.
Part of the reason for the wretched condition of the
company's slaves, according to the report, could be found in the
fact that some of the company's ships had originally been constructed

^Report of the government of the Danish West Indies on the
slave trade, October 15, 1787, pp. 2-5.
^But i t was not true that approximately half of each slave
cargo was sent to S t . Thomas. The government's own enclosed data
contradicts this statement. See Appendix IV.

for use in whaling; also, the surgeons on the Baltic-Guinea
Company's slave ships were characterized by lack of knowledge and
s k i l l [Uvidenhed og Uk.yndighed].

Worst of a l l , in 1782 and 1783,

years when demand for slaves was high in the French colonies, the
company had sold no slaves on St. Croix.

The average number of

slaves sold by Danish slavers on St. Croix between 1778 and 1787 was
508 annually.

But the colonial government argued that S t . Croix

needed a t least three times that many.

I t would therefore not be

harmful t o the planters were the company t o lose i t s monopoly on trade
with the Danish Guinea f o r t s . 51
The report suggested that all Danish vessels, including
those from St. Croix but not those from S t . Thomas (ships from the
l a t t e r island were too likely to be owned by foreigners), should be
permitted to participate in the slave trade from Danish Guinea; i t
also listed other changes which i t f e l t should be made in the rules
regulating trade t o St. Croix. 5 2

Foreign ships, the report

advised, should not be allowed t o participate in the slave trade t o
the Danish islands:

"For i t i s certain that the Americans can s a i l

with less expense than most other nations, especially ours, and would
therefore soon undersell the Danish merchants i f their ships were

Ibid., pp. 6-9.
52Ibid.,

See Appendix V.

p. 9. See Appendix VI. The report urged allowing
Englishmen to serve as captains on Danish slave ships because English
captains were better acquainted with the slave trade, withstood the
warm climate better than Danes, spoke the language that was dominant
on the Guinea Coast, and for these reasons would be likely to do a
better job of looking a f t e r the interests of the ship owners.
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permitted to transport slaves to St. Croix."
The report closed with a comment on the value of freedom
of trade and on the evils of trade restrictions, especially in the
form of monopoly trading companies.

Because of the lesson

learned

in recent years from the failure of so many Danish monopoly companies,
the West Indian government concluded that "the patriot can now,
with hopeful anticipation, look forward to . . . happier times for
the state."54
By the time the report arrived, Schimmelmann had already
arranged the liquidation of the Baltic Guinea Company and i t s
replacement with de Coninck's company, enjoying similar privileges.
Yet there remained the basic problem of what to do with a slave trade
that seemed incapable of earning enough t o meet expenses.
In November 1786 Schimmelmann had s e t up a committee to
study the Guinea trade.

The committee reported in June 1787 that

in i t s opinion the Guinea trade, including the slave trade, could
not be expected to break even.

This report led to renewed interest

in the idea of establishing plantations in Africa so that tropical
products could be produced there, ending the need to transport
slaves to the West Indies.

Bargum's Trading Association had originally

suggested the possibility of establishing plantations on the Gold
Coast and had even brought in three missionaries in 1768 in hopes

53Ibid.,

p. 12.

54Ibid.,

p. 14.

61
they would succeed in doing so.

But the original missionaries and

their replacements died before they could accomplish anything.

55

During his lengthy stay on the Gold Coast, Isert concluded
that plantations in Africa were a possible means of making the slave
trade unnecessary.

After wondering whether Europeans could do

without sugar, coffee, chocolate, and other tropical products, he
wrote:
No! That would only make a large number of Europeans unhappy,
just as i t might make the Africans happy. Why weren't our
forefathers intelligent enough to establish plantations in
Africa? Where they could have obtained enough workers a t less
cost? But no, the discovery of America was more flattering to
their vanity [schmeichelte der Eitelkeit besser]. The Europeans
would certainly have been ruthless enough to do the same thing
to Africa as they did to America, but Africa i s a large
continent with too many inhabitants to be so easily brought under
control . . . . After the Europeans murdered the original
inhabitants of America and populated the land with Africans,
who had either been purchased or simply kidnapped [gestohlen]
and brought t o America, the Europeans believed they could enjoy
undisturbed possession of a kind of property which causes nature
to rebel and one's conscience to suffer torture.
Africa remains that part of the world where, by establishing
plantations, all the products which we now acquire from America
could be produced and the shameful export of Negroes from t h e i r
happy fatherland gradually could be restrained. The blacks would
gladly grant t o the Europeans the best and largest of the land
areas which have lain desolate for millenia, i f only the
Europeans would approach them with an olive branch in hand instead
of deadly weapons, and for only a small payment they would help
us. ^6
In Copenhagen Isert published a book on his experiences
in Africa and the West Indies, and met with Schimmelmann, who agreed
to support I s e r t ' s plan for establishing plantations on the Gold

^Ntfrregaard, Guldk.ysten, pp. 270-71 , 206-07.
56

I s e r t , Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln,
pp. 338-40.
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Coast. 5 7

In 1788 Isert returned t o Danish Guinea equipped with

royal authorization to s e t up a plantation, money advanced by the
government, and the rank of captain.

With the help of an African

friend, Isert established a plantation in the interior and formed
an alliance with an African chieftain who agreed t o protect the
plantation in exchange for Danish arms.

But I s e r t died on

January 21, 1789, before any lasting results could be achieved.
With his unique a b i l i t y to work with Negroes, his f a i t h in his
mission, and his knowledge of Africa, Isert was undoubtedly the
ideal man to establish successful plantations in Danish Guinea, and
with his death the effort to do so lost a l l real hope of success.
Though further attempts were made, a viable plantation economy was
never established. 5 ®

5 ?Henrik

1788-1860,"

Jeppesen, "Danske Plantageanlaeg paa Guldkysten
Geografisk Tidsskrift, LXV (December 1966), 50.

5 ®N0rregaard,

Guldkysten, pp. 272ff. That I s e r t ' s death was
lamented by Schimmelmann i s shown in a l e t t e r from Countess Charlotte
Schimmelmann t o Countess Louise Stolberg (born Reventlow), on January9,
1790, in which she wrote: " I s e r t died of a putrid fever a f t e r having
made the most commendable beginning towards the new republic; a l a s ,
he spent only six months there. The blacks are lamenting his death
as i f they had lost t h e i r father. They say that his great genius
had directed [preside] all he had done, and that no one could
worthily replace him. His wife survived him by only a month. I
have shed tears a t the tragic end of t h i s good family. Ernst was
keenly affected when he learned the news and exclaimed: 'No, I
am not a t a l l happy, I ought to renounce these concerns [ j e devrois
renoncer aux a f f a i r e s ] . ' I t i s true that he has l i t t l e happiness,
when one thinks of what he would have been able to do and would have
wished t o bestow round about him; they have not understood him,
they will never understand him in Denmark." See Bob^, Reventlowske
Familiekreds, IV, 121-22.
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Schimmelmann always believed himself t o be marked by
ill-fortune.

He tTfed to So too much and was nearly overwhelmed

by his many duties.

His responsibilities were enormous:

in addition

t o his many business enterprises and his posts as head of the Board
of Finance and the Board of Trade, he was also head of the Bureau
of Treasury Management (Skatkammerdirektion), the Credit Bureau
(Kreditkassen), a director of the Greenland,Icelandic, Faroe Island,
and Finmark trade, and head of the Commission for Liquidation of
the West Indian Debt (den vestindiske gaelds likvidations Direktion).
A countess wrote of him in 1787:

"Schimmelmann continues to work

and do his best to bring everything into disarray.

His office i s an

abyss where everything i s confused and disappears; i f he doesn't go
mad, i t will be a miracle.
Schimmelmann has been criticized for indecision and for a
tendency to heed too willingly the opinions of his associates and
subordinates.

Holm view's Schimmelmann as "a lovable person

. . .

who wanted t o do as much good as possible, easy to live with and
unselfish as few others." 6 0

A Norwegian official who worked with

Schimmelmann discussed him thusly:
This knowledgeable, broad-minded, ingenious [qeniale], and
noble man was poorly f i t t e d t o serve as an administrator and
least of a l l as finance minister under an absolute monarchical
constitution. He lacked power of resistance and self-confidence.
He was in addition insufficiently Scandinavian. He should have
devoted himself to s c i e n t i f i c and scholarly a c t i v i t i e s . 6 !

5 9 Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, VI, Part I , pp. 202-203.
Letter by Countess Schulin, October 27, 1787.

Holm, Danmark-Norqes Historie, V, 620.
61 Ibid.,

VI, Part I , p. 203.
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Schimmelmann's humanitarian sympathy for the poor in Denmark
and the slaves in the West Indies was genuine, though he was ever
CO

mindful of his own financial s e l f - i n t e r e s t .

In 1782, upon learning

that he and Reventlow had been appointed directors of the slavetrading Baltic-Guinea Company, Ernst Schimmelmann wrote t o his
fiancee, Charlotte Schubart:
The fate of man i s strange. To think that Reventlow and I
are directors of a company involved in the slave trade. Ah,
i f only we were directors of an association created t o further
the happiness of man! If instead of bringing turmoil and
devastation into another part of the world in order there t o
appeal to avarice and perfidy, we could muster our energies
to create there a happier day. This would be, I dare say, a
destiny more worthy of us. But one does not serve men more by
giving them gold. Those who do so believe in nothing but gold.
All t h e i r other beliefs are mere formalities—the greatness of
the soul exists only in our t a l e s , i t i s a fiction of the
statesmen [ l a grandeur d'ame n'existe que dans nos contes,
c ' e s t la fabTe des hommes d ' e t a t ] . One does not with impunity
cause others t o suffer, the years and the centuries will bring
a vengeance which they have been preparing in secret—already
our slaves in America raise luxury products which corrupt and
weaken us here in Europe by debasing us and making us more
deserving of being slaves in our turn. But we will lose our vain
riches one day, we will not have the means to pay for these
creatures, these victims. What t o do then, when in misery
one ridicules, with l i t t l e success, heroism and mores [Comment
f a i r e alors, dans l a mi sere on persifle avec moins de succes
Vheroisme e t les moeurs]? But, my dear friend, what a
digression; i t , too, i s the fault of this black company. 6 3

® 2 Schimmelmann was an ardent adherent of the agrarian reforms
for which Christian Ditlev Reventlow and Ludwig Reventlow were the
leading spokesmen. See Povl Engelstoft and Svend Dahl, e d s . , Dansk
Biografisk Leksikon (27 vols.; Copenhagen: J . H. Schultz Forlag,
1933-44), XXI, 136. The man directly responsible for establishing
the Schimmelmann plantations as model enterprises was Ernst
Schimmelmann's f i r s t cousin, Heinrich Ludvig Ernst Schimmelmann, who
arrived on S t . Croix in 1768 to take charge of the plantations. He
l a t e r served in the government of the Danish West Indies and was
governor general. See Bricka, e d . , Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, XV, 139.
6 3 Bobe",

Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 14. Letter from
Ernst Schimmelmann to Charlotte Schubart, January 9 , 1782.
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Yet Schimmelmann, despite his distress a t being made
director of a slave-trading company, invested 23,000 rigsdaler
in the company. 6 4

He l a t e r tried hard t o save the company, and

he secretly acquired stock in i t s successor.
Schimmelmann 1 s income was heavily dependent on the
production of sugar on his plantations in the West Indies and
the refining of sugar in Copenhagen.

With I s e r t ' s death and the

apparent failure of the attempt to establish plantations in
Guinea, slavery seemed as necessary as ever for the production of
sugar, and slavery i t s e l f apparently depended on the continuation of
the slave trade, for without the l a t t e r the slave population would
decline, and so would sugar production.

Schimmelmann could not

tolerate an immediate abolition of the slave trade; but perhaps
some means of "gradual" abolition could be found which would end the
immoral slave trade and s t i l l permit the Danish West Indies to
flourish.

In the meantime no action was taken on the recommendations

of the government of the Danish West Indies, and the monopoly on
trade with Danish Guinee was continued a f t e r 1787 by de Coninek's
slave-trading company.

6 4 Sveistrup

and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandel, p. 114.

CHAPTER I I I
The Report of the Committee on the Slave Trade
In June 1791 Schimmelmann drew up a twenty-page proposal
urging that a committee be established to investigate the possibility
of abolishing the slave trade to the Danish West Indies.

It is

clear that Schimmelmann himself, a deeply religious "man of feeling,"
regarded the slave trade with a strong sense of repugnanceJ

His""""

protege Isert had condemned the slave system, and his s i s t e r Julie
(Countess Juliana Reventlow) strongly urged him t o help the slaves.
Her concern for the slaves, which was based on her religious
convictions, i s credited by Otto Brandt with having been a major
factor in motivating Schimmelmann to act in favor of a b o l i t i o n . 2
She believed one of her most important tasks was to promote, in
cooperation with her brother, the work of the Moravian missionaries
among the slaves in the Danish West Indies and t o improve the l o t of
the slaves. 3
In a l e t t e r t o Schimnelmann on February 17, 1789, Julie

1Schimmelmann's own religious feelings are revealed in
l e t t e r s in Bobe', Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, p. 13 and p. 22.
He was president of the Danish Bible Society in 1813.
2 0tto

Brandt, Geistesleben und Politik in Schleswig-Holstein
um die Wende des 18. Jahrhunderts (2d. e d . , r e v . ; Kiel: Walter
Mllhlau Verlag, 1927), p. 113.
3Ibid.,

p. 107.
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Reventlow noted that she had been deeply moved by a re-reading
of David Cranz's history of the conversion of the slaves.^

She

urged that the slaves be granted an extra day off each week t o work
t h e i r garden plots and that regulations be enacted t o improve the
treatment of slaves, especially elderly and sick ones.

She

proposed that Moravian missionaries, who had been "angels from
Heaven" for the slaves, be used to see that ameliorative regulations
were enforced on the plantations and expressed the belief that " I t
i s our calling [Beruf] to alleviate the slaves' miserable existence
and to obtain for them these improvements by means of our own
personal sacrifice." 5

One could not allow present conditions t o

continue:
Something at least must be done for these oppressed people
[diese Gedrtlckten] i f we want our lives t o be happy [wenn wir
unsers Lebens froh werden wollen]. With horror I think of the
arbitrary floggings which the slaves receive without the l e a s t
justification.
The poorest peasant, for whom one feels sympathy, i s s t i l l
f a r better off than the slaves. If our ideals are only
impracticable schemes, oh, then I would like t o hide myself
in a hole . . . . 6
Julie Reventlow did not envisage an immediate emancipation

^David Cranz, Den gamle oq n.ye Br0dre Historie e l l e r ; Pet
Evangeliske Br0dre-Unitets korte Historie i de aeldre Tider oq i
Saerdeleshed udi naervaerende Aarhundrede (Copenhagen, 1772).
Cranz's book was a history of a l l the Moravian missions down t o 1769.
He was himself a Moravian.
5 Bobe',

Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 340. J u l i e Reventlow
was one of the five members of the Schimmelmann family t r u s t , which
derived the overwhelming part of i t s income from the four Schimmelmann
plantations and the sugar refineries in Copenhagen.
6 Ibid.,

p. 341.

of the slaves, but thought of i t as a long-range goal:
To give the slaves complete freedom will indeed remain the
ideal, but to ease their l o t , that we will be able t o do, I
pray t o God; and perhaps we can, a f t e r a number of years,
emancipate them and purchase no new slaves. The Quakers in
Pennsylvania paid for the Negroes' labor and gave them their
freedom, because they found i t wrong for Christians to hold
slaves. In so doing the Quakers benefited their worldly
interests too. The loyalty and diligence of t h e i r black
7
workers increased and none of them wanted to leave the Quakers.'
The countess, by way of emphasizing the depth of her concern
for the slaves, closed her l e t t e r by adding:

"I have exhausted

myself completely [Ich habe mich ganz e p u i s i r t ] .

You cannot imagine

how often-these thoughts occupy me and agitate my heart [mein
innerstes erschtlttern]. 1 , 8
Julie Reventlow's husband, Count Fritz Reventlow, was
much more restrained than his wife in desiring to help the slaves.
In a l e t t e r t o Ernst Schimmelmann dated June 14, 1789, obviously
written in response t o some proposals by Schimmelamnn for improving
the treatment of slaves on the Sch inane Imann family plantations,
Reventlow made dutiful comments on the need to help the slaves, but
urged an extremely cautious approach: "I share with you, my dear
Ernst, your wish to improve the l o t of the poor black slaves on our
plantations . . . . "

Reventlow then argued that neither sentiment

nor humanitarian feelings should motivate one to help the slaves but,
rather, a sense of Christian duty which "requires our actions and the
necessary sacrifices."

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

But he continued:
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I t i s no less true that a zeal which carried us beyond our
capacities, a theory of duties which circumstances, and even
those abuses intimately linked to the circumstances, prevented
entirely from being practiced would—rather than being useful
t o the goal which we propose—only put us farther away from
achieving i t . 9
Reventlow added that though i t was completely wrong f o r
anyone to own other persons as property, "property rights t o a l l
possessions except human beings ought t o be inviolable, . . .
a natural right."

He continued, apparently fearful that Schimmelmann

would go too f a r in attempting to help the slaves, by arguing that
there was no natural law or precept of religion "which obligates
us or requires us t o deprive ourselves of our whole fortune for the
benefit of the slaves."

Indeed, tampering with slavery might have

"baleful consequences [consequences funestes]."
The actual happiness of the slaves, their genuine well-being,
i s now determined by the fortune of t h e i r masters, and such i s
not only the . . . abusive law of their own particular f a t e : i t
i s the law of a l l humanity.
The divine sentence which condemned man to earn his bread by
the sweat of his brow i s quite general, since the exception i s
infinitely small in comparison with the number of those upon whom
i t i s carried out daily, and in a l l probability will continue . . .
as long as the world i s as we know i t . I t i s to that sentence
that the inequality among men, both as to power and means, i s
linked by an indissoluble bond, and therefrom stems the absolute
impossibility of general or complete libertyJO
Reventlow then urged Schimmelmann to take plenty of time
selecting the right man t o send t o S t . Croix t o carry out reforms t o
help the slaves on the Schimmelmann family plantations, for choosing

9 Bobe,

Reventlowske Familiekreds, VIII, 287. This l e t t e r
was translated from the French by Channing Horner, Northwest Missouri
State University.
1 °Ibid.,

pp. 288-89.
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the wrong man "could wipe out instantly our whole fortune and with
i t a l l the good we intend to do."

He proceeded to argue that more

data concerning the plantations was needed before any action should
be taken.

11

Judging from Reventlow's l e t t e r , especially his rejection of
the thought of "complete freedom," i t would appear likely that
Schimmelmann, writing to Reventlow a t some time a f t e r receiving the
l e t t e r of February 17, 1789, from Julie Reventlow, had, in addition
to l i s t i n g proposals to ameliorate the slaves' living conditions,
also mentioned the possibility of emancipation.

Schimmelmann clearly

was concerned with improving the treatment of the slaves--he asked
Hans West, prior to the l a t t e r ' s departure for S t . Croix in 1788, t o
send back recommendations for appropriate ameliorative measures.

1?

Schimmelmann's humanitarian desire t o help the slaves on his planta
tions probably was strengthened by his realization that improving the
slaves' living conditions might make i t possible to increase the
slave-population by natural means, ending the need for further purchase
of Africans.

^ I b i d . , pp. 289-91.
^ 2 West mentions t h i s in a plan for improving the treatment
of the field slaves which he sent t o the General Customs Department
on August 17, 1791, entitled Plan t i l ved e t enkelt Forsgig a t befordre
Mark-Negrenes Opl.ysninq og Formildelse i Kaar m.v. paa Eilandet S t .
Croix, p. 12, DSA, Ventindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. He wrote: "Schimmelmann, before I
l e f t the fatherland, often showed his t r u s t in me by sharing with me,
both orally and in writing, his thoughts on improvements he hoped t o
make on his plantations here to alleviate the l o t of the slaves [ a t
formilde den lavere Medbroders Kaar]."

That there was already some anti-slavery sentiment in
Copenhagen, aside from Schimmelmann's c i r c l e , i s indicated by
criticism in the weekly Laerde Efterretninger of West's comments on
West Indian slavery contained in an eighty-three-page a r t i c l e
entitled "Beretning om det danske Eiland S t . Croix i Vestindien, f r a
Juniimaaned 1789 t i l Junii maaneds Udgang 1790" which he
in the July 1791 edition of I r i s .

published

Laerde Efterretninger attacked

West's views that the slaves were well treated, that the slaves and
the free colored were lazy and debauched persons who were inclined
to thievery, and said West praised the West Indian social and legal
system only because i t allowed 2,000 whites to rule 22,000 blacks.
The writer added:

" I t i s incredible that a thinking man can write

such things.
The Danish slave trade had continued to languish a f t e r being
taken over by de Corn"nek's new company in 1787.

Only four slave

ships made the voyage from the Guinea Coast to the West Indies in
1788-89, and in 1790-91 only two ships were sent out.
III.)

(See Appendix

Schimmelmann concluded there was no likelihood that the number

of Danish ships used in the slave trade could be increased.

In

1790-91 the Danish f o r t s on the Guinea Coast sold their excess slaves
to French s h i p s . ^

13
Laerde Efterretninger. Copenhagen, No. 42, 1791, pp. 65863. West, though he defended slavery, did c r i t i c i z e the slave trade:
"Of course, the slave trade i s a horror which stains our Christianity
and shames our so-called philosophical century." See I r i s ,
Copenhagen, July 1791, p. 57.
14

DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre
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The international situation was probably another influence
on Schimmelmann's thinking.

The English abolitionist movement had

been gaining strength in the l a t e 1780s, and i t s progress was
followed closely by Schimmelmann, in whose private archives there
i s a 71-page, hand-written German translation of the April 18, 1791,
debate in the House of Commons on the abolition of the slave t r a d e . ^
Despite the rejection of William Wi1berforce's motion for abolition
of the slave trade, Schimmelmann, from his reading of the debate in
Parliament, concluded that the victory of abolition in England was
imminent, for the most influential and respected members of the
Commons (William P i t t , Charles James Fox, and Edmund Burke) had
favored ending the slave trade.

16

If England (and, perhaps, France)

were t o oppose the slave trade, could smaller powers such as Denmark
continue t o engage in i t ?

Was there not a risk that Denmark might

be forced to abandon the slave trade a t a time when continued
importation of slaves was imperative for sugar production in the Danish
West Indies?

Perhaps by announcing that Denmark intended to abolish

Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunterthcfnigste Vorstellung an ihro
Kttnigliche Majestflt, December 28, 1791, p. 23.
^DSA, Ernst Schimmelmanns Privat Arkiv, Pk. 11, Koncepter
angaaende Slavehandelen og Negervaesenet i Vestindien og Kopier vedr.
Sierra Leone Kolonien, Debatten im Unterhause des englischen
Parlaments Uber die Abschaffung des Sclavenhandels,. The translation
was based on an extract of the debate published "in one of the best
English newspapers," The Diary or Woodfall's Register, according t o
a note on p. 1 . of the translation.
^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Ernst Schimmelmann's Bedenken (on the
slave trade), June 18, 1791, p. 1 .
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the slave trade a f t e r a transition period lengthy enough t o permit
building up the slave labor force in the islands prior to abolition,
the Danish government could protect i t s e l f from possible foreign
pressure to end the slave trade and guarantee the future of sugar
production in the Danish i s l a n d s . ^
Schimmelmann was also surely aware that his four plantations,
two on S t . Croix and one each on S t . Thomas and S t . Jan, would be
better able than others t o overcome any d i f f i c u l t i e s arising from
abolition, for they were notably well stocked with laborers, and the
slaves on them had in recent years shown a tendency t o maintain their
ranks without any great dependence on the Atlantic slave trade.
Immediately prior t o the publication of the abolition edict in 1792,
Justitsraad C. Hansteen, a member of the General Customs Department,had
presented to the department his arguments against abolition, and in
so doing noted that Schimmelmann's plantations, unlike the others,
already had enough slaves and had sufficient land to allow for
planting yams, corn and other crops to provide ample food for the
slaves, something which other plantations were hard pressed t o
manage.

18

Schimmelmann in fact stood to gain from any overall decrease

in sugar production in the Danish West Indies, for his share of

^Svend Green-Pedersen, "Danmarks ophaevelse of
negerslavehandelen: omkring tilblivelsen af forordningen af 16.
Marts 1792," Arkiv. I l l , No. 1 , 1969, p. 36.
^ 8 DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Justitsraads Hansteens Allerunderdanigst
Forestilling, March 14, 1792, pp. 1-2.
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production was likely to increase i f abolition caused d i f f i c u l t i e s
for other planters, as the price of sugar might then r i s e , and his
share of the market for raw sugar in Denmark would expand.
Schimmelmann's efforts t o make the Danish slave trade
profitable had f a i l e d , as had his attempt to use Isert to establish
tropical plantations on the Gold Coast.

He had long regarded the

slave trade as immoral although, paradoxically, he had maintained
major investments in i t , and obviously his moral sensibility was
not strong enough t o induce him to interfere with profits when there
was a conflict between the two.

Yet he knew that i f he could devise

a means of abolishing the trade without bringing financial harm t o
Denmark, the Danish colonies, or the Schimmelmann family t r u s t , he
would win the praise of contemporaries in Denmark and obtain favorable
recognition for the Danish Crown abroad.

In the l a t e spring of 1791

his plans for ending the Danish slave trade solidified, perhaps in
part because of the apparent progress of the abolitionist movement
in England and the political prominence in France of Brissot de
Warville, head of the amis des noirs.
On June 18, 1791, Schimmelmann sent a proposal for abolishing
the slave trade to an unknown member of the Danish government,
addressed merely as "your excellency," along with a l e t t e r

which

explained the background and reasons for the proposal and urged f u l l
cooperation.

In the l e t t e r , Schimmelmann

noted that he had already

spoken with Bernstorff and had received assurances of the l a t t e r ' s
cooperation, and said that Bernstorff favored implementing
Schimmelmann's proposals by means of a special committee in Copenhagen
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which would assign to another committee in the West Indies the
task of carrying out reforms to help the slaves.

According t o

Schimmelmann, "The proposals in my essay contain nothing which could
bring about the destruction of private property or the infringement
of private property rights, for the proposals are aimed a t protecting
private property and a t prodding the planters to base their own
profits [Vortheil] on something more secure than a temporary use
[Benutzunq]."^ 9
Schimmelmann added, " I t has become necessary to reach a
decision about the slave trade and the principles and regulations
to be applied to i t in the future," which was probably a reference
to the inability of the Danish slave trade to prosper.

He opposed

involving the government of the Danish West Indies in drawing up
a final plan, for that "would only be another way of rejecting the
entire plan and would perhaps, for no reason a t a l l , s t i r up such
a tumult [GShrunq] as not even a decision to adopt my proposals
would produce." 2 ^ 1

He concluded by stating that i f his proposals

were accepted, "the Crown Prince and Denmark could s e t a great

19

Letter by Ernst Schimmelmann accompanying his Bedenken
on the slave trade, June 18, 1791. Here Schimmelmann meant that
instead of continuing to rely on the slave trade to replace laborers
who had been worked to death in just a few years (what he called
"eine temporaire Benutzung), i t would be more profitable for the
planters t o t r e a t their slaves better and thereby end the need for
the slave trade.
on

Apparently Schimmelmann feared d i f f i c u l t i e s would a r i s e
not from the government.of the Danish West Indies i t s e l f , which had
already recorded i t s distress a t being involved with slavery (see
above, pp. 55-56), but from the Borgerraad, or burger council,
which represented the planters.
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example.
Schimmelmann in July 1791 convinced the government to
establish a conmittee t o investigate the slave trade and then sent
the committee a copy of his essay.

In a brief accompanying l e t t e r

he noted that he had learned he was t o be appointed t o the committee
and said he wanted t o give the committee a chance t o study his essay
in hopes that committee members might use his Bedenken as a basis
for t h e i r deliberations.

22

Schimmelmann began his twenty-page Bedenken by stating
that the debate in the House of Commons of April 18, 1791, on a
proposal t o abolish the slave trade "cannot but rouse the greatest
attention in a l l the other states which conduct the [slave] trade."
The leaders of both parties in England, who are distinguished
by t h e i r influence, t a l e n t , patriotism and authority, have voted
for the abolition of the slave trade. The most important
political and s c i e n t i f i c societies as well as the best part of
the nation have a l l declared themselves in favor of this motion
[for a b o l i t i o n ] . "
The proposal had f a i l e d , Schimmelmann believed, because i t
had called for immediate abolition.

Had the slave trade been abolished

immediately, "the wealth and the profits [Erwerb] of many persons
would have suffered and perhaps in part have been l o s t as a consequence
of such an abrupt and absolute decision t o abolish the slave trade."

Letter by Ernst Schimmelmann accompanying his Bedenken
on the slave trade, June 18, 1791.
2 2 Introductory l e t t e r of July 16, 1791, accompanying
Schimmelmann's handwritten Bedenken (proposal on the slave trade).

23

Ernst Schimmelmann 1 s Bedenken, June 18, 1791, p. 1 .
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If . . . immediate and complete abolition were decided upon,
how could those who have placed their capital in this trade
save their investments? How would they be able to dispose of
t h e i r remaining merchandise, their factories, their claims
[Forderungen], the wealth they have circulating in the slave
trade, i f a l l of these investments should become obsolete . . .
as a result of abolition? How would the planters be able to
save themselves, since their economy a t present depends on the
purchase rather than the breeding [Zuziehung] of slaves? 2 ^
Schimmelmann then proceeded to a consideration of what
he thought was the basic question which had t o be answered before
abolition of the slave trade could become feasible:

could the slave

population in the West Indies be maintained without continued
dependence on the slave trade?

He was well aware t h a t , hitherto,

slave populations in the West Indies and Brazil had failed t o maintain
themselves by natural means.

He asked:

How i s i t possible to establish on a l l the plantations the correct
ratio of male t o female slaves necessary for propagation, without
importing more slaves? How can the debauchery which impedes the
growth of the slave population be done away with promptly, and
marriages and morals encouraged to promote population growth?
How . . . in conformity with the present system of cultivation
in the West Indies . . . [can] the labor of the slaves be
lightened t o the extent needed to further the growth of t h e i r
population and the rearing of their children? What recourse
[Rettunqsmittell i s there for those who, because of misfortunes
and calamities, such as epidemic diseases, lose a considerable
part of t h e i r slaves and creole slave-children [Creol-Kinder]. 2 ^
Schimmelmann believed that both the abolitionists and t h e i r
opponents had spent too much time discussing the harmful or beneficial
effects of the slave trade and not enough studying "the fundamental
point [Haupt-Bemerkung] . . . that the great value of the West Indian

?4
25
Americas.

I b i d . , pp. 2-3.
I b i d . , p. 4. "Creole" slaves were those slaves born in the

colonies and the benefits they provide for the countries which
possess them depend on the cultivation of sugar cane, and that the
cultivation of t h i s product has been pursued in accordance with an
economic system which requires the constant acquisition of new slaves.
He blamed the European nations, "England in particular," f o r enacting
laws and encouraging commerce which made the slave trade a necessity.
An unlimited form of slavery had been established in the West Indies
and America leaving the slaves "completely abandoned to the absolute
will of harsh masters and s t i l l harsher overseers."^
Schimmelmann then raised the question of whether a law
abolishing the slave trade could be enforced a t present.

He noted

that resistance t o abolition would be strong among the planters and
that forcing them to comply would involve so many d i f f i c u l t i e s that
the mother country might eventually allow the law to be disregarded.
Aware that the Danish slave trade could not be considered in isolation
Schimmelmann wondered whether a l l the slave-trading nations would be
able to unite in favor of abolition and to enforce i t effectively.
He was particularly conscious of the importance of England and
France:
Do England and France, i f they should reach an agreement in
favor of abolition, have the power t o use force in compelling the
obedience of their colonies? Will they really want t o expose
themselves t o the embarrassment and the losses which could be
the result of enforcing abolition? Does not the most important
commerce of both nations, as well as the maintenance of t h e i r
finances and t h e i r inhabitants, depend on the preservation of
the West Indian colonies? If France and England unite on a

2 6 Ibid.,

pp. 4-5
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common policy, will Spain, Portugal, Holland, and North America
adopt the same measures?
Is not an effective abolition measure more important than
an unworkable prohibition?27
Schimmelmann moved next to the immorality of the slave trade,
stating he assumed that all persons "well-acquainted with the slave
trade and the manner in which i t i s presently conducted would agree
that the practicable abolition of the slave trade i s a duty of
humanity."
I t i s impossible t o maintain that the sale of slaves in Africa
does not, by means of the constant demands of Europeans t o
purchase slaves, give rise t o a demand for brandy, rum, gun
powder, guns, copper, and various manufactured goods, which have
become indispensable for the African tribes [Neger-Nationen].
Slaves are a t present virtually the sole important a r t i c l e of
exchange [Tauschwaare] possessed by the Africans. Therefore the
African tribes must procure slaves, no matter what the cost . . . .
Prisoners of war and criminals are sold t o Europeans as slaves
in accordance with the custom of the African tribes. When war
and infringement of the laws do not by themselves provide
enough slaves, should not private warfare, violence, and
kidnapping be used and engaged i n , so that the needed victims
can be procured? There i s yet another consequence which must
follow from the slave trade: since slaves are the main a r t i c l e
of trade which Africa produces, since slaves are themselves the
most expensive merchandise, they are not used to produce and
gather merchandise which could serve as a r t i c l e s of commerce
with the Europeans. I t seems more profitable and convenient t o
exchange the people themselves instead of the potential products
of t h e i r diligence and labor. Therefore every native industry
and type of production must remain s t i f l e d in embryo [im ihrem
ersten keim e r s t i k t werden], and the epoch of savagery ana
barbarism must last as long as the slave trade i t s e l f . 2 °
Not only does the slave trade devastate Africa—it also causes
corruption and depopulation in the West Indies.

The plantation

owners merely purchase new slaves instead of caring properly for the

^ I b i d . , pp. 7-8
OO

Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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slaves they already own.

As a r e s u l t , "the sparing of slave mothers

and the rearing of slave children receive insufficient attention."
Normal family l i f e among the slaves i s also rendered impossible by
the planters' recourse to the slave trade, for the planters have
l i t t l e incentive to encourage "the kind of moral behavior [Sitten]
which promotes marriages, and consequently morals in general."

29

Schimmelmann regarded individual examples of cruelty
connected with the slave trade as unavoidable consequences of a
system of commerce in human beings in which personal profit was the
guiding motive of those involved:

" I t i s impossible t o shackle so

large a number of people of different tribes and ages for many months
in the hold of a ship without bringing on their untimely death and
unnatural destruction, which are consequences of the journey and the
accompanying sickness, debility, sorrow, and change of climate."
To those who die on the ships during the Middle Passage must be
added those who perish in the West Indies soon a f t e r t h e i r a r r i v a l .
Normally from 30 t o 40 per cent of the slaves taken from Africa die
during these two periods, and "these usual and inevitable causes of
destruction" can be augmented i f , for instance, the ships are delayed
and forced to sail along the African coast to complete t h e i r cargo
of slaves, for there i s then an added risk of epidemics and slave
insurrections on the ships.3°

^ 9 Ibid., p. 9.
^ I b i d . , pp. 10-11.
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Concerning the treatment of slaves in the islands,
Schimmelmann noted that West Indian slavery had been variously
described as harsh or mild, depending on the purpose of the writer.
Nevertheless, certain conclusions could be drawn: "deliberate
inhumanity or cruelty" was not a major factor; rather, mistreatment
of the slaves could be ascribed t o the slave system i t s e l f .
The labor of the slaves i s in general extremely heavy and i s
rigorously exacted. Their d i e t and maintenance are confined
t o necessities. The women and children are used for heavy
field labor; and the slave women, even when pregnant or suckling
t h e i r children, must nevertheless engage in the usual field work.
The work i s evenly a l l o t t e d , and the variations in physical
strength among the slaves certainly are not considered carefully.
Common matters of dispute among the planters and overseers are
whether or not i t i s more profitable t o overwork the slaves in
the extreme, without any consideration of the impact of such
overwork on the slaves themselves, or to take better care of
the slaves [so that they might live longer]; and whether i t i s
more profitable for the growth of the slave population t o occur
by means of natural increase or by the purchase of new slaves.3'
Schimmelmann summed up the question of the morality of the
slave trade by stating that "after sober study and the most careful
examination," he was certain that a l l would agree "that e v i l ,
oppression, and misery for humanity in general are inevitably
associated with the slave trade, that abolition would be worthy of
the efforts of a wise law-giver [GesetzqeberLand that i t must be
the duty of everyone who can to a s s i s t in bringing about abolition
and t o contribute everything possible toward that goal." 3 ^
Schimmelmann then began t o discuss "the question we are here

31 Ibid.,

pp. 11-12.

32Ibid.,

p. 12.

82
primarily concerned with, that i s , how i t might be possible to abolish
the slave trade."

He doubted that a total ban on the slave trade

would succeed because constant complaints by those whose interests
were harmed by abolition would lead the government t o ignore violations
of the law and would perhaps weaken the authority of the government.
He thought that in order for abolition to succeed, "The colonies
must be placed in a position where they can maintain their slave
population in the future and increase their slave population a t the
present time . . . .

Customs and methods of treating the slaves which

can induce a population increase must be established and maintained." 3 3
Schimmelmann's belief that the slave trade could be abolished
successfully was based on his conviction that improved treatment of
the slaves would make the trade unnecessary.

The problem involved

bringing about a situation, theretofore not achieved anywhere in the
West Indies, where there were more births than deaths among the
slave population.
The principal reason for the unnatural decrease of the slave
population and for the constant need to import new slaves from
Africa i s to be found in the treatment and condition of the slaves
in the West Indies. If their treatment . . . should ever be
based on the principle of promoting the natural increase of the
slave population, i f the treatment and condition of the slaves
were consequently improved and regulated, the time would come
when the legislator could dictate as a law something that
would already be a reality as a consequence of the measures
which the legislator had e a r l i e r adopted and promoted. 3 4
Schimmelmann then proceeded to l i s t his suggestions for

33Ibid.,

34

pp. 12-13.

Ibid., p. 13.
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solving the problem of the slave trade in a series of propositions
which he hoped the Committee on the Slave Trade would use as a basis
for i t s deliberations:
1. In order f i r s t and foremost t o maintain the present
system of cultivation, as many slavesas are s t i l l needed t o
populate the islands must be obtained.
2. Those regulations and arrangements which are necessary
in order t o enable the slaves t o multiply t h e i r own population
by means of natural increase must be enacted.
3. The trade in slaves in Africa and the subsequent
transportation of slaves t o America must, so long as there i s
no alternative but t o permit i t , be organized in a regular
manner under the supervision of the government.
4. There must be put into effect a binding obligation
[Verbindlichkeit] on the planters, compelling them to supply
their plantations adequately with the number of slaves necessary
for the attainment of the previously mentioned goal [that of
maintaining the slave population by natural increase alone],
and police laws [Polizeigesetze] which, by regulating the t r e a t 
ment of slaves, will result in the preservation of the slave
population must be put into effect by the planters.
5. During the period in which the importation of slaves
i s considered a necessity, the slaves will have t o be protected;
but all regulations which would be drawn up should be considered
only as a preparation for a point in time when the importation
of slaves would no longer be tolerated (except perhaps as an
exception in individual instances).
6. If the arrangements decided upon are to have their
intended e f f e c t , i f voluntary agreements thereto are to be
effective, i t must be stated and made explicit in advance that
this epoch i s certain of coming to pass, and the date [when the
slave trade will be abolished] must not be postponed for so long
that the planters who prefer to remain inactive would feel free
to do nothing.
7. Care will have to be taken t o make available to the
planters the funds necessary t o enable them t o carry out the
plan, insofar as the planters do not possess the wealth, on t h e i r
own, to implement the plan.
8. The less well-to-do as well as the wealthy planters
for whom the needed credit would be provided must, insofar as
possible, be given the means of providing the security which i s
indispensable for obtaining credit.35
Thus Schimmelmann envisaged no change in the plantation system and

3 5 Ibid.,

pp. 14-15.
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no end to the institution of slavery; he wanted the Danish
government both to try to improve slave treatment in order to attain
the goal of a self-sustaining slave population, and to prod the
planters to acquire the number of slaves needed to reach that goal
on each plantation, with government aid made available for planters
needing i t for the purpose of buying fresh slaves.

This l a t t e r

proposal would also serve, as Schimmelmann was surely aware, to
undermine the planters' opposition to abolition.

In order to

abolish the slave trade, i t would be necessary f i r s t to encourage i t .
There were additional suggestions which Schimmelmann wanted
the committee to consider after i t had dealt with the major points.
He asked i f i t would not be wise to specify the number of slaves
each plantation needed so that thereafter special attention could be
devoted to attaining and maintaining that figure.

Ought not the

morals and family relationships of the slaves be strengthened as a
means of encouraging the birth rate and the rearing of children?
Perhaps an arrangement could be made by which de Coninck's slave-trade
company (in which Schimmelmann had a secret investment) could sell
slaves to the islands at a fixed, low price, in return for being
guaranteed a sale?

And, i f so, would i t not be appropriate to allow

those planters who lacked a sufficient number of slaves to buy the
slaves they needed a t that fixed, low price, according to a system
which took into account the age and sex of the slaves?

In exchange

for being allowed to engage in so secure a commercial undertaking,
ought not the company be subject to regulations for improving the
treatment of slaves a t the Guinea forts and during the Atlantic

crossing?

Perhaps the company could then be guaranteed payment for

the slaves in fixed installments, with the government establishing
a loan fund [Negociation] in the islands to make loans a t an interest
rate of four percent to those planters unable to pay for their
slaves in the regular, fixed installments guaranteed to the company?
(Schimmelmann apparently had not yet abandoned his attempts to make
the slave trade profitable.)

Perhaps i t would be advisable to allow

the loan fund to serve as security [Hypothek] for the planters,
because the plantations and slaves which previously provided the
requisite security would be an inadequate mortgage i f , after abolition,
there were plantations on which an adequate number of slaves had not
been established.

Such a government-supported loan fund would also

increase the security of the creditors—the old creditors would not
only retain their former guarantee, but would see i t improved in the
future.

Finally, would i t be possible to make i t easier to export

sugar in exchange for slaves and the provisions required for them? J
Schimmelmann's concluding statement urged adoption of a plan
for abolition based on his proposals:
If a plan based on the ideas sketched here were to be put
into execution, so that the present slave population would not
only be maintained but would on the contrary after a certain
number of years be increased, thereby putting an end to the
need for further importation of slaves, I should then imagine
that the cause [Vorschriften] of humanity could not in this
regard be in opposition [Widerspruch] to the political and
economic interests [VortheilenJ of the state. During the period
while the slave trade continued to be necessary, all of i t s
benefits for the commerce and shipping of private subjects would

^ I b i d . t pp. 15-19.

exist. The wealth of the West Indian islands would be increased,
and the increased production of the islands would enlarge the
profits of the mother country. If the time were to come when
the importation of slaves into the West Indies were to be
discontinued, then the considerable sums which presently must
be spent on the slave trade each year by Denmark and her colonies
could be saved, and the forts on the African coast would no
longer be needed for that purpose."
The committee created to consider the future of the slave
OO
trade was established on August 5 , 1791.
I t was given the
disarming t i t l e of the Committee for Improving the Organization
of the Slave Trade in the West Indian Islands and the Coast of
Guinea (Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre Indretning paa de
Vestindiske Ejlande og Kysten Guinea), better known as the Great
Committee on the Slave Trade (den store Negerhandels Kommission).
Schimmelmann was the dominant figure on the committee.

In

addition to him, the committee consisted of Jtfrgen Erik Skeel, head
of the General Customs Department; Fr. Carl Trant and Niels Tender
Lund, high-ranking members of the department; Chr. Brandt, former
head of the department and Chancery President (Kancelli-praesident);
and Carl Wendt, a member of the Finance Department.

Schimmelmann's

private secretary, Ernst Philip Kirstein, was the committee's
secretary.

All of these high-ranking bureaucrats brought with them

special experience in colonial administration and finances that
qualified them to serve on the committee.

Skeel had a good reputation

as an administrator who was particularly sympathetic with the poor;

3 7 Ibid.,

pp. 19-20.
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A royal edict of August 5, 1791, created the committee and
appointed members to i t , beginning with Schimmelmann.
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he had been made head of the General Customs Department, in charge
OQ
of the West Indian and African colonies, in 1789. 17 Trant had
served with the West India Company for several years and had been
appointed to the General Customs Department in 1790; he was considered
an expert on educational reform, having published a book on that
subject in 1789 (Uber Schulen und Schulanstalten in Dclnemark), and
was capable of assisting the committee in i t s deliberations on the
education of slave children. 4 ^

T0nder Lund had experience in colonial

administration going back to 1778.

41

Brandt had been head of the

General Customs Department from 1784 to 1789. 4 2

Wendt had been

Christian Ditlev Reventlow's tutor and had remained a close advisor
to Reventlow.

He was highly respected in financial matters and had

been a member of the Finance Department since 1784.
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There was l i t t l e publicity surrounding the creation of the
Committee on the Slave Trade.

The committee's full t i t l e was,

indeed, a smoke screen designed to avoid arousing untimely
opposition.

One journal which did comment on the committee was

Politisches Journal, published in Altona (a Danish port on the Elbe
near Hamburg) by G. B. von Schirach, who corresponded wi th Bernstorff5 4

3 9 Pansk

Biografisk Lexikon, XVIII (1904), 32-33.

4 0 Ibid.,

XVII (1903), 478-79.

4 1 Ibid.,

X (1896), 439-40.

4 2 Ibid.,

III (1889), 3-4.

4 3 Ibid.,

XVIII (1904), 384-385.

4 4 Ibid.,

XIV (1901), 145-46.

An article datelined Copenhagen, September 14, 1791, said that the
committee had met several times but, because i t had not had enough
data, had as yet reached few decisions.

The article noted that the

purpose of the committee was "not . . . to place without consideration
a class of people in a condition of full freedom, for to do so would
benefit neither the slaves nor their white masters [Gebietern]."
I t said:
The committee will seek in part to remedy in an appropriate
[zweckmassige] manner the shortage of slaves on the West Indian
plantations, and in part to ameliorate the lot of the slaves as
much as possible and to establish regular marital unions among
them, whereby i t will be possible to hinder the monstrous
debauchery [ungeheuern Ausschweifungen] and the dreadful
pestilence [schrecklichen Seuchen] which prevail among the slaves,
to put them . . . in a thrifty frame of mind [hckislichere
Verfassunq] and perhaps provide them with some land which they
would be able to work for their own profit without, however,
owning the land as private property. Happier results can be
expected from such wise and suitable measures than from the
chimerical projects of romantic-thinking friends of man
[romanhaft denkender Menschenfreunde]. 4 5
The committee's deliberations, which were secret, resulted
in a report of 102 folio pages written in German by Kirstein and
completed on December 28, 1791.

The report began with a brief

history of European involvement in the African slave trade, from i t s
beginnings in the fifteenth century with "the depredations [Rflubereien]
of a single Portuguese ship's captain," and attributed the s t a r t of
the slave trade to America to the "mistaken zeal of a Spanish priest
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Politisches Journal, Altona, September 1791, pp. 1019-20.
The'dreadful pestilence" referred to was probably venereal disease.
I t i s perhaps worth noting that Thorkild Hansen, in his Slavernes 0er,
attributes the last line of the above article to Schimmelmann himself
and gives no indication of the actual source of the statement.
Hansen, Slavernes Per, p. 268.
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[Las Casas] who without reflection found a yoke from which he wanted
to free the inhabitants of America a t the expense of the inhabitants
of Africa."

Critics of the trade such as Morgan Godwyn and, l a t e r ,

the American Quakers John Woolman and Anthony Benezet were mentioned,
and the Quaker campaign against the slave trade and slavery resulting
in "abolition of the slave trade by several provinces in North
America and their [the Quakers'] declaring all Negroes in their
province free."^ 6
The slave trade, the report continued, has recently
attracted the attention of various writers, especially in England
and France, and the English Parliament has debated the issue
of abolition "with the greatest animation."

Though until now the

party favoring continuation of the slave trade has kept the upper
hand, the foremost proponent of abolition, William Wilberforce, will
continue to pursue the issue with unremitting ardor, and the leaders
of both parties in Parliament have declared themselves strongly in
favor of abolition.

Therefore, " I t i s highly probable that the

previous rejection of the motion to abolish the slave trade should
be regarded not as a fine 7 decision but rather as merely a postpone
ment."

I t is possible that the motion was rejected in order to
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DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunterthflnigste Vorstellung, pp. 1-2.
This was in reference to Pennsylvania, which in 1780 passed a
gradual emancipation law; there were s t i l l some slaves in Pennsylvania
in 1800—see David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age
of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975),
pp. 87-88.
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give more time to those who are involved financially in the trade
to prepare themselves for a change "which, of course, i f i t occurred
too quickly, would have to be detrimental to their interests.

If

this i s the case, then the matter surely deserves . . . the attention
of all nations which have an interest in the slave trade, since i t
would, after a l l , be difficult not to follow closely such an example,
once given [da es_ doch vielleicht schwer wtlrde einen einmal gegebenen
Beispiel nicht nahzufolgen].
The report noted that a considerable number of studies of
the slave trade had been made by Europeans in recent years, allowing
one to arrive a t a better-informed view of the trade in all i t s
aspects:
Because of the indifference with which the slave trade was until
recently regarded, such doubts [Bedenklichkeiten] as might arise
about the slave trade could be set a t ease by the belief that
all of the Negroes taken from Africa either were already slaves,
whose situation, indeed, was not worsened by their removal from
Africa, but might perhaps be improved; or that they were
prisoners of war who by being sold into slavery were saved from
an otherwise certain death; or that they were criminals who
similarly were rescued from death by means of the milder punish
ment of enslavement.' By use of such presumptions rvoraussetzungen]
one could easily convince oneself that the slave trade was
perhaps even worthy of praise and actually redounded to the
benefit of the slaves themselves [zum Gltlkke der Sclaven selbst
gereiche]; i t i s only more recent testimony by unbiased eye
witnesses [unverdSchtigen Auqenzeugen] that has explained these
circumstances in such a way that one i s now compelled to adopt
quite a different viewpoint, unless one prefers to avoid the
truth by means of far-fetched illusions.48
Europeans now are amply informed about the evils of the slave

4 ^Allerunterth£lnigste

Vorstellung, pp. 3-4.
with Schimmelmann's Bedenken i s striking.
^ I b i d . , pp. 4-5.
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trade, and whites can no longer use ignorance as to the origins
of the slaves they purchase as an excuse for continuing to support
I

the trade:

"Exempt from immediate involvement with violence in

Africa, the Europeans have found i t all too easy to disregard the
rapine which they have brought on indirectly."

Yet in critically

examining the slave trade and the harm i t causes, i t i s best to
avoid "the simple declamations with which some writers have attacked
the slave trade, and by which the writers have only harmed their
own cause; only facts [Thatsachen] cannot be refuted."

The facts

can best be established by the testimony of credible witnesses,
and an excellent source of such testimony i s the report prepared
by a committee of the English Parliament appointed to investigate
the slave trade.

49

The report makes i t clear that the manner in

which the slave traders acquire ownership of slaves on the African
coast "consists for the most part of a web of cruelty and injustice."

50

The Danish committee argued that persons who were already
slaves in Africa did not benefit from being sold as slaves in America,
as defenders of the slave trade contended.

One can safely assume

"that the slaves' situation in Africa, where their labor i s not
devoted to the production of costly articles of trade but rather to

4 9 This

report i s in the Danish State Archives, Vestindiskguineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, under the t i t l e heading "Det
engelske Parlaments Forhandlinger ang. Slavers Transport t i l
Vestindien," a detailed compilation of testimony on the slave trade
taken in 1788 concerning the Dolben Bill and in 1788-89 before a
committee of the Privy Council appointed to obtain data on the slave
trade.
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, p. 6.
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the production of only the most necessary subsistence articles
[Nahrungsbedurfnisse] in what i s usually a very f e r t i l e s o i l , i s
hardly as exhausting [schwerlich so drtikkend i s t ] as in the colonies
in America."

African chieftains sometimes sell their own subjects

into slavery in exchange for liquor, even going so far as to set
f i r e to villages a t night and seize the fleeing inhabitants for
sale as slaves.

"That the slave trade with the Europeans i s

responsible for a situation in Africa in which the seed of morality
and humane behavior must be destroyed is difficult to deny."^
Many slaves purchased by Europeans in Africa are not slaves
a t all but prisoners

of war.

Though defenders of the trade argue

that these prisoners would be executed i f they were not sold as
slaves on the coast, many witnesses acquainted with the practices
of the African tribes state that wars are frequently started for
the sole purpose of obtaining slaves for sale to the Europeans.
"Thus we have another consequence of the trade which can have only
a baleful influence on the destiny of Africa . . . i t i s difficult
to comprehend how the areas where such warfare i s most common avoid
becoming depopulated."^
Criminals are another source of slaves, and the sale of
criminals as slaves to Europeans "perhaps . . . provides the
opportunity for the greatest cruelty and injustice.

There i s l i t t l e

doubt . . . that transgressions which previously could be paid off

5 1Ibid.,

pp. 7-8.

5 2 Ibid.,

p. 9.
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with a small fine . . . are now punished with enslavement.

CO
°

The committee concluded that the European presence on the
coast of Africa had had only "the most evil consequences for Africa":
Africans have learned of needs [Bedtlrfnisse] and luxuries of
which they previously knew nothing; the Europeans have taught the
Africans to satisfy these wants a t the cost of every feeling
of humanity and morality; we have taught them to use our weapons,
so that they could make war with greater success and procure a
great number of prisoners. On the other hand, we Europeans
have kept the Africans in ignorance of all the things which
could have been truly useful to them. We have done nothing
with regard to exporting useful knowledge to these peoples—who
are surely not unfit for a certain amount of civilization. The
Europeans have not taught the Africans living in areas where
the soil i s extremely f e r t i l e to grow crops which would enable
them to engage in a trade which would have to become incomparably
more important for them than this trade in human beings, this
slave trade which tears asunder their bonds of community and
spreads mistrust and unrest [Unruhe] among tribes which, with
their climate and s o i l , are so strongly favored by nature. With
all of these disadvantages on the one side and absolutely
nothing but the selfishness of the Europeans on the other, no
more doubt can be allowed concerning the morality of the slave
trade. For this reason one cannot possibly maintain that the
slave trade i s legitimate.54
As for the European slave traders and those who buy slaves in America,
they cannot plead their innocence by saying they know nothing of how
the slaves they buy actually became slaves when, in fact, they are
the ones who provide the motive for "the most unlawful, evil deeds"
by which more Africans are

enslaved.

55

The committee argued that Africa would clearly benefit if
the slave trade were outlawed and quoted testimony by Alexander

5 3 Ibid.,

p. 10.

5 / 4bid.,

pp. 10-11. Again, the influence of Schimmelmann's
Bedenken i s clear.
5 5 Ibid.,

p. 12.

94
Falconbridge, who had found during his travels along the coast of
Africa that the only Africans who suffered when the slave trade was
interrupted were those engaged in the slave trade, and that peace
and trust had returned when i t was interrupted.
I t is thus indisputable that the Europeans are the cause of
the crimes of the Africans, crimes the latter commit on account
of the slave trade. The crimes of the Africans would cease i f
the occasion [Gelegenheit] for the crimes were to cease; and
when one . . . applies the principles of religion and ethics
to the slave trade, then probably no other conclusion can be
drawn but that the slave trade . . . i s i l l i c i t [unerlaubt]
and that no other benefit could be important enough to justify
the continuation of the slave trade.5°
Even more immoral than the purchase of slaves in Africa
was the Middle Passage.

In order to avoid exaggerating i t s evils,

the committee's report cautioned, one had to "set aside a l l notions
and feelings which, because of a refined upbringing . . . would make
another condition seem more terrible than i f such feelings were
absent."
But whatever standard of human development [Ausbildung] one
chooses to presuppose, i t i s undeniable that i t would be
difficult to imagine a more miserable physical condition than
that in which the Negro slaves find themselves during their
transportation from Africa to America. Crowded together and
chained in the narrow hold of a ship, they must often during
stormy weather spend several days without any access to fresh
a i r and endure an atmosphere which even the European crew
members cannot approach without fainting. All day the healthy
often remain chained together with the loathesomely i l l , the
living beside the dead. 5 7
The slaves are given only the barest amounts of food and
water because, on the slave ships, space i s needed to place as many

5 6 Ibid.,

pp. 12-14.

5 7 Ibid.,

pp. 14-15.
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slaves as possible.

There are many instances recorded where

the slaves, driven by desperation, have sought to free themselves by
force, but "even more frequent are the examples of their eagerly
seeking an opportunity to throw themselves overboard . . . .

It is

unnecessary to delve further into these revolting details . . . .
What has already been said can suffice as proof that the transport
CO

of the slaves i s not reconcilable with any feelings of humanity."
Some argue that the Negro i s inferior, but this has not
been proven; even i f i t were true, i t would not justify the
wretched treatment of the slaves during the Middle Passage.

The

state could perhaps ease the lot of the slave during the journey
by means of regulations, but enforcement would be difficult so long
as such regulations were contrary to the interests of those
conducting the slave trade.

The high mortality rate for the slaves

during the Middle Passage provides incontestable proof of the
disastrous impact of the slave trade on the enslaved Africans:
When one considers that the slave buyers on the African coast
take pains to purchase only healthy persons; that all of these
persons are in an age group which in normal circumstances has
a mortality rate that i s far lower than that of other age
groups; and yet that the number of these persons who die in
the brief time period of a few months i s absolutely out of all
proportion to what is normal in other circumstances, . . . no
cause for this unnaturally high mortality rate i s possible other
than the treatment to which the slaves are subjected during the
journey to America. 5 9
The committee, without giving any source, stated that the

^ I b i d . , pp. 15-16.
5 9 Ibid.,

pp. 16-18.

"treatment of slaves on Danish ships i s acknowledged to be better
than on the ships of other nations," but then used data i t had
gathered to support i t s contention that slave ships were death
traps.

Of 17,113 slaves shipped from Africa to America from 1778

through 1789,

2,706 died during the Middle Passage, or fifteen

per cent of the total.

During the subsequent "seasoning" in the

islands, because of illnesses contracted on the ships or the change
in climate and way of l i f e , as many i f not more died as on the
ships:
Facts such as those presented here require no further comment.
They speak for themselves. I t i s hard to acknowledge, yet
even more difficult to dispute, that the border line between
such an inevitable sacrifice of human l i f e [as i s involved
in the slave trade] and actual murder, i f the line were to be
drawn by an impartial hand, could only be very vague
[schwankend].60
As a result of their practice over a long period of time,
however, abuses such as the slave trade can become so intimately
connected with beneficial matters that eradicating the abuses
risks destroying practices which are useful, and there i s
consequently a need for the most careful deliberation before any
action is taken:
This may well be the case with the slave trade and, as much
as we, by dint of every moral and humane sentiment, might feel
ourselves pressed to recommend most humbly that Your Royal
Majesty abolish the slave trade unconditionally [die unbedingte
Aufhebung des Neqerhandels allerunterthanigst anzurathenj, we
s t i l l have the duty of not failing to investigate carefully
the connection between the slave trade and other matters that
are important for the state and for the subjects of Your Royal

60Ibid.,

pp. 18-19.

Majesty, and the consequences which might result from
abolition.
The committee therefore dealt in turn with the importance
of the slave trade i t s e l f for Denmark in comparison with "other
branches of commerce" and the influence of the slave trade on
"the present and future cultivation of Your Majesty's West Indian
colonies."

The data indicated that from 1778 through 1789, a total

of 17,113 slaves was purchased in Africa by Danish slavers, including
12,062 at the Danish forts, for a yearly average of 1,426 (see
Appendix I I I ) .

The committee took care to note that those years

included a war between England and France "which provided the Danish
slave trade with an opportunity for expansion which normally i s not
available."

During the; years when the slave trade was not affected

by the war, Danish slavers carried an annual average of

894 slaves

to America; and since the war ended, the Danish slave trade has
"receded into i t s usual rut [Geleis]."
The number of ships used in the trade was proportional
to the number of slaves carried, and peaked during the war years
and the two immediate post-war years (see Appendix I I I ) .

Altogether,

from 1778 through 1789, Danish slavers made 50 voyages from Africa
to the West Indies; only one voyage was made in 1791.

Spare slaves

a t the Danish forts in Africa had been sold recently to French
slavers in accordance with agreements with French companies.

6 1 Ibid.,

p. 20.

6 2 Ibid.,

pp. 21-22.

The
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committee concluded "there i s at present no likelihood that these
Co
numbers can be increased."
The committee next analyzed the cargo l i s t of a ship engaged
in trade with the Guinea Coast in an attempt to describe the origin
of goods used to purchase slaves.

The total value of the cargo was

58,336 riqsdaler, with articles valued a t 21,415 rigsdaler probably
produced in Denmark and the rest of the merchandise, valued at
36,921 rigsdaler, produced abroad.

Even if two such cargoes were

sent to the Guinea Coast each year, only 42,830 rigsdaler worth of
Danish products would be involved. 6 ^
Experience, the committee noted, has shown that the slave
trade itself has "nearly always produced more losses than profits."
The royal committee appointed in 1786 to investigate means by which
the Guinea trade could be made more profitable had found l i t t l e
hope for improving the situation.

The committee had found that, in

order to export 1,400 slaves annually, "four forts and three lodges
had to be maintained on the Gold Coast with a not inconsiderable
number of employees, so that i t i s easy to perceive that unusually
high sales earnings are required in order to defray the extraordinary
expenses."

Prices for slaves in the Danish islands are low, and

even the sale of slaves to the French islands has not brought

6 3 Ibid.,

MH
O
Ibid.,

pp. 22-23.

p. 24. The most valuable items in the cargo
studied by the committee were gunpowder, muskets, and brandy, with
gunpowder valued at 8,528 rigsdaler, muskets a t 6,083 rigsdaler and
brandy at 5,506 riqsdaler.

particular benefit to Danish slavers; in fact, "the entrepreneurs of
the slave trade are satisfied when they realize . . . quite moderate
profits or merely escape without losses."^
The committee argued that the effect of the slave trade on
Danish shipping was of very slight significance:
Employment of two or three ships and the sailors needed to man
them i s , in relation to the totality of Danish shipping, such a
small matter that, i f i t i s not to be regarded as quite
unimportant, i t could nevertheless scarcely be considered
significant once a more noble and important interest made i t s
abolition necessary.
As an additional indictment of the slave trade, the
committee used Thomas Clarkson's argument that the trade, rather
than serving as a nursery for seamen, was actually a graveyard for
them.

For various reasons, including the long sojourn on the Guinea

Coast and disease on the ships, "there are always far more deaths
among sailors on slave ships than . . . in normal circumstances."
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No data from Danish slave ships were used to support this contention.
The committee concluded:
We can consequently, in view of the points we have examined
here, be of no other opinion than that the slave trade in i t s e l f
cannot be regarded as so important for the state, or for those
of Your Majesty's subjects who are immediately involved in i t ,
that i t s economic importance could be used as an important
argument against abolition.68
But though the slave trade i t s e l f was not important enough

6 5 Ibid.,

pp. 25-26.

67Ibid.,

pp. 26-27.

6 8 Ibid.,

p. 28.
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to provide an argument against abolition, the committee f e l t there
was another matter which might be:
We come now to the most important and most difficult point
of this entire investigation, namely the relation of the slave
trade to the West Indian colonies, and the question of whether
with respect to the colonies i t would be possible and feasible
to abolish the slave trade. 9
The committee believed that, without recourse to the slave
trade in the past, the West Indian islands would have been poorly
developed and that slavery as i t now existed had to be accepted as
"the established and customary system of cultivation" which "cannot
yet be abolished."
No matter how desirable i t would be to attain the goal of soon
freeing the slaves [So wtlnschenswerth es seyn wdrde den Zwek den
Befreiung der Neqer bald zu erreichen]7U and as much as we are
convinced that this distant but, at some future time, possible
goal must not be lost from view in all arrangements which are
made with regard to the slaves [und so sehr wir tlberzeugt sind,
dass dieser entfernte aber dereinst mfigliche Zwek bei alien
Veranstaltungen, die in Absicht der Neqer getroffen werden,
nicht aus dem Gesicht verloren werden mtlsse^] .yet we are also
fully convinced that emancipation i s absolutely not a matter to
be dealt with at present, and that each incautious regulation
could bring on very dangerous consequences [so sind wir doch auch
vttl1ig Uberzeugt, dass das durchaus keine Sache des Augenbliks
seyn, und dass jede unvorsichtige Masregel sehr gefahrfiche
Folqen veranlassen kOnne]./Z

6 9 Ibid.,

pp. 28-29.

^°Ibid., pp. 29-30. The word "soon" [bald] was deleted from
the Danish translation of the report published by Kirstein in Minerva,
April 1792, p. 56. This was f i r s t noted by C.A. Trier in his article
"Det dansk-vestindiske Negerinfdtfrselsforbud af 1792," Historisk
Tidsskrift, 7th Series, V (1904), 430.
^This statement also was deleted from the version published
in Danish in Minerva. The committee apparently feared that the
language used on the subject of emancipation in i t s original report
was too strong and that, since emancipation was not deemed feasible
anyway, broaching the subject would serve only to frighten persons who
could accept abolition of the slave trade but not emancipation.
7 2 Allerunterthanigste

Vorstellung, pp. 29-30.
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The committee believed that a long period would be needed
in which to prepare the slaves for freedom:
Before a class of people which for so many years has lived in
a state of unconditional slavery can be liberated from forcible
subjection to their masters [gegen die Gewalthfltigkeiten ihrer
Herren 7 3 ] and placed under the protection of public laws, i t i s
absolutely necessary that they possess a certain level of
knowledge [Kenntnisse] and morality which, among the Negro
slaves, cannot be assumed to exist at the present time. The
education of the slaves must precede their emancipation, for
otherwise their own well-being and the well-being of their
masters will be jeopardized [Ihre Erziehung muss ihrer Befreiung
vorangehen, sonst wird ihr eigenes Mohl und das Mohl ihrer
Herren aufs Spiel geseztlT A premature and rash measure could
easily carry them to the point where they would choose to obtain
by violent means that which must s t i l l be withheld from them;
and with their numerical preponderance over the white inhabitants
of the colonies, perhaps only a few bold and clever leaders
would be required to put into execution such a plan and to bring
i t to fruition.74
The committee thus postponed consideration of emancipation on grounds
that the slaves were not yet ready for freedom and that talk of
emancipation might spark a major slave revolt. 7 5

7 3 This

phrase too was l e f t out of the Danish version
published in Minerva, p. 56.
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, pp. 30-31. The thinking
of M. Frossard was probably of influence here, as his book was one
of the sources used by the committee. After strongly condemning
slavery as an odious tyranny that violated the rights of man
("L'esclavage est 1'infraction la plus criminelle des droits de
l'homme e t du citoyen, la tyrannie la plus odieuse, l ' a t t e n t a t l e
plus reprehensible."), Frossard stated that "L'affranchissement
gene'ral des negres est un projet sublime dans la theorie. Mais
son execution n'est possible que graduellement . . . . II faut
un si^cle de bonnes actions pour corriger trois siecles de tyrannie."
See his La Cause des esclaves negres e t des habitants de la Guin^e
(Lyon, 1789), pp. 20-21.
75
The slaves in the Danish West Indies were not emancipated
until July 3, 1848, and then only when they threatened to destroy
St. Croix.
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But emancipation was not the real issue confronting the
committee.

Rather, i t s problem was to find a means to end the

slave trade—a type of commerce that was both unprofitable and
immoral—yet maintain an adequate slave labor force in the colonies
so that sugar production would not suffer:
If i t were possible to place the slaves who are presently in
the islands, or who would be present there after the passage
of a certain number of years, in a condition that would enable
them--as other peoples living under civilized conditions
[gesel 1 schaftlicher Verfassung]—not only to maintain their
population but to increase i t , all new importations would
become unnecessary and would cease spontaneously . . . .
The careful examination of this possibility has had to be one of
the principal objects of our investigation.' 6
The committee noted that, in Africa, Negroes reproduced as
well i f not better than people elsewhere.

And " I t i s an indisputable

truth that Negro females in the West Indies, when living in regular
conjugal relationships [ordentlicher ehelicher Verbindung], are very
f e r t i l e . . . ."^ 7

Therefore, when one finds that "hitherto no

regular and adequate propagation has occurred among the slaves in the
West Indian colonies of all nations, one can seek the reason for this
solely in their circumstances and condition in the colonies." 7 8
The Danish West Indies, the report stated, have been just as
dependent on the slave trade as have other West Indian colonies, with
the slave population declining whenever the slave trade has been

7 6 Allerunterth&nigste

Vorstellung, pp. 31-32.

7 7 Ibid.

Oldendorp, another source used by the committee,
had written about the high f e r t i l i t y rate of the slaves. See his
Geschichte der Mission der evangelischen Brtlder, I , 407.
7 8 Allerunterthclnigste

Vorstellung, pp. 32-33.

103
interrupted.

The committee, after detailed study of the population

problem, had concluded that a low birth rate rather than a high
death rate was largely responsible for the natural decrease of the
slave population.

Having obtained from the General Customs

Department a l i s t of all slaves on St. Croix during eleven
consecutive years, together with the number of births and deaths for
each year, the coimrittee found that the average number of deaths
-

annually was 776, the average number of births 432.

There was one

death for every twenty-eight slaves and one birth for every f i f t y one—a crude death rate of 35.7 and a crude birth rate of 19.6.
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The committee used data on birth and death rates in Europe
to show that the death rate among the slaves on St. Croix was not
abnormally high but that the birth rate was unusually low; i t said
deaths could be reduced by better care of young children and sick
persons, and by checking the spread of epidemics.
especially important:

The latter was

in 1784 only 485 slaves died, but in 1782,

1,118 died and in 1783, 983; each of these years saw epidemic out
breaks of smallpox and measles.

In 1789, another year in which there

was an epidemic, 1,278 slaves died.

During the eight years in which

there were no epidemics, deaths averaged 644 per year, or one death
for every thirty-four slaves (a crude death rate of 2 9 . 4 ) . ^
The committee suggested that i t was unlikely that three
years out of every eleven would witness epidemics, but quite probable

^ I b i d . , p. 33.
80Ibid.,

See Appendix VII.

pp. 34-35.
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that there would be one or two such years per decade; therefore
i t combined the death rate which included the three years when there
had been epidemics with the average death rate for the eight years
in which no epidemics had occurred to obtain a rate judged to be
more realistic, in this case one death for every thirty-one slaves
(a crude death rate of 32.3).*^
The committee commented on the peculiar age structure of
the slave population, with i t s low ratio of children to adults
(a result of importing primarily adult slaves), and noted that the
death rate for young children was in normal circumstances much higher
than for adults.
I t appears therefore to follow that the mortality rate for adult
slaves must be much greater than is normal and that, i f the
number of children were in the proper ratio to adults, the
slaves' mortality rate in i t s entirety would prove to be more
disadvantageous than the calculations above indicated. We
believe i t must be admitted that in fact such a high death rate
among adult slaves does occur, but we believe also there i s
ample reason for believing that i t i s partly due to the high
mortality rate among slaves recently imported from Africa.
This notwithstanding, i t appears to us s t i l l possible to assume
that the current mortality rate on St. Croix could, by means
of some suitable arrangements, easily be lowered to the extent
that i t would not stand in the way of the goal of having the
slave population become self-sustaining, thereby obviating the
need for continued dependence on the slave trade.82
A much more difficult problem than the death rate, according
to the committee, was presented by the low birth rate among the slaves.
In a normal society there would be an excess of births over deaths,

^ I b i d . , p. 36.
82Ibid.,

pp. 36-37.
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except during periods when extraordinary circumstances intervened,
but the Negro slaves did not live under normal social conditions.
Would i t be possible to improve their living standards so that,
"except for the matter of their lack of personal freedom," they
could "enjoy approximately the same advantages as mankind in
general?"
The slaves have always been regarded merely as tools [Werkzeuge];
people have even made the abominable computation [den abscheulichen
Calcul] as to whether i t i s more profitable to l e t the slaves
work moderately hard and thereby maintain their lives and useful
ness for a longer period, or to strain them to the utmost of their
powers and, when they die from their suffering, to purchase new
slaves. For so long as such a computation i s possible, i t is
difficult to imagine that anything can be done in order to bring
about natural propagation and multiplication among the slaves.
Experience also indicates that the planters in general have
always had in view only their immediate benefit and have opposed
everything which did not promote their immediate gain. Thus
in purchasing slaves their chief aim has been to acquire male
slaves because they could expect more work from them than from
female slaves; this has resulted in a numerical imbalance
between the sexes, wherein lies indisputably the principal reason
for the small number of births. 8 3
The committee had secured l i s t s of slaves on those St. Croix
and St. Thomas plantations which were mortgaged to the Danish Crown
and discovered that the ratio of male to female slaves on the St.
Croix plantations was 100:86.

On the plantations on St. Thomas,

however, the ratio was 100:94.6. 8 ^

83Ibid.,

84

pp. 37-39.

Ibid., p. 39. These differing ratios of male to female
slaves surely derived from the fact that St. Croix was a much more
recently developed island than St. Thomas, and therefore i t s slave
population was more strongly influenced by the African slave trade,
which supplied more male slaves than female.
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The committee relied on very limited data in reaching i t s conclusion
that there was a major imbalance between the sexes, a conclusion later
shown to be without basis; i t s fear of involving the West Indian
government, and thereby the planters through their burger councils,
restricted i t s access to information on the slave population.

It is

indeed remarkable that Schimmelmann accepted this erroneous view of
the ratio of male to female slaves; he should have known from the
yearly reports sent to him from the islands that his plantations,
La Princesse and LaGrange on St. Croix, Caroline on St. John, and
Thomas on St. Thomas, possessed in 1792 a decided preponderance of
female slaves among their adult population—309 females to 258 males,
with the largest plantation, La Princesse, having 139 adult female
slaves and only 99 adult male slaves. 8 5
In addition to the disproportionate number of males in the
slave population, the committee believed there were other factors
detrimental to a higher birth rate.

One of these was the lack of

attention given to promoting slave marriages:
The indifference towards almost everything which could have
influence on improving the living conditions of the slaves has
been extended to include slave marriages. Slave marriages have
in general not been hindered, but nothing has been done to
encourage them, when one considers ,iow difficult i t must be for
people living as Negro slaves, in their suffering, to join
together in marriage. 8 ®

8 5 DSA, Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv.
Pk. 72.
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1782-1800, Vortrag zur
Generalversammlung den 1 May, 1794, p. 4. Slave population of the
Schimmelmann plantations as of October, 1792.
8 ®Allerunterthanigste

Vorstellung, p. 40.

107
The committee argued that planters, in breaking up slave
marriages by selling one of the partners or in destroying slave
families by separating children from their parents, actually
discouraged the formation of slave marriages and thereby impeded
the growth of the slave population.^

Because the slaves know

that there is no guarantee the families they form will not be
broken up by the masters, they tend to suppress their inclination
toward forming stable family units and live promiscuously instead.
The whites contribute to the slaves' promiscuous behavior when they
"unscrupulously use slave women, without considering the personal
situation of the women, for the satisfaction of their own (because
of the warm climate) passionate needs, as they would use the women
for any other service." 8 ^
There were other factors, besides the low birth rate, which
harmed the growth of the slave population:
The constant, exclusive goal of immediate profits results in too
l i t t l e care being devoted to women during pregnancy and after
delivery, as well as to the children in their earliest years.
I t i s true that now on most plantations pregnant women, in the
period immediately preceding delivery, are spared a certain
amount of work, but this practice i s s t i l l too arbitrary and
imperfect to have much effect . . . , especially when this
better treatment i s not extended to the c h i l d r e n . 8 9

8 7 Ibid., p. 41.
The committee told of a recent incident in
which a slave boy had been taken from his mother and sold to another
plantation; the woman had committed suicide.
88
Ibid., pp. 42-43. Promiscuity abetted the spread of venereal
disease, which often l e f t i t s victims s t e r i l e , and was thought to
reduce the care and attention slave mothers gave to their infants by
different or unknown fathers.
89Ibid.,

p. 43.
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When the mother i s compelled to return to work in the
fields a few months after giving birth, her baby i s denied the care
i t needs at such an early age.

The mother must take her child with

her into the fields where, while she works, i t lies "with a piece
of sugar cane in i t s mouth" and i s subjected to the bites of insects.
If there should be an old slave woman available who cannot be used
for any other kind of work, she i s assigned the task of looking after
the young children, though this i s s t i l l not as effective as having
the children's mothers look after them.

" I t is only natural that

the health of the children suffers from such treatment and i s often
ruined for the rest of their lives."9®
Another factor which the committee believed inhibited
population growth was the large number of house slaves.

These

slaves had become a customary symbol of success for the planters,
and some planters maintained as many as f i f t y of them.

House slaves

generally remained unmarried, and because there were so many of them the
number of slave births was believed to be lower than i t would otherwise have been.
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The committee believed the various hindrances to population
growth mentioned above were correctable weaknesses in the slave
system and could be solved, some immediately, others gradually, "if
. . . laws and morals were to lend a mutual helping hand to such a

9 0 Ibid.,

pp. 43-44.

9 1 Ibid.,

pp. 44-45.

)
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noble and useful purpose [einem so edlen und ndzlichen Zwekke]."
Data had been collected which, though rather incomplete, could
nevertheless be of value.

Two tables accompanying the committee's

report provided a l i s t of slaves on the four Schimmelmann family
plantations for the years 1773-1782. (See Appendix VIII.)

The

tables showed that on these plantations the slave death rate was
approximately the same as on St. Croix as a whole, namely one death
a year for every twenty-seven slaves (a crude rate of 35.2 per
1,000).

But on the other hand the Schimmelmann plantations had a

much higher rate of slave births—one for every thirty-five slaves,
or a crude birth rate of 28.5 per 1,000.

The ratio of male to female

slaves was 100:90, a disproportion which the committee considered
the primary reason for the excess of deaths over births.

"In any

case these facts provide a strong basis for the probability of our
earlier proposition that the present small number of births i s the
result of adventitious circumstances," the removal of which would end
Qp
the natural decrease of the slave population.
The committee had failed to obtain further examples of birth
and death rates on the Danish islands, but believed data found in
works describing the situation on other West Indian islands could be
instructive.

Clarkson had described more than half a dozen instances

in which plantations on Jamaica had been able to increase their slave
populations solely by humane treatment of the slaves and by encourage-
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Ibid., pp. 45-47. The ratio of male to female slaves on
the Schimmelmann plantations had changed dramatically by 1792. See
above, p. 106.

no
ment given the slaves to propagate.

Clarkson had noted other

islands, including St. Kitts, Antigua, Barbados, and St. Domingue,
on which an excess of births over deaths had occurred on some
plantations.

Clarkson had also referred to plantations where the

slave population declined dramatically when a new, harsh master
took over.

The conroittee also used examples provided by Frossard of

how good treatment of slaves in the French West Indies had ended or
almost ended dependence on the slave trade on some plantations there.^
The committee concluded that in the proper circumstances
the slaves were capable of maintaining and even increasing their
population by natural means.

The task remained of determining the

precise measures by which obstacles which hindered the natural
increase of the slaves in the Danish West Indies could be removed in
order to end the islands' dependence on the slave trade; normally one
would f i r s t investigate how this might be accomplished before
deciding that the slave trade should be abolished:
But, since we consider abolition of the slave trade to be itself
a means of promoting, of i t s own accord, the propagation of the
slaves, we must most humbly request permission here . . . a t
least to presume that Your Royal Majesty will deign most
graciously to abolish the slave trade irrevocably and to tolerate
the continuation of the slave trade only for a stipulated period
of perhaps ten more years.94
The committee believed i t imperative that the Crown should
announce i t s intent to abolish the trade:

93

Ibid., pp. 47-50. The committee was using Clarkson's
Essay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade (London, 1788), and Frossard 1 s
La cause des esclaves nSgres.
QA
Allerunterthflnigste Vorstellung, pp. 51-52.
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As soon as such a law is made public, one can anticipate
that the plantation owners will begin thinking spontaneously
of the means they might use to enable themselves to preserve
a plantation population which i s an indispensable necessity for
the benefit of the planters themselves, so that the success
of the matter could well nigh be l e f t to the planters; but t h i s ,
however, we dare not do, since experience has often shown that
people can also be insufficiently enlightened as to their own
self-interest to be able to surmount antiquated prejudices
[verjahrte Vorurtheile] and to proceed with a change in
procedures to which they have been accustomed for a long time.
Moreover, i t might develop in this instance that the necessary
arrangements require a cash advance which not all plantation
owners could obtain; hence, financial aid for them might be
found necessary and feasible.95
The committee noted that the slave population on St. Croix
from 1780 through 1790 ranged between 21,000 and just under 23,000
(see Appendix VIII), and during the decade the slave population
declined by 562.

The planters had not appeared eager to buy more

slaves and would probably content themselves with the smallest
number needed to get by:
We cannot accept the present slave population of St. Croix
as a sufficient basis on which the completed population could
be founded; even the disproportion between male and female
slaves stands in the way of this. One must at least take into
account the need to procure approximately as many slaves as are
necessary to bring about a proper ratio of male to female slaves;
and since there might be many individual plantation owners who
are more than casually interested in stocking their plantations
with new slaves, i t would be a hard blow to them i f they were
suddenly deprived of the hope of being able to save their
fortunes from ruin by purchasing fresh slaves. There would also
be complaints from the well-to-do planters i f they were
suddenly denied all opportunity for making improvements, which
they had the intention and means of carrying out, to their
property. On these grounds we have decided that, from the time
when the irrevocable decision to abolish the slave trade i s
made, there ought to be a ten-year toleration of the trade.
Such a policy . . . would give the planters an opportunity,
according to their circumstances and plans, of furnishing

95Ibid.,

pp. 52-53.
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themselves with as many slaves as they desire and are
capable of obtaining. In order to provide the planters with
every possible alleviation [Erleichterung], i t would in our
most humble opinion be advisable during the proposed ten-year
period [prior to abolition of the slave trade] to permit an
unrestricted importation of slaves . . . and also to allow
foreign vessels, in exchange for each slave they sell in the
Danish islands, to take out of the Danish colonies a certain
amount of sugar. We maintain that such an unrestricted
importation i s all the more necessary, as even now the complaints
of the West Indian planters over the small number of slaves
supplied by the entrepreneurs of the Baltic Company [de Coninck's
company] are very common.96
The committee referred to the number of slaves sold in
the Danish islands from 1778 through 1789 to indicate that the
planters did have reason to complain.

The number of slaves purchased

by planters in the Danish islands had declined:

96Ibid.,

1778

908

1779

979

1780

438

1781

1,229

1782

192

1783

629

1784

305

1785

115

1786

406

1787

492

1788

249

1789

287
6,229

pp. 53-56.
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Low prices for slaves in the Danish islands were considered
by the Baltic Company as the reason for the declining numbers of
slaves sold there, for the planters were willing to pay only
prices that were too low to allow for a profit.
The conmrittee decided that unrestricted competition both
for slave ships seeking to sell slaves in the Danish West Indies
and for planters wishing to buy slaves was the best solution to the
problem of supplying the islands with more slaves quickly.

The

planters who lacked the resources needed to purchase enough slaves
for their plantations should be aided by the Crown in order to ensure
the success of the plan for abolition; the planters should be
"allowed to entertain hopes of receiving some benefit through the
benevolence of Your Royal Majesty.
The committee estimated that during the l a s t ten years of
the slave trade to the Danish West Indies, the Crown would have to
assist needy planters in purchasing an average of 600 slaves a year.
If each slave cost 200 rigsdaler, a yearly sum of 120,000 rigsdaler
would have to be made available for that purpose, amounting to
1,200,000 rigsdaler over the ten-year period.

Detailed proposals for

the loans to the planters should be drawn up in the West Indies under

^ I b i d . , p. 57. Yet i f the demand for slaves in the Danish
West Indies really had been strong, the planters would have been
willing to pay more for African slaves. The local planters wanted
more slaves, but did not need them so badly that they were willing
to pay competitive prices.
no

J O Ibid., p. 58. Obviously, this would undercut any resistance
to abolition by the planters, as would the ten-year postponement
of abolition.
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the supervision of the burger councils on each of the islands,
and in Denmark direction of the loans should be entrusted to the
Commission for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt."

Security

for the loans would be provided f i r s t and foremost by a mortgage
on those slaves bought with the loans and if necessary on other
property owned by the planters.

For planters who were unable to

provide sufficient security for the loans they wanted, the committee
believed that appropriate supervision could keep the risk a t a low
level.

"And should i t prove impossible [for the Danish government]

to avoid some losses, the noble and great purpose [of the loans]
could probably justify a small sacrifice."^ 0 0
Because the loans were intended to serve primarily as a
means of improving the productive capacity of the plantations, the
committee emphasized that the planters must not be allowed to
neglect the slaves already present in the islands.

Slaves bought with

the loan should increase the population of the plantations, not
merely maintain i t J 0 ^
The committee also wanted the burger councils to see to i t
that those planters on whose plantations the male population was
disproportionately large used the loan to

" i b i d . , p. 59.
to administer collection
planters after the Crown
they held on plantations

purchase more female slaves

This commission had been created in 1786
of the debts owed the Crown by various
had bought from Dutch bankers the mortgages
in the Danish islands.

1 0 0 Ibid.,

pp. 59-60.

1 0 1 Ibid.,

pp. 62-63.
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in order to raise the birth rate.

For those planters who did not

need to use the loan fund to buy slaves, self-interest alone should
dictate an emphasis on acquiring more female slaves.

No law could

force them to do so, but "We believe that an arrangement could be
devised whereby the head tax [Kopfschatze] could be used in pursuit
of the goal of increasing the proportion of female slaves."

The

committee recommended removing the head tax on adult female slaves
and doubling the head tax on male slaves over twelve years of age.
To allow the planters time to prepare for this change and to acquire
more female slaves, a period of three years should elapse following
publication of this regulation before i t would be enforced.

This

measure would provide another motive for the planters to look after
their own future i n t e r e s t s J 0 2
The large number of house slaves was considered another
hindrance to population growth which the committee believed could
be dealt with by imposing a special head tax.

Revenue from this tax

should be set aside for distribution as bonuses to planters who did
most to promote slave marriages and the growth of the slave popula
tion.103
The remaining serious obstacles to population growth, the
committee thought, were based on the fact that the blacks were
enslaved, totally at the mercy of their masters.

This made i t

impossible for the slaves to do anything themselves to improve

102Ibid.,

pp. 64-66.

103Ibid.,

pp. 66-67.
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their condition—for them "there remains nothing but blind
obedience to the will of another."
emancipated:

The slaves cannot be

"In the present set of circumstances [that] can only

be prepared for, not actually brought about immediately by means
of laws."

Therefore the best way of improving the treatment of

slaves was by appealing to the planters' self-interest:

"This

route to the goal [of helping the slaves] will have to be taken,
for so long as the good-will of the planters i s not involved in
the matter, their unwillingness or even their insubordination will
necessarily make everything precarious.
Hitherto, the committee said, the planters have thought
that every step

towards improving the spiritual level of the

slaves or bettering their condition would endanger the security
of the white inhabitants of the islands.

This fear, which has

led the planters to refuse to accept proposals for improving the
living conditions and moral standards of the slaves, was the result
of the whites' being outnumbered ten to one.

The recent rebellion

on St. Domingue could only increase the fears and prejudices of
the whites.

Yet, the committee argued, the planters were mistaken

in believing that harsh treatment was a deterrent to slave revolts:
I t i s a principle derived from nature and the experiences of
history that, the more harshly people are oppressed, the more
active must be their desire to throw off their yoke and the
more terrible the explosion when they undertake to accomplish
this goal, which they will do as soon as they find an opportunity^

1 0 4 Ibid.,

pp. 68-70.

1 0 5 Ibid.»

pp. 70-71.
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The proposition that i t is less dangerous for the planters
to treat their slaves well than to oppose measures that would help
the slaves was also borne out by the events which usually occurred
during a slave rising:
Always during such rebellions the whites, and especially
the slave masters, are persecuted with the greatest rage by
the slaves, and only those whites who had been noted for
treating their slaves particularly well are exempted [from
harm], which fact also provides a curious proof that the slaves
are by no means insensible to feelings of decency and humanity
. . . . The slave must be inclined to make use of every
opportunity for a rising, so long as he has everything to gain
by doing so and extremely l i t t l e to lose. The bonds which t i e
the slave to the human community are . . . so weak that their
rending asunder can cost the slave's heart very l i t t l e . . . .'06
Improving the treatment of slaves would help the planters
combat the threat of revolt:
When the external circumstances of the slave's existence
are softened; when, at least for a s t a r t , the slave's marriage
and his entire domestic l i f e are protected; when the slave i s
given universal permission and opportunity to acquire something
of his own; when the prospect i s thereby opened to him of some
day obtaining freedom for himself or his children; then all
of those things will provide so many bonds that the slave's
inclination to tear himself away from his situation will be
resisted. The more he has to lose, the less willing he will be
to risk rebel!ion.107
Reforms which gave the slaves hope for the future were one

106Ibid.,
107Ibid.,

pp. 71-72.

pp. 72-73. Of course in practice the slaves were
permitted to sell produce from their garden plots and acquire money
to buy goods in the towns or to buy their freedom. Oldendorp wrote
that he knew a Negro who had purchased his own freedom and that of
his two wives, and mentioned the practice whereby a slave could
make a down payment on his freedom and obtain conditional release,
so that he could move to one of the towns to earn the money needed
to purchase his full freedom. See his Geschichte der Mission der
evangelischen Brtlder, I , 402.
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way of reducing the danger of insurrection, the committee stated.
Another means of achieving the same goal was to abolish the slave
trade:
Without doubt the danger of slave rebellion would be very
greatly reduced i f , as a result of the abolition of the slave
trade, the day should come when all the slaves in the West
Indies have been born there and no more slaves arrive from
Africa. Slaves from Africa, who have been snatched away from
their fatherland and deprived of all their family connections,
and then subjected to atrocious treatment during the Middle
Passage, are certain to be much more inclined to attempt
a desperate rising than those slaves born in the West Indies,
living in a family unit which they value highly, and
acquainted with no better living conditions from their own
experience
The committee was highly sensitive about the rights of
property, including property in human beings, and was hesitant on
the subject of having the Danish government enact laws that would
interfere with the slaveholders' control of their slaves.

The

committee insisted again that by treating their slaves well,
"the whites are bound to bring about a security of l i f e for them
selves based on love and t r u s t , which i s incomparably more productive
than controlling the slaves only by force."

The committee could

either recommend attempting to persuade the planters to improve the
treatment of their slaves or trying to compel the planters to do

^ AllerunterthSnigste Vorstellung, p. 73. An undated
document in Kirstein's handwriting, obviously used during the
committee's deliberations, stated that the general opinion of writers
acquainted with the West Indies was that slaves born in the islands
"were a better race of people than those brought from Africa [eine
bessere Race von Menschen sind als die aus Africa gekommen]."
Oldendorp, Frossard, and E. Long, History of Jamaica (3 vols; London,
1774) were used as sources. Kirstein added that slaves from Africa
were described as "filled with hate for the whites" and the prime
agents of insurrection, while creole slaves frequently assisted their
masters in uncovering plots and quelling revolts.
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so by means of legal restrictions.

After urging that the Crown

issue ordinances which, though not legally binding, would admonish
the planters to adopt a policy of amelioration, the committee
suggested that perhaps "regulations having the force of law
[geseztliche Anordnungen]" would have to be issued to provide some
protection for the slaves.

Yet the committee tried to avoid giving

the impression that i t wanted to interfere with the property rights
of the slaveholders:
Of course we have not, in considering the need for regulations,
lost sight of the fundamental principle that the slaves are
s t i l l to be regarded as the lawful property of their masters,
and therefore anything that appears to be an attack on the
planters' property rights must be avoided; but, . . . as i t i s
incontestably within the realm of the legislating power to
direct every use of property in such a manner that no detriment
for society as a whole [das qanze der Gesellschaft] arises
therefrom, . . . there can be even less dispute about adopting
regulations which serve the common good and do not interfere
with the legitimate use of property J 09
The committee proceeded to discuss the various areas in
which, for the good of society, the state might decide to interfere
with the property rights of the planters.

In keeping with the

committee's deep concern for population growth, the matter of
improving the moral behavior of the slaves (that i s , reducing
promiscuity) was dealt with f i r s t :
In order to liberate the slaves from this lack of morality
and to accustom them to a regular and proper l i f e , we believe
that nothing could be as effective as general instruction
[allgemeiner Unterricht] in the Christian religion. If this
instruction i s done properly and makes an impression, the
consequences, even for the daily l i f e of the slaves, could be

^ 0 9 Allerunterthanigste Vorstellung, pp. 74-75.
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nothing other than extremely beneficial. For that reason i t
would be very desirable that the islands be divided into
districts which would constitute slave congregations, with a
house, in which religious instruction and services could be
held, built for each congregation, to which a man would be
appointed who, either as a minister or schoolmaster, would
a t t e n d t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e s l a v e sJ ' 0
The committee recommended assisting the Moravian Brothers,
partly as a means of reducing the costs of the instructional
program, and partly because "their doctrine i s perhaps the most
suitable and comforting for the slaves in the Negroes' present
condition [ihr Lehre i s t vielleicht die passendste und
trflstlichste fiir die jetzigen Zustand der Neger]."

Indeed, the

teachings of the Moravians could be of positive benefit in controlling
the slaves and making them content with their present circumstances:
The indifference towards all earthly tribulations, the constant
references to a better situation in the future and to the purity
of the heart which the Moravians inculcate in the slaves are
direct moral precepts. The slaves are led to feel less
dissatisfied with their fate and thereby adjust better to the
course of their lives.
The strong emphasis on the role of the Moravians as agents of
control over the slaves suggests that the committee's interest in an
obedient labor force was perhaps as great as i t s desire to reduce
immorality among the pagan blacks.
The Moravians have given ample proof of the efficacy of
their instructions, overcoming all obstacles, including those for
which the slaveholders were responsible, and have had several

1 1 ^Ibid.,

pp. 75-76.

1 1 1 Ibid.,

pp. 76-77.
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thousand slaves in their congregations for years.

"The masters

have at l a s t had to acknowledge that their Christian slaves are
their best slaves, so that in recent years the obstacles placed
in the way of the Moravians by the masters have been fewer."
The slaves were very receptive to the appeal of Christianity:
they often sought instruction in religion when their day's work was
done and were willing to travel considerable distances to attend
their classes.

The Moravians dealt with the slaves in a sincere,

brotherly manner which apparently made an excellent impression on
the slaves; " i t i s worth noting here that this quite brotherly
association [of white Moravians and slaves] . . . has never had any
evil consequences, which says much about the argument that the
slaves must be kept constantly a t a great distance from the
whites."

112

The committee proceeded to make a bold suggestion, one
which i f carried out would involve government interference with the
operation of the plantations:

the slaves' teachers, i t proposed,

might serve as protectors of the slaves.

The slaves could confide

their grievances to the teachers, who would then convey the complaints
to the planters in an attempt to resolve them.

Most importantly,

the teachers would have authority to decide on the best manner of
instructing the slaves, and the planters would be forbidden from
interfering with the teachers.

112Ibid.,

pp. 77-78.

Another recommendation of the
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committee which involved interfering with the power of the planters
over their slaves was a proposal that all slave children under six
years of age and all new-born babies be baptized and reared in the
Christian religion, without regard to whether their parents were
Christian or pagan.

113

In an attempt to regularize the sexual unions of the slaves,
the committee urged that slave marriages be registered in a book to
be kept by the teacher to whose congregation the slaves belonged.
But the marriages would be registered only after the planters had
given permission to the slaves to marry.

Divorce could be obtained

i f one partner demanded i t , and divorces, too, were to be registered,
so that "no abrogation of a marriage could occur without the prior
knowledge of the master or the overseer of the plantation and the
teacher of the congregation."

The committee insisted that the

planter or overseer on each plantation had the duty of watching
closely to see that no male slave lived with a female in a
"permanent, intimate association [bestclndigen vertrauten Umqange]"
without a formal registration of their union, and that no marriage
was ended without the slaves' giving proper n o t i c e . ^
grasp of plantation realities was clearly deficient.

The committee's

The committee

consisted of persons well read on the slave trade and slavery, but
no member of the committee had ever visited the West Indies.

113Ibid.,

pp. 78-79.

114Ibid.,

pp. 79-81.
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The committee believed that once the slave trade was
abolished, the planters would have every reason to promote slave
marriages and would certainly do nothing to restrain regular marital
unions among their slaves.

The committee, even so, favored

providing legal protection for slave marriages "to the extent that
an entirely arbitrary separation of married slaves by their master
would not be permitted."

The masters a t present, the report

continued, readily accepted slave marriages, and Christian slaves
were taught that such unions were inviolable:
How then i s this concept supposed to be reconciled with the
fact that a Christian slave master, thinking only of his own
gain, can separate his married slaves and sell them as he
chooses? A law banning the separation of married couples
seems to us, therefore, to be a natural consequence of
permission to marry, and we are of the opinion that, with
regard to slaves who live on the same plantation under the
same master, slave marriages could be guaranteed unconditionally.
The matter becomes more difficult with regard to married slaves
living on different plantations. Nevertheless, since these
unions too can occur only with the permission of the masters,
i t appears to us that i t would not be unfair i f these married
partners too were guaranteed against being arbitrarily
separated by their masters, at least for so long as the
masters, whose permission they obtained to get married, . . .
remained alive and in ownership of the p l a n t a t i o n s . ^
In cases where bankruptcies make i t difficult to keep married
slaves together on the same plantation, the problem of avoiding the
separation of married slaves could perhaps be overcome by granting
the planter who purchases one of the married slaves the f i r s t chance
to buy the slave's marital partner.

"But i t would be much better i f

^ 5 I b i d . , pp. 81-82. To enact such a law, of course, would
represent interference with the property rights of the planters, and
i t s enforcement, accordingly, would be difficult.
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i t were decreed that the owner of the wife . . . would always have
to buy the male partner a t his appraised value [Taxations-Preise].
The committee noted that the slaves, according to all
reports, were very fond of their children and said the threat that
they would be separated from their children probably acted as a
deterrent to marriages.

Therefore, the committee proposed that slave

children be allowed to stay with their parents until they were at
least six years old and, local conditions permitting, the age limit
could perhaps be raised.
The harshness involved in removing a very young [unerzoqenes]
child from the care of his parents i s so striking that i t would
be difficult for anyone to deny the justice of a law which a t
least guaranteed the slaves the possession of their children
to a certain age.117
With regard to the feeding and clothing of slaves, the
committee believed no laws to help the slaves were feasible.

"We

believe these matters must be counted among those for which,
because of the difficulties of control, legal regulations are
virtually i m p o s s i b l e . T h e committee thus admitted that so long

^ 6 I b i d . , p. 83. Evidence of just how common i t was for
married slaves to live on separate plantations is provided by the
l i s t s of married slaves attending the Moravian missions a t
Friedensthal and Fridensburg on St. Croix. See Appendix IX.
That slaves frequently traveled from one plantation to another at
night i s attested to by Governor-General Walterstorff in a report of
September 21, 1792, pp. 7-8: "Such night visits [Natte Bes0q] are
the slaves' greatest desire . . . . The planter who tried to keep
his slaves ( i f i t were possible, which i t i s not) from visiting their
wives and husbands a t night would make himself more hated than the
worst tyrant."
^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, pp. 83-84.
^ I b i d . , p. 85.
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as the planters exercised unrestricted property rights over their
slaves, amelioration would depend on the cooperation of the slave
holders.

In view of this, i t seems peculiar that the committee

believed that the Crown could compel the planters to allow teachers
to go onto the plantations to listen to the slaves' grievances and
serve as mediators between the slaves and the planters, and that i t
f e l t laws against the separate sale of married slaves and the
separation of young children from their parents could be enforced.
In i t s deliberations, the committee said, i t had been
necessary to assume that the slaves were totally subjected to their
masters, "but we have at the same time pointed out that we have not
excluded the possibility of a future change in a situation which
deserves more detailed discussion."

The committee then asked the

Crown to confine the activities of another committee, which had been
given the task of preparing a slave code for the Danish islands,
to criminal law only and "to leave to us all matters relating to the
state [Verfassung] of the slaves and the free c o l o r e d . E v i d e n t l y
the committee feared that i f a stringent slave code were drawn up,
opportunities for improving the slaves' treatment and preparing them
for eventual emancipation would be restricted.

In fact no slave code

was ever finished.
The committee next considered the ways in which the slave
trade was connected with the cultivation of the West Indies in an

119Ibid.,

pp. 86-87.
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effort to determine the benefits the planters derived from the
importation of slaves and whether such benefits were so important
that heavy losses to the planters would result from abolition of
the slave trade.

After calculating the cost of buying slaves and

the returns that could be expected from such investments, the
committee argued that "the benefit the planters derive from newly
purchased slaves i s very slight or perhaps nonexistent."^
I t would be much more advantageous for the planters, the
committee said, i f the slave population on the plantations could
be maintained by natural means.

The cost of providing for slave

children in their earliest years was small; and as the children
grew older„ they could be used for a variety of tasks, such as
gathering hay by the time they were s i x , so that the planter got
some material benefit from feeding and clothing them.

Though

the committee said i t was impossible to discover precisely how
much i t cost to raise a slave on a plantation, "We feel certain that
such a slave will be . . . considerably cheaper than one purchased
by means of the slave t r a d e . A s the price of new slaves continued
to increase, i t would become ever more important for the planters
to obtain much of their labor force from births on the plantation
itself.
The committee then began to summarize i t s argument in favor

120Ibid.,

pp. 88-91

1 2 1 Ibid.

pp. 92-93.
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of abolition.

I t spoke of "the injustices and cruelties which the

slave trade directly and necessarily brings on"; the minimal
importance of the slave trade itself as a branch of commerce; the
possibility of using only slaves born in the islands to cultivate
the plantations, since 1 t appeared certain that the slaves were
capable of reproducing enough to maintain their numbers; the greater
safety which would ensue for the whites i f Creole slaves populated
the islands; the small profits derived from using imported slaves;
and the financial benefits to the planters of using only slaves born
on the plantations.

The committee therefore recommended that the

Crown permit the slave trade to continue for another ten years.

This

would give the planters time to prepare for abolition of the trade
by purchasing more slaves and to carry out the measures suggested
in the report for improving the living conditions of the slaves in
order to make the slave population self-perpetuating.

199

Another reason for delaying abolition was that "the
disturbances fGflhrungen] among the slaves in the French islands could
make i t risky a t the present time to proceed with any change concern
ing the slaves."

But the committee noted that the future abolition

of the slave trade was not to be officially publicized among the
slaves in the Danish islands, and the other proposed changes affecting
the treatment of the slaves "contain nothing which in any way could
provide a cause for them to demand more immediately."^ 2 3

^ 2 2 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
123Ibid.,

pp. 96-97.
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The committee proposed that the ten-year period of preparation
for abolition should begin January 1 , 1793, since there would be
so l i t t l e time in 1792 to begin implementing the measures i t had
recommendedJ 2 4
Arguing that, for the sake of consistency, the Crown should
not be content with abolishing the importation of slaves into the
Danish West Indies, the committee urged that "no commerce in Negro
slaves should be allowed to be conducted under the Danish flag."
The committee pointed out that the Crown, in the contract signed
with de Coninck's company, had reserved the right to reclaim
authority over the forts in Guinea after giving a year's notice of
i t s intention.

Since the company had shown l i t t l e enthusiasm for

continuing the Guinea trade, i t would probably offer no objections.
I t i s therefore our opinion that nothing . . . stands in the
way of forbidding the slave trade [for Danish subjects] every
where and in so doing of setting an example, the importance of
which we would allege as sufficient grounds [for abolition],
if the issue did not already have so many arguments in i t s favor.
I t might nevertheless be worth mentioning that Your Royal
Majesty's decision [in favor of abolition] will, beyond any
doubt, create a strong sensation in other nations which find
themselves in similar circumstances with regard to the slave
trade, and perhaps will produce effects which would be glorious
for your Royal Majesty and a blessing for entire peoples
[ganze Vtilker].' 2 5
The committee recommended postponing any decision on the
future of Danish Guinea, saying that retention of the forts would
depend entirely on the possibility of establishing colonies there

124Ibid.,

p. 97.

125Ibid.,

pp. 98-100.
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that would produce the same products presently grown in the West
Indies.

The progress of the English colony at Sierra Leone was

deserving of attention and might provide an indication of the
I Of.
feasibility of a similar Danish endeavor. °
The committee concluded i t s report by saying that i t s
"most humble presentation" was now to be entrusted to the Crown for
approval.

If the main points advocated in the report were accepted,

the committee requested that i t be allowed to send the resulting
royal resolution immediately to the General Customs Department so
that any changes needed could be made and the whole matter expedited .^7
The committee's report bore a strong resemblance to
Schimmelmann's Bedenken on the slave trade, combining humanitarian
concern for the slaves with a pragmatic appraisal of the economics
of abolition.^®

Despite the statements in the report that the

immorality of the slave trade alone was sufficient grounds for a
policy of abolition, i t is evident that this was not quite the case
so far as Schimmelmann and the committee were concerned.

Their

humanitarianism was genuine, as i s evident from the language they
used in condemning the trade as well as their thoughts on the
desirability of emancipation (thoughts which were toned down

126

Ibid., p. 101.

127Ibid.,

p. 102.

^Schimmelmann 's wife, in a l e t t e r to Countess Louise
Stolberg on February 13, 1792, said of the report that "the style
i s Kirstein's, but the ideas t o a great extent are Ernst's [ l e
s t i l est de Kirstein, les idees en grand partie de Ernst]." See
Bobe', Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, p. 133.
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considerably in the shortened public version of their report later
printed in Minerva).

Yet they were not prepared to advocate

abolition i f i t appeared to pose a danger to sugar production in
the islands.

Having assured themselves that there was no such

danger, they then sought to minimize the impact of abolition on
the colonies by recommending a ten-year period of preparation which,
along with the loans made available to the planters, would also
serve to weaken opposition to abolition.
something to everyone:

The report offered

the Crown would win international acclaim

for i t s morality; Schimmelmann and the rest of the committee similarly
would enjoy praise from their friends in Denmark; an unprofitable
branch of commerce would be eliminated, though i t would be stimulated
in i t s final years; the planters with help from the state would be
able to expand their labor force and thereby their sugar production;
and if abolition stirred misgivings among them, the date set for
ending the trade was distant enough to cause them l i t t l e immediate
anxiety.

Now i t remained for the Council of State to approve the

committee's recommendations and for the General Customs Department
to give i t s suggestions before the royal edict on abolition could
be issued.

CHAPTER IV
The Abolition Edict
The Council of State approved the main recommendations of
the Committee on the Slave Trade in a royal resolution on February 24,
1792.

Charlotte Schimmelmann, for one, had known earlier of the

Crown's acceptance of her husband's ideas J

But the public knew

nothing of the matter, as the Council of State's deliberations
were kept secret and, furthermore, were not recorded.
The fourteen-page resolution stated that, in accordance with
the recommendations made by the comittee, the Crown found i t s e l f
"compelled to abolish entirely the slave trade on the coast of
Africa and in all other regions where the same might be conducted."
The slave trade would, however, be allowed to continue until
January 1 , 1803, after which "no Negro slave may be purchased by our
subjects, transported in Danish ships, or imported into our islands
in the West Indies and offered for sale there."

2

The resolution said that in order to avoid harming the

^Bobe", Reventlowske Familiekreds, IV, 133.
2 DSA,

Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Royal Resolution, February 24, 1792, p. 1.
Page 1 of the resolution i s reprinted as Appendix X.
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economic well-being of persons dependent on the slave trade, the
decision in favor of abolition should be made public immediately
to allow everyone adequate time to prepare for i t s impact.

The

resolution approved the committee's proposal that planters who
wished to purchase additional slaves in the years prior to the date
set for abolition be granted government-guaranteed loans, provided
they gave sufficient security, submitted to government ordinances
to enforce improved treatment of slaves, and attempted to maintain
or increase the size of the slave population on their plantations
by reproduction alone.

The plan for the loans should be drawn up

in the West Indies by a committee consisting of the governor-general,
the government, and the citizens in accordance with general guidelines
set by the Committee on the Slave Trade.

Final approval of the loan

proposals would be given by the Council of State, and interest rates
should range from four-and-a-half to five per cent.

The Commission

for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt would be in charge of
•5
administering the loans.
The Crown clearly considered an increase in the size of
the island's labor force a crucial prelude to successful abolition
of the slave trade.

To make the acquisition of new slaves as easy

as possible prior to 1803, the resolution said the slave trade to
the Danish West Indies would henceforth be open to ships from all
countries, with foreign vessels allowed to exchange slaves for sugar

3Ibid.,

pp. 2-6.
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and sell the sugar anywhere they wished, after paying the usual
customs duty.

As a means of encouraging the long-range growth of

the field-labor force, the Crown adopted the committee's belief
that the percentage of female slaves should be increased and said
that, beginning in 1795, the head tax on female slaves used in
field labor would be abolished and the tax on male slaves would be
increased enough to avoid any loss of revenue.

The Crown said that

the head tax should be increased on those house slaves in any home
whose numbers exceed a certain necessary minimum, indicating i t s
acceptance of the committee's argument that house slaves were often
unproductive status symbols and, because they were more likely to
be single, failed to have as many offspring as did field slaves.^
The resolution also supported the committee's view that
slave marriages had to be encouraged and said a ceremony should be
held at each marriage, whether the slaves involved were Christian or
heathen; slave marriages were to be dissolved when one of the partners
demanded a divorce, but there was to be a ceremony marking the
solemnity of the parting.

The Crown then took a step which, if carried

through, would have placed important restrictions over the slave
holders' power to dispose of their slaves as they chose:

i t said

planters could not separate married slave couples, nor could they
take a slave child under six years old from i t s mother against her will.
All slave children under six were to be taught Christianity and

^Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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baptized, though no child would be baptized without the permission
of i t s mother. 5
With regard to the teachers whom the committee wanted to
have sent onto the plantations to teach Christianity to the slaves
and serve as mediators between the slaves and their masters, the
Crown said that the teachers should also keep records of slave births,
deaths, marriages, and divorces, as well as informing the overseer
or planter about instances of adultery and fornication among the
slaves.

The teachers should also warn the masters when slave children

were not being properly instructed.

The Crown agreed with the

committee that Moravian missionaries were best suited to serve as
the slaves' instructors in religion, with tb®~g£)vernment covering
the costs incurred by the missionaries. 6
The Council of State concluded the resolution by stating
that no slaves in the Danish islands were to be sold to foreign
colonies, and deportation of slaves guilty of criminal offenses was
to occur only with the permission of the governor-general.

The

General Customs Department was instructed to study the resolution
and present i t s own report on the contents of the resolution and
on arrangements needed to comply with the orders of the Council of
State.

A decision on the future of the Danish forts and factories

on the Guinea coast was postponed.''

^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
6 Ibid.,

pp. 11-13.

^Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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The committee asked the General Customs Department to
study the royal resolution and suggest adjustments which could be
embodied in the edict proclaiming an end to the Danish slave trade.
The committee wanted a prompt response from the department so that
the edict could be published as soon as possible and sent to the
West Indies "with the f i r s t ship sailing there from Copenhagen.'

O

The General Customs Department sent i t s thirty-two page
Forestillinq on the resolution to the Council of State on March 13.
The department decided that matters such as slave marriages,
education, and the loans for purchase of new slaves from Africa did
not come under i t s jurisdiction, and concentrated i t s remarks on
the proposals for opening the slave trade to ships of all nations,
outlawing the exportation of slaves from the islands, and changing
the head tax to try to increase the number of female slaves and
thereby help bring about a higher birth rate.

The department

insisted that i t had long sought to ameliorate slave treatment in
the Danish West Indies and to supply the islands with the number
of slaves needed for maximum production.

I t added that the slaves

could never be properly educated so long as new slaves from Africa
were needed and available; and encouragement of slave marriages and
milder treatment of female slaves was unlikely to become widespread

®DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from Committee on the Slave
Trade to General Customs Department, February 29, 1792.
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because of the very existence of the Atlantic slave trade.

Also,

the best interests of the Guinea Trade often failed to coincide with
those of the Danish West Indies, the result being a significant
reduction in the advantages Denmark obtained from i t s Caribbean
colonies.

Therefore, in order'to overcome the difficulties, avoid

financial losses for Crown and colonies, and improve the treatment
of the slaves," the department said i t was convinced that the
decision to abolish the slave trade was wise.®
Also, in another regard, and even i f the cruelty connected
with this trade were lost sight of, the abolition of this
trade would s t i l l be advisable. For . . . the ferment which now
exists among the blacks in the West Indies might spread to the
Danish colonies, which islands have not always been secure and
free from slave revolts [Neger Opstande]. And the seeds of revolt
will, i f the slave trade continues, always be brought in from
Guinea, as the slaves, abducted in a violent and cruel manner,
will, no matter how well they are treated in the West Indies,
continue to miss their homeland, their friends, their freedom
and their previous effortless existence.
But from those slaves who are born in the islands, raised
there, accustomed from childhood to the labor expected of them,
and acquainted with no other persons than those with whom they
are raised, there i s l i t t l e to fear.
From this point of view, the nation which f i r s t abolishes the slave
trade i s the nation which will act most wiselyJ 0
The department agreed with the committee's conclusions in the
l a t t e r ' s report of December 28, 1791, that the slave population of

q

DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse,
General to!dkamrets Allerunderdanigst Forestilling concerning
abolition of the slave trade, March 13, 1792, pp. 1-6.
^ I b i d . , pp. 6-7.
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the islands could become self-sustaining once the needed reforms in
slave treatment were made, the proper ratio of female to male slaves
established, and the planters, knowing they could no longer buy new
slaves from Africa, found i t to their own advantage to "promote
marriages and provide for the preservation and care of the newborn."
The department added, in a passage suggesting l i t t l e in the way of
humanitarian concern for the slaves, that with better care and food
the slave population would surely increase, for this was the case
with "domestic animals everywhere

[Husd.yrene overalt]."^

The department noted that all of i t s members (three of whom-Scheel, head of the department, and Trant and Tender Lund— were
members of the committee on the Slave Trade) except Justitsraad
Hansteen agreed that the slave trade could be abolished as proposed
without harming Denmark and the Danish West Indies.

Hansteen, in a

separate Forestilling, conceded that "the idea of abolition . . .
i s for every right-thinking person magnificent and excellent."
he did not think i t could be carried out in the time allowed.

But
The

risk posed by epidemics of smallpox and other diseases was too great.
Also, most planters were already deeply in debt, their property
mortgaged, their yearly income dependent on a climate in which
droughts were frequent.

Wealthy planters such as Schimmelmann, whose

plantations had enough slaves already, could manage despite abolition
of the slave trade.
argued.

But poorer planters would be ruined, Hansteen

These planters would seek to escape their creditors by

^ I b i d . , p. 8.
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fleeing the Danish islands at night, taking their slaves with them,
and leaving the colonies with a serious labor shortage.

He also

warned that the slaves might become dangerously restless i f they
learned that the laws hitherto enforced by the government were no
longer supported by, "in the language of the slaves, the so-called
European King."

Hansteen therefore urged (1) that publication of

the abolition edict be delayed, (2) that changes directly affecting
the slaves be announced in the islands by the governor-general and
the colonial government so that the slaves could more easily be
kept obedient to local authorities and respectful of the l a t t e r ' s
authority, (3) that the planters be exhorted to grant their slaves
better treatment, for without the planters' voluntary cooperation
l i t t l e could be accomplished, and (4) that planters who undertook
reforms as urged by the Crown through the colonial government be
rewarded by the Crown J 2
The department countered Hansteen's views by expressing doubt
about the extent of the threat of epidemic diseases, especially
smallpox as a killer of children, for "The intelligent slave master
will look after his slave children by having them inoculated."
And the potential losses to epidemics had been included in projections
made of the probable growth of the slave population under improved

^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse,
Justitsraads Hansteen's Forestilling concerning abolition of the slave
trade, March 14, 1792, pp. 1-6.
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circumstances.

13

Hansteen's fears that the planters faced financial

ruin were without basis, for new slaves could be purchased during
the next ten years by means of the proposed program of state-guaranteed
loans.

Without the loans, the department believed, abolition would

f a i l , for the required number of new slaves could never be purchased
by the planters if the l a t t e r had to rely entirely on their own
resources; and without the loans, the planters might not be inclined
to cooperate with the government and accept abolition.

Concerning

Hansteen's fear that the authority of the West Indian regime would be
dangerously diminished in the eyes of the slaves if i t appeared the
royal government in Copenhagen reached decisions without consulting
with local authorities, the department said the slaves knew nothing
about how or by whom decisions affecting them were reached, and would
hardly trouble themselves about the matter even i f they did know.^
In order to encourage the sale of female slaves in the Danish
islands, the department recommended that an equal amount of sugar
be made available for export in return for both male and female
slaves, setting the amount at 2,000 pounds for healthy adults, 1,000
pounds for adolescents, and nothing for children.

15

The West Indian

government in 1787 had urged, in an effort to open the slave trade
to ships of all nations and increase the supply and lower the price

1 3 6eneralto1dkamrets

the slave trade, pp. 11-12.
^ 4 Ibid., pp. 12-14.
1 5 Ibid.,

pp. 22-23.

Forestilling concerning abolition of
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of slaves in the Danish islands, that 2,000 pounds be set as the
amount of sugar that could be exchanged for an adult male slave,
with only 1,000 allowed for a female slave, a policy which i f
followed now that the Danish government had decided to open the
trade would encourage slave ships to deliver only male slaves
rather than female ones to the Danish West Indies, thereby under
mining the goal of creating an equilibrium between the sexes in the
interests of a higher birth r a t e J ^

The trading of sugar to foreign

slavers in payment for slaves would indeed remove some sugar from
the home

market, a violation of traditional policy, but this would

be compensated for by the increase in sugar production in the islands
that would soon result from the efforts of the growing labor f o r c e . ^
Regarding the duty on imported slaves, which since 1764 had
stood a t four rigsdaler for an adult, two for an adolescent, and one
for a child, the department discussed the possibility of doubling the
duty on male slaves while removing i t from female slaves, but said
perhaps the tax should be levied on the sugar exported in exchange
for the slaves, "in order to avoid the unpleasantness of levying a
tax on people."

Yet each of these possibilities seemed to militate

against the Crown's goal of encouraging slave ships to supply the
Danish islands with as many slaves as possible prior to 1803.

The

^ 6 DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Bemaerkninger . . . angaaende SlaveHandel en, report from government of Danish West Indies to General
Customs Department, October 15, 1787, p. 13.
^General to!dkamrets Forestilling, pp. 23-24.
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department therefore recommended that all slaves be imported into
the Danish colonies duty free or, as an alternative, that the duty
on female slaves be abolished, with that on male slaves remaining
unchanged or being doubled to compensate for the loss of revenue
caused by ending the duty on female slaves J 8
The Crown wanted to end by January 1 , 1795, the head tax
paid by planters on female field slaves, while raising the head tax
on male slaves by an amount sufficient to avoid a loss of revenue.
The department recommended that this increase in the head tax on
male slaves be set a t twice the current tax.

The department, while

not disagreeing with the Crown that an increase in the head tax
on "excessive foverfl0diqe]"

house slaves was needed, stressed that

no action should be taken in that regard until the colonial govern
ment had been given a chance to study the situation and recommend
how many house slaves were needed by a white family, how many of
them were actually artisans who should perhaps not be considered as
house slaves, and how much in extra taxes a family should pay for
keeping excessive numbers of house s l a v e s . ^

The Crown approved all

of the department's recommendations for inclusion in the abolition
edict, except that no import duty would be levied on female slaves,
while the export duty on sugar exchanged for slaves would be
increased by one-half per cent to replace revenue lost by revoking

1 8 Ibid.,

pp. 24-28.

1 9 Ibid.,

pp. 29-31.
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the duty on female slaves. 2 0
The edict announcing abolition was issued on March 16
and stated that the Crown, after having all aspects of the slave
trade studied carefully, had concluded that i t would be "beneficial
and profitable" [velqi^rende og qavnligt] i f the need to import
slaves from Africa could be suspended and cultivation of the islands
l e f t to "workers who, born and raised on the islands, were from an
early age accustomed to the work, the local environment [Himmelegnen],
and the people under whom they are to labor."

The report of the

Committee on the Slave Trade had clearly shown "that i s i s possible
to end the slave trade and that i t would be of advantage to our West
Indian islands to do without the purchase of new slaves, once the
plantations have been supplied with enough slaves to maintain the
population by reproduction a l o n e . T o help attain the goal of a
self-sustaining slave population, the Crown would provide assistance
for plantation owners who needed to purchase more slaves, and slave
marriages, education and improved moral conduct were to be encouraged.
No mention was made of the suffering caused by the slave trade; indeed^
abolition was depicted as a favor which the Crown was performing for
the colonies, as the edict stated that immediate publication of the
Crown's plans concerning the slave trade was necessary "in order to

2 0 DSA,

Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Vestindisk Journal, No. 80, 1792, p. 1.
21

DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Forordning om Negerhandelen, March 16,
1792, p. 1. See Appendix XI.
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free our West Indian possessions from their dependence on the slave
trade and eventually to make the slave trade unnecessary."^
The remainder of the edict consisted of six provisions
dealing with different aspects of the slave trade.

The f i r s t

announced that abolition would take effect January 1 , 1803.

Danish

subjects thenceforth could not participate in any aspect of the
slave trade on the coast of Africa or anywhere else outside the
Danish West Indies, but trade in slaves in the Danish islands them
selves would be permitted.

Prior to the end of 1802, the slave trade

to the Danish islands was t o b e open to ships of all nations, in
order to encourage competition, lower prices, and defuse long-standing
objections by planters that they could not purchase enough healthy
slaves from Danish slavers.

Another measure designed to increase the

sale of slaves in the Danish islands was the permission given to
foreign slavers to take raw sugar out of the islands for sale in
foreign countries—2,000 pounds of sugar for an adult slave, 1,000
for an adolescent, but nothing for a child.

The import duty on female

slaves was to be remitted, the loss in revenue to be made up by a . 5
per cent increase in the duty on sugar exported to foreign countries
in exchange for slaves.

The head tax on female field slaves was to

end on January 1 , 1795, but the tax on male slaves was to be doubled.
The head tax would remain in effect for female house slaves.

Export

of slaves from the islands was banned; and only in cases where the

2 ^Ibid.,

pp. 1-2.
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government believed i t absolutely necessary could slaves convicted
oo
of crimes be deported.
The response in Denmark to the abolition edict was muted,
for the public had been kept ignorant of the government's deliberations
on the slave trade, probably in part from fear of an adverse response
to the possibility of abolition from those who might feel their
interests threatened.

Doubts were expressed to Schimmelmann by one

of his secretaries, who wrote, in an apparent reference to the plan
for abolition, that i t would surely receive widespread acclaim, and
was an "honor for mankind and for the Schimmelmann name [Ehre ftlr die
Menscheit und f(lr den Schimmelmannschen Nahmen]."

Yet i t was a

delicate undertaking which could "be accompanied by very grievous
consequences [mit sehr betrubte Folgen begleitet werden], not only
for the Count's own property but also for the entire island."24
Such fears, as well as untimely rumors circulating in Denmark o r ,
worse, the islands, could only cause problems.

There was considerable

confusion among those Danes who took note of the abolition decree,
and many apparently thought a l l trade in slaves, including that within

23Ibid.,
2 4 DSA,

pp. 2-3.

Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
hereafter abbreviated VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, fragment of a l e t t e r ,
undated, in the margin of which i s written "Schmidt von Ldbeck,
Privatsekretaer hos Grev E. Schimmelmann, Udkast t i l Forordningen
om Negerhandelens Ophaevelse, Fragment fra Lindenborg." Lindenborg
was one of Schimmelmann's e s t a t e s .
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the Danish West Indies, was to be outlawed.25
that slavery i t s e l f was to end. 2 ^

Belief was widespread

The poet P. A. Heiberg praised

Crown Prince Frederik for freeing the peasants and the slaves.

27

Three journals commented on the abolition e d i c t , a l l
favorably.

In Altona, Schirach wrote in his Politisches Journal

that the abolition edict had brought honor to Denmark as the f i r s t
country to end i t s slave t r a d e . 2 8

The most important journal in

Denmark was the pro-reform monthly Minerva; i t had been founded in
1785 by Christen Pram and K. L. Rahbek, both prominent literary
figures enjoying good connections with the governing e l i t e . 2 9
The April 1792 issue of Minerva contained a slightly
abbreviated Danish translation of the original report of the committee
on the Slave Trade with a forward by Kirstein, Schimmelmann's private
secretary and secretary to the committee, which provides his and

2 5 H.

Lawaetz, Peter von Scholten (Copenhagen:
1940), p. 137.

Gyldendal,

2 6 A.S.

Copenhagen:

0rsted, Af mit Livs og min Tids Historie (2 v o l s . ;
Gyldendalske Boghandling, 1852), I I , 94.

2 ^Vibaek,

Dansk Vestindien, p. 181.

2 8 Politisches
2 9 Vibaek,

Journal, Altona, April 1792, p. 443.

Reform og Fall i t , p. 188. Rahbek was primarily
interested in the theater, but Pram was concerned with politics and
humanitarian reform. See Hans Peter Kyrre, Kund L.yne Rahbek, Kamma
Rahbek og Liyet paa Bakkehuset (2nd e d . ; Copenhagen: H. Hagerups
Forlag, 1929), p. 112. Pram had written the poem inscribed on the
monument Schimmelmann built in honor of his f i r s t wife following her
death, and he and Rahbek were frequent visitors a t Schimmelmann's
palace. See Gustav Albeck and F. J . Billeskov Jansen, Fra Runerne
t i l Johannes Ewald, Vol. I of Dansk Literatur Historie, ed. by P. H.
Trausted (4 vols.; Copenhagen: Politikens Forlag, 1964-66), pp. 587-88.
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presumably the committee's views on why the committee had favored
abolition.

Kirstein commented on the excitement which abolition had

created in England and France and praised William Wilberforce for
his "persistent firmness, which i s nourished by his . . . noble
intentions and which seldom fails to achieve i t s purpose . . . .
The name of Wilberforce shall live forever in history."^®

Kirstein

mistakenly assumed that the vote in the House of Commons in favor
of gradual abolition meant that England had decided to stop
participating in the slave trade.

He wrote t h a t , because of the

revolution in France and the slave revolt on S t . Domingue, i t was
impossible to predict what would happen to abolitionism in France.
He said i t was a mistake to blame the S t . Domingue revolt on measures
suggested in France to help the slaves, for recent information
indicated clearly that the revolt was the outgrowth of disputes among
the whites and between the whites and the free gens de couleur.
The slaves were tools used by others.

Kirstein thereby dealt with

potential arguments against helping the slaves in the Danish islands,
implying that improving the living conditions of the slaves there
would not lead t o revolt.

Kirstein pointed out that though the

Danish slave trade was small in comparison with that of England and
France, i t was important enough to Denmark t o require the full
attention of the government.

3 0 Ernst

The committee had concluded that the

Philip Kirstein, "Udtog af Forestillingen t i l
Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens Afskaffelse," Minerva, April 1792,
p. 43.
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trade was so barbarous that abolition was the only possible action.
Thus Kirstein made the immorality of the slave trade appear to be
the prime factor motivating the committee.

He ignored economic

arguments against the slave trade which held that the trade was a
burden t o the s t a t e and could not be made profitable.

Having

decided that the slave trade should be abolished on moral grounds,
the committee, he wrote, had then sought a way of ending the trade
without being unfair to the planters—of "combining humaneness
with . . . fairness toward the planters."
The r e s u l t , according to Kirstein, was a study made to
determine wehther the slave population could become self-sustaining.
The committee concluded that t h i s was possible, unanimously approved
the report, and sent i t to the Council of State; the l a t t e r in i t s
turn unanimously endorsed the report, resulting in the edict of
March 16 abolishing the slave trade.

The committee had assumed the

planters would cooperate, because the slave trade would be ended in
a way beneficial to t h e i r interests and because such a noble cause
as abolition would surely appeal to the planters' sense of justice,
once they had been shown how the goal could be reached.^
Borgervennen, a weekly, was the third Danish journal to
respond to the abolition edict.

Borgervennen showed interest in

slavery prior t o the abolition edict of March 16:

3 1 Ibid.,

pp. 45-46.

3 2 Ibid.,

p. 46.

on March 2 , an
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editorial comment on slavery asked, "When will the time come
when a l l human beings will become humane and once more t i e the bonds
of holy brotherly love?" 3 3

In the next issue, Borgervennen praised

"our good prince" for taking an interest in abolition and for
appointing men, "from whose ideas and competence one can expect so
much, t o investigate the condition of the slaves on the Danish
islands in the West Indies." 3 4

After publication of the abolition

e d i c t , Borgervennen said the Danish government was wise to compromise
in i t s approach to abolition and to allow ten years before banning
the slave trade:

"In t h i s intervening period much can be done to

overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s [posed by abolition]." 3 5
Borgervennen's interest in the slave trade and slavery was
probably stimulated by i t s co-editor, Johan Philip Rosenstand-Goiske
(1754-1815), a former theology student who worked in the General
Customs Department from 1781 t o 1813. 3 6

From 1792 t o 1795 he was

co-editor of Borgervennen; throughout his career he championed
humanitarian reform in his many speeches and writings.

In 1790 he

wrote Fors0g t i l en Laerebog i Religionen, which he intended for use

3 3 Borgervennen,

March 2 , 1792, p. 207.

34Ibid.,

March 9 , 1792, p. 220.

35Ibid.,

April 27, 1792, p. 282.

36

Rosenstand-Goiske's father was a noted theologian who had
been a professor a t the University of Copenhagen and had helped
popularize in Denmark the belief that reason and religion could never
conflict. See Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, VI (1892), 222 f f . RosenstandGoiske' s brother, Peder, began modern Danish drama criticism in the
1770s. See Albeck and Billeskov, Dansk Litteratur Historie, I , 473ff.
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in teaching the slaves in the Danish West Indies about Christianity.
Rosenstand-Goiske was l a t e r to play a major role in the struggle t o
get the Crown t o stand by i t s decision on abolition.
There was no public opposition in Denmark t o the abolition
edict.

The Times (London) published a report from Copenhagen dated

March 30, which stated that the edict "does not seem t o have caused
any s t i r in Denmark among the West India merchants, and i t i s not
OO
thought i t will cause any in the islands.'
A l e t t e r in the papers of the Committee on the Slave Trade
indicates that a t least one former West India bureaucrat opposed
abolition, however:

he was U.W. Rtiepstorff, former Kommandant

of S t . Thomas and St. John and governor of the Danish West Indies
during Struensee's

ascendancy.^

R5epstroff wrote t h a t , though

he sympathized with the "pure intentions" of the e d i c t , the slave
trade could not be ended entirely because an epidemic might a t
any time destroy a large part of the slave labor force, a view that
would be repeated in

l a t e r years when opponents of abolition made

a powerful attempt t o have the edict revoked.

Rflepstorff also feared

that the slaves would become progressively "whiter" as a result of
"mixing with the whites" (blandninq med de Blancke), until they were
as light-skinned as the Europeans and were no longer able t o work

^Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, VI (1892), 221-22.
3 8 The

39

Times (London), April 19, 1792, p. 3.

David P. Henige, Colonial Governors From the Fifteenth
Century to the Present (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1970), p. 10.
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"in the fields in the excessive heat of the sun" without dying.
Finally, "in order to keep 30,000 white Negroes under control . . .
the presence of 10,000 soldiers would be required."

40

Though rather bizarre in formulation, Rdepstorff's fears
that abolition would lead to economic catastrophe and slave revolt
were fundamental tenets held by most European and West Indian
opponents of abolition; in response to such doubts that the slave
trade could be ended, Rosenstand-Goiske wrote an a r t i c l e entitled
"Letter From the Country" (Brev fra Landet) in Borqervennen in
support of the edict.

Though no written, public criticism of the

edict had appeared, opposition had surely been expressed orally,
and Rosenstand-Goiske was probably aware of Rdepstorff's l e t t e r
as well as Hansteen's Forestillinq of March 14.

Rosenstand-Goiske

wrote that c r i t i c s of the abolition edict were using the same
arguments that had been advanced against the agrarian reforms a few
years e a r l i e r ; he predicted t h a t , just as the agrarian reforms had
been followed by several years of excellent harvests, abolition of
the slave trade would lead to bountiful harvests in the West Indies
as a sign that "enforcement of humanitarianism and the ennobling of
man are blessed."^

But in addition to his conviction that a noble

act was certain to be rewarded, Rosenstand-Goiske believed there

^DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, unaddressed l e t t e r from U.W. Rtiepstorff,
March 25, 1792.
^Johan Philip Rosenstand-Goiske, "Brev fra Landet,
Borqervennen, June 15, 1792, pp. 331-34.
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were other, more concrete, reasons for assuming that abolition
would prove beneficial to a l l .

He asked:

Can anything be more unnatural, both politically and economically,
than to fetch workers, a t great cost, from other parts of the
world, in order to cultivate the soil? Can t h i s arrangement
continue to exist in the face of enlightenment [kan denne
Indretning bestaae med Oplysninq]? I s n ' t i t more natural for
the islands t o produce t h e i r own workers? . . . Is i t not more
reasonable for plantations to be operated in Africa by African
natives, instead of having Africans work in chains in such
^
far-away places [as America] for the benefit of a few persons?
As for the contention that the West Indian planters would be
ruined and cultivation of sugar would cease in the event of abolition,
Rosenstand-Goiske answered that the report of the Committee on the
Slave Trade had provided ample evidence that the islands' economy
would not suffer.

He added that English debates on abolition had

shown that the planters could prosper without constantly buying new
slaves; consequently, there should be no doubt as to the a b i l i t y
of planters in the Danish West Indies to do the same.

His own

optimistic calculations, which he admitted were not based on hard
evidence, were used t o show, a t least to his own satisfaction, that
the slave population would more than reproduce i t s e l f once the
imbalance between the sexes was ended and slave labor conditions
improved. 4 3
As expected, the Danish edict attracted attention abroad,
especially in England, where Wilberforce's campaign for abolition was
being waged in the House of Commons.

42Ibid.,

43

p. 335.

I b i d . , pp. 335-37.

English abolitionists favored
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immediate abolition; however, the Danish edict posed a problem for
them, as i t suggested the best approach to the slave trade was to
avoid immediate abolition in favor of a less disruptive, long-range
approach.

44

The Danish ambassador in London kept Copenhagen informed

of the progress of Wilberforce's abolition b i l l in the spring of
1792 and provided some information on how the Danish edict was
received in England.

He noted on March 27 that he was pleased t o

learn of the Danish e d i c t , "dictee par des principes d ' humani t e .
The edict was praised for being f a i r to a l l interests and for
displaying "the circumspection necessary in order t o prevent false
interpretations resulting from either ignorance or bad intentions.

°

Further insight into how the Danish edict was viewed in England i s
provided by Fredrik Sneedorff, a prominent Danish historian who was
in London in the spring of 1792 as part of a lengthy tour of western
Europe.47

Sneedorff expressed his joy a t learning of the Danish

government's plans t o abolish the slave trade and added that he was
proud "that my fatherland has given Europe an example in this important
matter.

" ^ 8 Sneedorff wrote in a l e t t e r dated May 4 , 1792, that the

4^Sir Reqinald Coupland, Wilberforce (Oxford:
Press, 1923), pp. 160-61.

Clarendon
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DSA, Departement for udenrigske Anliggender, 1771-1848.
England I I . Depecher 1792-93, No. 24, London, March 27, 1792, p. 1 .
46Ibid.,

No. 28, April 20, 1792, p. 1.

^Dansk Biografisk Lexikon, XVI (1902), 135-37.
^Frederik Sneedorffs Samlede Skrifter (Copenhagen:
Gyldendalske Forlag, 1794), pp. 468-69.
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Morning Post had published an abridged version of the Danish
abolition decree on April 19 and had apparently misunderstood i t s
provisions:
The entire decree was twisted so badly that i t was clear
that a member of Wilberforce's group, which adovcates immediate
abolition, had intentionally had i t published in mutilated
form. I gave my copy of the decree to Mr. Wolf, our Danish
consul, and he promised t o translate i t and have i t printed;
but when I returned to see him the next day, the entire decree
had already been translated word for word in the April 21
issue of the Times. 4 9
Sneedorff suggested that Henry Dundas, whose amendment
inserting the word "gradually" into Wilberforce's motion for abolition
had been approved by the House of Commons on April 3, or someone else
supporting gradual abolition might have been responsible. 5 0

The Times

i t s e l f supported gradual abolition, describing immediate abolition
as a way "to injure ourselves by precipitate annihilation." 5 ^

Later,

above the translation of the decree in the April 21 issue, the Times
criticized the English abolitionists for misleading the public about
the Danish decree, saying they had wrongly referred to i t as "an
Edict for the immediate abolition of the slave trade . . . .

How

f a r they are warranted in putting such a construction on t h i s Edict,
we leave our Readers t o judge, by laying before them a genuine

49Ibid.,

pp. 490-91. This translation i s the one used in
Elizabeth Donnan, Documents I l l u s t r a t i v e of the History of the Slave
Trade t o America, Vol. I I , The Eighteenth Century (4 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), pp. 616-17.
5 0 Frederik
5 Vhe

Sneedorffs Samlede Skrifter, p. 491.

Times (London), April 12, 1792, p. 2.
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Translation . . . [in order to expose] t h e i r nefarious a r t s . " 5 2
So, just as the Danes were careful observers of abolitionism in
England, the English made use of the Danish decree in t h e i r own
domestic debates.
I t i s possible that the Danish approach to the issue of
abolition influenced Dundas' decision t o favor "gradual" abolition.
He certainly must have known of the ten-year delay in implementing
abolition, which was the centerpiece of the Danish e d i c t , prior to
the April 2 debate in the Commons, during which he successfully
inserted the word "gradually" into Wi1berforce 1 s b i l l . And the Danish
ambassador noted in his report of April 20:

"The considerations

embodied in the Danish edict have already been strongly recommended
by distinguished members of the English government [ont deja e t e
fortement recommande par des membres Distingues du governement
Anglais]," and he added that he had every reason t o believe the
Danish edict would influence "future English deliberations on the
subject.
For the Danish government the problem was gaining acceptance
for the edict in the Danish West Indies.

The cooperation of both the

colonial government and the planters was crucial.

On March 24, 1792,

52Ibid.,

April 21, 1792, p. 3. In particular the Times
admonished the abolitionists for having "artfully misrepresented" the
third provision of the edict as requiring "a duty of 2000 l b . of
sugar upon every slave imported" and added that the Danish government
"has undertaken to lend money a t 4 per cent to the Planters of
S t . Croix to enable them to purchase slaves."
^Departement for udenrigske Anliggender, England, Depecher
1792-93, No. 28, April 20, 1792, p. 2.
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the General Customs Department sent a l e t t e r and 100 copies of
the abolition edict to the government of the West Indies; the copies
of the edict were to be distributed throughout the islands, but only
a f t e r the planters, organized in t h e i r burger councils, had been
told about the edict and of "his majesty's well-meaning intentions." 5 ^
The l e t t e r contained an explanation of the Danish government's
decision in favor of abolition and requested data on the islands'
slave population so that planning for the reforms mentioned in the
royal resolution of February 24 could proceed.

The General Customs

Department told the colonial government that the abolition edict
expressed the same humanitarian s p i r i t as the colonial government's
l e t t e r of October 15, 1787, to the department.

(See pp. 55-56 above.)

The department instructed the government to post signs throughout
the islands to inform everyone that i t was permissible for ships of
a l l nations to s e l l slaves in the Danish islands in exchange for the
amounts of sugar stipulated in the abolition edict.

But the l e t t e r

was careful t o note:
The edict permits the importation of male and female slaves from
the African coast only. In accordance with this i t ought t o be
clear that no slaves or people of color [Folk af kouleur]
can be brought into the Danish islands who have already spent a
long time on other islands in the West Indies, and this i s
especially true regarding slaves from those islands where the
slaves are in revolt, because importing them could cause unrest
[Uroeligheder] and tumult among the slaves in the Danish islands.

5 4 DSA,

Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, 0m
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from General Customs Department
t o government of Danish West Indies, March 24, 1792, p. 1 .
5 5 Ibid.,

pp. 2-3.
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Concerning loans and financial aid for planters needing
more slaves, the department said that the necessary arrangements
would be made.

I t pointed out that loans were available primarily

for the purchase of field slaves; house slaves, when not also
capable of serving as skilled artisans, were not important.

To

encourage a reduction in the number of house slaves, i t had been
decided that the head tax on house slaves would be increased in
instances where a clearly excessive number of such slaves was
maintained.

Accordingly, the department asked the colonial govern

ment to present a report detailing how many house slaves of each
sex were needed by a family in the countryside and in the towns, and
recommending how large the tax increase should be.

Also, the

department wanted t o know whether house slaves who were also
artisans ought t o be exempted from t h i s tax increase in cases where
t h e i r ranks exceeded the number of house slaves deemed necessary for
a rural or urban residence.56
Concerning slave marriages and education, the department
sent a l e t t e r to the Danish Chancery, which was in charge of the
department, informing i t of the measures being taken to f u l f i l l the
reforms stipulated in the royal resolution of February 24.

The

department emphasized the importance of improving the morality of
the slaves in order to give t h e i r marriages greater s t a b i l i t y and
security and to better the upbringing and education of t h e i r children.
Slave marriages, whether the slaves involved were Christian or heathen,

56lbid., pp. 3-4.
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were to be entered into by means of "certain . . . prescribed
formalities," a f t e r which the couple was to be considered married.
Such marriages were not to be disbanded except on demand of one or
both of the partners; married couples were not to be separted
against t h e i r will under any circumstances.

Nor were children t o

be separated from t h e i r parents before the age of s i x ; all slave
children were to be educated and raised in the Christian religion,
and to that end a l l slaves were t o be gathered into Christian
congregations, each of which would be under the direction of a
specially appointed Christian teacher.

Moravian missionaries,

because of t h e i r successful experience, should be used in these
positions.^
That the department was not solely motivated by a desire
t o help the slaves i s shown by i t s comment on the close relationship
between the reforms i t wanted implemented and the economic well-being
of both the islands and Denmark i t s e l f .

In order t o bring the

colonies to full prosperity and obtain for the Crown's subjects in
Europe the maximum benefit of owning colonies, the common welfare
of both the Mother country and the colonies had to be considered.
I t was essential t o the welfare of a l l that the planters be supplied
with enough slaves "who have attained, for t h e i r condition, a
suitable degree of morality."
They [the slaves] must be able to maintain and increase t h e i r
numbers in the islands by procreation alone [De maae kunne ved

57

DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt Generaltoldkammer, Om
Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from General Customs Department
to Danish Chancery, May 22, 1792, pp. 1-2.
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den naturlige Forp'lantelse underholde og forme re deres Maengde
paa 0erneT~This they have hitherto been unable to accomplish.
But with proper and steady marriages, with education in religion
and the morality acquired therefrom, with more lenient treatment
[mere skaansomme Omqanq] by their masters, i t i s thought that
the number of working slaves in the islands can be maintained
and possibly increased . . . . In that way the full prosperity
of the islands will be attained . . . and the Crown's goal
[Hensigt] will be promoted, namely that the slave trade to the
Danish West Indies shall cease entirely after a short while.5°
The department noted that i t had requested that the West
Indian government supply information on the number of Christian
married couples among the slave population as well as on the number
of heathen couples living together and the number of children under
eight.

Suggestions as to how many congregations the islands should

be divided into and how many teachers would be required had also been
sought from the colonial government.

Since both the schools for

the slaves and the protection needed for slave marriages were dependent
on the cooperation of the colonists and closely bound up with the
economy of the islands, i t would be best t o adopt a plan that was
"adapted t o local conditions [indrettet e f t e r den lokale Forfatning]
and suited to the special circumstances [of the islands]."

In

adopting this approach the department was in effect abandoning hopes
for implementing the reforms, for "local conditions" would not permit
an outside power, the s t a t e , to interfere with the relationship
between master and slave.

The department suggested that the 1,800

rigsdaler vestindisk courant which the Crown had used to support
Luthern missionary activity in the islands could help cover the cost

^ I b i d . , pp. 3-4.
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of establishing the congregations and schools for the slaves. 5 ^
After carefully deliberating on the various problems posed
by abolition, the Danish government had made i t s decision, coupling
abolition ten years hence with a wide-open slave trade and loans to
planters to buy slaves in the meantime; i t had also urged that
reforms be made immediately with the dual purpose of alleviating
the harsh l o t of the slaves and of enabling the l a t t e r to reproduce
in sufficient quantity so t h a t , once abolition took e f f e c t , no
more slaves from outside would be needed.

The question now was:

How would the planters respond?

eg

^ Ibid., pp. 4-5. Rigsdaler vestindisk courant was a currency
valued a t twenty per cent less than dansk courant, which was used in
Denmark.

CHAPTER V
The Colonial Response to the Abolition Edict, 1792-96
The West Indian government moved cautiously a f t e r receiving
on May 24 the General Customs Department's pro-memoria of March 24
and 100 copies of the abolition edict.

The S t . Croix Burger Council

was given eight copies of the edict on July 4 , a t which time the
colonial government informed the planters' representatives of the
financial support the Crown had pledged to aid the planters in
purchasing more slaves "in order t o guarantee that the island was
cultivated sufficiently."

Accordingly, the government asked the

Burger Council to conduct a survey of the planters on the island t o
determine "how many slaves of each sex i t was thought S t . Croix
might need." 1
The planters, had they not been offered the prospect of
loans guaranteed by the Crown, might have resisted abolition; yet the
abolition e d i c t , with i t s provision for a ten-year grace period
before suspension of the slave trade, reduced any apprehensions the
planters might have f e l t , for ten years was a long time, especially

^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1793, No. 139. Letter from
government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department,
December 31, 1792, p. 1 .
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in the West Indies, where planters commonly sought quick profits
and dreamed of a triumphant return to t h e i r European homeland, with
their future financial status secure.^

Once the planters had been

told of the Crown's decision, the edict was made public, appearing
in St. Thomas Tidende on August 18 in the Danish original and an
English translation.-^
The loan to the planters was a cornerstone of the abolition
plan, serving both to overcome the planters opposition and to
encourage a rapid increase in the slave population prior t o 1803.
Governor Walterstorff wrote the Committee on the Slave Trade that
he hoped abolition would succeed, for "who could be so insensitive
that he did not want to give a willing hand to clear away those
d i f f i c u l t i e s which could halt or oppose that most noble of a l l goals-to promote the welfare of an oppressed people [ a t befordre e t
undertr.ykket Slaegts Vel]?" The Committee on the Slave Trade, which
had been given the task of overseeing arrangements for the loan t o
the planters by the royal resolution of February 24, 1792, finished
a preliminary proposal for administering the loans on March 19 and
sent i t to the West Indian government.

The Committee wanted the

loans to be used only for buying slaves t o work land already under
cultivation, and i t requested an estimate of how many more slaves

p

Hans West complained bitterly of the tendency of S t . Croix
planters to leave the island and return t o England as soon as they
had made what they considered was enough money. See his Plan t i l
ved e t enkelt ForsiSg a t befordre Mark-Negernes Oplysning og Formildelse
i Kaar m. v. paa Eilandet S t . Croix, p. 2.
3

St. Thomas Tidende, August 18, 1792, p. 1.
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would be needed to attain maximum production and t o maintain the
size of the slave labor force after 1802.4

Walterstorff, the

governor of the Danish West Indies, responded that this provision
was acceptable i f he understood the committee's meaning correctly-that no plantations established in the future were to be permitted
access to the loan fund, but those plantations presently in existence
and suffering a labor shortage would be able to expand production by
using the loans to acquire new slaves.^
The committee wanted agreements reached with the planters
on how many additional slaves were to be purchased by means of
the loan for each plantation; i t also wanted each planter to be
obliged to maintain a certain number of slaves on his plantation.
The mortgage which the planters provided for the loans should cover
the entire sum granted them.^

Walterstorff agreed that the planters

should t e l l the government how many slaves they wished t o purchase
by means of the loan in the next ten years and added that i t would
be necessary to allow the planters to use the slaves acquired each
year as security for the loans, something Schimmelmann had hoped t o
avoid.

But a f t e r considerable repayments had been made by the

planters, the loan committee in the islands should be.authorized to

^DSA, VGRGT, Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung of the Committee
on the Slave Trade concerning the proposed loans to planters for
buying more slaves, Copenhagen, March 19, 1792, p. 1.
5 DSA, VGRGT, Response of the government of Danish West Indies
to proposal of Committee on Slave Trade for loans to planters,
September 21, 1792, p. 1 .

^Allerunterthclnigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 1 .
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allow a certain number of slaves obtained by means of the loan t o be
written off so that t h e i r owners could use them to obtain new loans
elsewhere.

Walterstorff agreed that the planters should not receive

loans larger than the sum they could offer as security for the loans,
but he said nothing about the committee's

proposal that each

planter participating in the loan plan be required to maintain a
stipulated number of slaves, for this must have seemed unrealistic
to him, as an epidemic or a drought could a t any time decimate the
slave population on a plantation.^
The committee wanted the loans to be available to both less
well-to-do planters and wealthy ones (Die Vorschusse werden nicht
bios ganz unvermbgender sondern auch vermflgenderen zugestanden),
so long as a l l applicants for the loan intended t o buy slaves to
improve production on t h e i r plantations.^

Walterstorff's response

was to caution against making loans to poor planters who lacked the
wherewithal to care adequately for t h e i r slaves.
That which more than anything else makes the slaves'
conditions harsh and their fate so varied, i s that they some
times become the property of a poor man who can barely provide
food for himself and i s plagued by his creditors, so that he in
turn i s forced to plague his slaves with overwork and, what i s
worse, to l e t them go without adequate food and clothing.
Politically as well as morally, in so far as one seeks t o
promote an increase in cultivation and to improve the

^Response of government of Danish West Indies t o proposal
of Committee on Slave Trade for loan to planters, September 21, 1792,
p. 1 .
^DSA, VGRGT, A1 lerunterthctnigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792,
p. 1.
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circumstances of the slaves, i t seems advisable to give
preference to assisting prosperous and well-to-do planters . . . .
Politically considered, i t i s not wise to encourage poor
persons to become planters or to parcel out plantations.
At the very least one ought to use great care in supporting
the purchase of slaves by poor persons; one should be convinced
not only that such a poor man's land could be improved i f he
obtained more slaves, but also that he was a man who would t r e a t
his slaves well and had the means t o provide them with the
necessities.9
Walterstorff's favoritism toward wealthy planters was
understandable, as he had become one of them since arriving as a
government o f f i c i a l , and the big planters were the group which had
to be induced to accept the Crown's decision in favor of abolition.
Only they, or the slaves, could cause trouble. Walterstorff's
statement that i t was "politically" unwise to help poor whites buy
slaves was probably motivated by fear of the dangerous situation that
might arise from mistreatment of a large number of new African slaves.
The committee suggested that the average loan for buying a
slave should be 200 rigsdaler (oder auf einzeine Neger vielleicht
i dieser Proportion:

260-210-180-150). No distinction would be made

between rich and poor planters in deciding on the sumJ^

Walterstorff,

however, suggested that the average loans should be slightly higher
than suggested by the committee.

Arguing that the loan sum must be

adjusted t o the "quality [beskaffenhed]" of the slave in question,
he recommended as a general guideline that 250 rigsdaler vestindisk

Response of government of Danish West Indies to proposal of
Committee on the Slave Trade for loan to planters, September 21, 1792,
p. 2.
l 0 Allerunterthclnigste

Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 1 .
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courant be s e t as the average sum loaned for purchase of an adult
female slave from 14 to 22 years of age; 225 rigsdaler for an adult
male not more than 32 years old; 200 rigsdaler for an adolescent
woman [halvvoxen Qvinde] or for older women [Koner] from 25 to 35;
180 rigsdaler for an adolescent male from 12 to 18; and 150 rigsdaler
for children of both sexes from 7 to 12.

These sums would not cover

the entire purchase price of slaves in the various categories, but
planters who were unable t o pay part of the price themselves should
not be encouraged t o buy slaves, for their credit was probably poor,
and "the Crown would be exposed to a rather certain l o s s . "
Walterstorff added:

" I t i s universally of greater advantage for the

colonies and cultivation that a wealthy rather than a poor man
increases his plantation's labor force [Overalt e r det t i l stflrre
Nytte for Landet oq Culturen a t en velhavende end a t en f a t t i q Mand
forager sin Plantages Besaetning.]"^
The committee instructed the colonial government t o recommend
the most appropriate ratio of male to female slaves on the plantations
and t o try to purchase new slaves, in so f a r as possible, so that t h i s
ideal r a t i o would be reached, in line with the long-term goal of a
population capable of sustaining i t s e l f .

19

Walterstorff foresaw a

serious problem, however, in obtaining a larger number of female slaves

^Response of government of Danish West Indies to proposal
of Committee on the Slave Trade for loan t o planters, September 21,
1792, p. 3.
^Allerunterth&nigste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 2.
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than males; male slaves were more readily available on the Guinea
Coast because of a number of factors, including t h e i r more frequent
enslavement for crimes and debts and t h e i r being captured in w a r . ^
Walterstorff suggested that the loan provided an opportunity
to give special encouragement t o planters t o induce them t o t r e a t
t h e i r slaves better:

By raising the interest rate charged the

planters for loans from four and a half to five per cent, enough
money could be obtained to allow the colonial government to offer
an award of 200 rigsdaler for the best sketch of a hospital and
nursery (Barselstue), with the winning sketch t o be selected by
local government o f f i c i a l s .

Planters who modeled t h e i r hospitals

and nurseries a f t e r the award-winner would in turn be granted 50 t o
300 rigsdaler.

Furthermore, female slaves could be given two

rigsdaler when their children were six weeks, six months, and twelve
months old, in order to encourage slave mothers to take better care
of t h e i r infants J 4

Walterstorff believed 1 ,000 slaves would have

to be purchased each year prior t o abolition.

He calculated t h a t ,

over the ten-year period, the Crown would have t o loan the planters
1 ,305,658 rigsdaler vestindisk c o u r a n t . ^

This sum was l a t e r

reduced by the colonial government to 1,302,644 rigsdaler vestindisk

^Response of colonial government, p. 4. According t o
J.D. Fage, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of African
History," Journal of African History,, X (1969), 400, only one-third
of slaves exported were women.
^Response of colonial government, p. 4.
^ I b i d . , pp. 4 , 6 , and 8 .
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courant.

1
The committee insisted that slaves obtained by means of

the loan were not in turn t o be used as security for obtaining the
loans, and, furthermore, were not to be used as security when
borrowing from any other source.

In computing the number of slaves

on a plantation, house slaves and others not engaged in productive
labor were to be excluded [alle.Neger die a l s Huusneqer oder sonst
der Plantagen Arbeit entzogen werden, sind a l s Abgang zu rechnen
. • .).17
Though Walterstorff had suggested a need for 1,000 new slaves
each year until 1803, the Committee on the Slave Trade wanted an
accurate census of the slave population as well as surveys made of
the needs of each planter in order t o determine as precisely as
possible how many more slaves were needed.

The final plan for loans

t o the planters obviously was dependent upon the number of new slaves
needed.
Peter Lotharius Oxholm, Stadshauptmand on S t . Croix, had
arrived as a royal official in 1779 and had married into the planter
class, acquiring two plantations J 8

He did most of the work involved

l^DSA, V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger i
Anledning af den t i l Negerhandelens Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions
Grundsaetninger t i l en Laane Plan for de vestindiske Plantere, from
government of Danish West indies t o Committee on the Slave Trade,
S t . Croix, December 29, 1792, p. 6.
^Allerunterthflngiste Vorstellung, March 19, 1792, p. 2.
^Dansk Biografisk Leksikon, XII (1898), 507-08.
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in gathering census data on the slave population of the islands.
On August 1 , 1792, he sent the committee a twenty-four page preliminary
report on the slave population and the loan.

He wrote that the only

way of obtaining a reliable census of the slaves was t o demand of
each planter an accurate l i s t of his slaves broken down by sex and
age and an estimate of how many more slaves were needed of each sex.
The l i s t s used for purposes of the head tax were not helpful, because
they did not differentiate between men and women and because the
persons who compiled most of the l i s t s often didn't bother t o mention
the yearly change in the age of the slaves.

A new census was there

fore essential before anything definitive could be said about the
slave population.

19

Oxholm argued that i t was essential t h a t the planters be
allowed to use the slaves purchased with the loans as security for
the loans, because most of the planters' property was already
mortgaged, and there was no alternative to using the slaves, distaste
ful as t h i s was t o the committee.

He added that the loan committee

in the West Indies should be l e f t free to reach agreement with each
of the planters concerning the schedule for repaying the loan, and
that i t was impossible for a planter to guarantee he would maintain
the number of slaves on his plantation—"he can only do his best."20

^DSA, VGRGT, Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger
ved den kongelige Commissions t i l Negerhandelens bedre Indretning
paa de vestindiske Ejlande og Kysten Guinea, dens Pro Memoria af
7 April, 1792, e f t e r ordere, August 1 , 1792, p. 1 .
20Ibid.,

pp. 3-7.
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Oxholm said trie planters could not be expected to maintain
a balance between births and deaths among t h e i r slaves, though they
might achieve such a goal in the future.

In the previous ten years,

he noted, 4,694 slaves had been born, but 8,770 had died; the excess
of 4,076 deaths over births meant t h a t , on the average, more than
400 more slaves died each year than were born.

Only in 1784 did

births exceed deaths, and then merely by thirty-three.

A two-per-cent

excess of deaths over b i r t h s , which seemed unavoidable "under present
circumstances [ e f t e r nuvaerende I n d r e t n i n g ] m e a n t that this excess
would amount t o four or five thousand slaves during the next ten
years.

So, he argued, a t l e a s t ten or twelve thousand more slaves

had t o be brought into the islands; 1,500,000 rigsdaler in loans
would, Oxholm f e l t , be sufficient.

21

The loans should be repaid within five t o ten years,
depending on the financial status of the buyer, because the slaves,
whom Oxholm considered the only possible security for the loans,
were such an "uncertain form of property [uvis Ejendom]."

Only very

special circumstances might require terms of repayment that would
exceed ten years.

99

The S t . Croix Burger Council agreed with Oxholm t h a t , until
reliable data had been collected from the planters, i t was impossible
to make a final decision as t o how many more slaves would be needed

^ I b i d . , pp. 7 , 18, and 8 .
2 2 Ibid.»

p. 19.
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before 1803.

"However, until this information i s gathered, we

think, according to a rough calculation [en 10s Calcul], that ten
thousand slaves . . . , or approximately one thousand per year
during the next ten years, would be sufficient f o r attaining his
majesty's intended purpose." 2 ^
300,000 rigsdaler a year.

The sum required for t h i s would be

The Burger Council believed t h i s estimate

of the needed number of new slaves was not exaggerated because so
many of the new slaves "will be l o s t , in spite of the best care,
before they are seasoned," and there will be "the normal population
decrease among those already seasoned [den naturlige Afganq i
Antallet imellem de Saisonnerede],
The burger councils of S t . Thomas and S t . John were
consulted by the royal council on S t . Thomas under Commandant
Thomas Malleville, who then sent his report to S t . Croix.

Each

planter has been asked how many more slaves he needed, and the
total was 3,471 more slaves for S t . Thomas and S t . John a t a cost of
about 694,200 rigsdaler.

Malleville argued, as had Oxholm, that

the newly purchased slaves themselves were the only security the
planters could offer in return for the loans, as nearly a l l the
plantations on St. Thomas and S t . John were mortgaged a t least once. 2 5

2 3 DSA, V6RGT, Pro Memoria from S t . Croix Burger Council
to government of Danish West Indies, September 5 , 1792, pp. 1-2.
24Ibid.,

25

p. 2.

DSA, V6R6T, Erindringer ved Laan Planen, from Raadet paa
S t . Thomas to government of Danish West Indies, November 19, 1792.
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Mailevilie feared that the price of African slaves, then averaging
325 to 358 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, might increase dramatically
because of the planters' need to obtain as many slaves as possible
prior t o abolition, "cost what they

will.

"26

Oxholm, once the new population l i s t s for S t . Croix had
been received from the planters, calculated that there were in the
three Danish islands 15,403 field slaves engaged in cultivating
sugar and 1,673 in cotton.

"With these we have, though with

d i f f i c u l t y , mastered the work; but both cultivation and population
have suffered because of the labor shortage."

I t would have been

impossible "to have reached our goal, i f we had not allowed our cane
to grow without replanting for six to seven years as a rule [have
naaet vores Maal, var det ikke fordi vi lade vore R0r ratunne fra 6_
t i l 7 Aar i Almindelighed]." But in the future the sugar plants
would have t o be replaced more often as the soil lost i t s f e r t i l i t y ,
and more f e r t i l i z i n g would be needed.

More slaves, therefore, would

soon be required to work the fields presently under cultivation.

?7

Because of the high mortality rate among new slaves (Bosaler),
from 10,000 to 12,000 slaves would have t o be imported i f 8,000
were to be added to the population by 1803.

Indeed, he continued,

i t would be best t o import 1,500 slaves a year for the f i r s t five

26Ibid.,

27

p. 3.

DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger ved
hosftflgende Tabellen over S t . Croixs Dyrkning og Besaetning, from
P. L. Oxholm to government of Danish West Indies, S t . Croix,
December 27, 1792, p. 2.
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years and 1,200 a year for the l a s t five during which the slave
trade was permitted, which would bring 13,500 new slaves to the Danish
islands.28

The more thought Oxholm gave to the matter, the greater

the number of slaves he f e l t were needed.
The l i s t s submitted by the S t . Croix planters indicated a
need for 6,309 additional s l a v e s . 2 9

Oxholm believed this figure was

too low, for he was certain "there were many planters who had the
means and the will t o buy slaves, but whose pride would not allow
them to admit they needed more slaves . . . . "

This pride had, he

f e l t , led them t o deny that t h e i r plantations suffered a labor
shortage.

Others had, perhaps because of a "somewhat stingy

disposition," failed t o indicate t h e i r real needs.

Oxholm concluded:

"One can, I believe, assume that 8,000 slaves are needed for the most
profitable cultivation of the island [Landets fordeelagtiqste
Dyrkelse]." 3 ^
The colonial government, in turn, believed Oxholm's estimate
of 8,000 was too low.

The government said i t found Oxholm's argument

that the planters' pride had led them to underestimate t h e i r need
for slaves very convincing, and then noted that the S t . Croix Burger

28Ibid.,

pp. 2-7.

29

DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, P. L. Oxholms General
Extract af 0en S t . Croixs Bebyggelse og Besaetning af Creaturer og
Negre, December 21, 1792, p. 3. The planters said they needed
1,554 adult male slaves' 1,774 adult females, 1,346 boys* and 1,635
girls.
3 0 Ibid.,

p. 2.
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Council wanted 10,000 more slaves brought t o the island. 3 ^

The

colonial government insisted that repayments on the loans should be
ten per cent a year rather than seven-and-a-half per cent, as
suggested by the committee.

The planters should not be given too

much time to repay the loan, for they "never pay more than they are
forced to pay, and, besides, they generally die in debt."

32

The colonial government reflected the opposition of the
planter class to the Danish slave trade company, Pingel, Meyer, and
Praetorius, which had held a monopoly on the sale of slaves in the
Danish islands prior to the abolition e d i c t , by arguing against any
kind of contract between the company and the Crown for the delivery
of slaves from Africa.

The planters must not be bound in any way

to purchase slaves from a particular company, for "reasonable and
reliable [fornuftige og vederhaeftigel" planters would i n s i s t on
seeing what they purchase and on selecting their new slaves according
t o the sex and age group most needed on t h e i r plantations.

One

clause in Pingel, Meyer, and Praetorius's contract was singled out
as particularly odious.

I t read:

"That the emaciation [Maqerhed]

or the poor appearance [of the slaves] which i s a result of their
transportation on the ship can not serve as an excuse for rejecting
or refusing to buy a slave."

3 ^DSA,

This, said the colonial government,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Bemaerkninger i
Anledning af den t i l Negerhandelens Ophaevelse nedsatte
Commissions Grundsaetninger t i l en Laane Plan for de vestindiske
Plantere, from government of Danish West Indies to Committee on the
Slave Trade, S t . Croix, December 29, 1792, p. 1 .
3 2 Ibid.,

p. 9.
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demonstrated the difficulties involved for the planters in their
relationship with the company:
Anyone who has ever purchased or owned a slave knows that
emaciation or poor appearance in every instance must be
considered, not only because there i s always a risk that a
slave whose health has been severely undermined during the
journey from Africa will never recover fully in America,
where climate and food are different from Africa, but also
because the buyer will have to pay for extra food [for an
emaciated slave] and will lose several months' work from the
slave before the l a t t e r has recovered his strength. 3 3
The government complained also that Pingel, Meyer, and
Praetorius kept slaves several months on the company's ships along
the Guinea Coast, waiting until a full cargo was on board before
sailing to the West Indies, and thereby undermined the health of
the slaves.

Furthermore, the ships used were not properly outfitted

for carrying slaves and the provisions on board were insufficient
for the long voyage.

The government praised English slave ships for

supplying healthier slaves than their Danish counterparts, "especially
since the improvements in the slave trade by the English Parliament,"
a reference to Dolben's Act. 3 ^

Ships "have arrived in the English

islands with 400 to 500 slaves without losing a single one during the

3 3 Ibid.,

pp. 14-15.

3 ^Dolben's

Act of 1788 sought to ameliorate the existence of
slaves on board the ships by providing limitations on the number of
slaves that could be carried per ton and paying premiums to the
captain and ship's doctor when the mortality rate was below three
per cent. I t reduced the death rate on English slave ships by more
than half. See Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British
Abolition, 1760-1810 (London: The MacMillan Press, 1975), pp. 30-31,
69-70, 419-21.
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voyage."^ 5
The government feared that the Crown might give special
advantages to Pingel, Meyer, and Praetorius, putting the planters at
a disadvantage.

After a l l , Schimmelmann was a secret investor in

the company, the report on abolition by the Committee on the Slave
Trade had suggested the possibility of a contract which would help
the company continue to sell slaves in the islands, and the
committee had mentioned such a contract in i t s preliminary proposal
on the loans for buying slaves. 3 ®

The colonial government insisted

that any arrangement with a Danish company be accompanied by safe
guards which would assist the Danish West Indies and would provide
benefits to the planters there comparable to those enjoyed in the
English islands when i t came to buying healthy slaves a t f a i r
prices. 37
The Committee on the Slave Trade, having studied the reports
sent to i t from the West Indies, finished i t s proposal for the loan
plan and sent i t to the Council of State on April 16, 1793.

The

committee said that the reports i t had received from the colonial

3 5 Bemaerkninger i Anledning af den t i l Negerhandelens
Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions Grundsaetninger t i l en Laane Plan
for de vestindiske Plantere, p. 15.
3 ®DSA,

VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Allerunterth&nigste Vorstellung of Committee on the Slave Trade, in i t s report
on abolition of the slave trade, December 28, 1791, p. 62; AllerunterthSnigste Vorstellung of Committee on Slave Trade, concerning loans
to planters for purchase of new slaves, March 19, 1792, p. 3.
"^Bemaerkninger i Anledning af den t i l Negerhandelens
Ophaevelse nedsatte Commissions Grundsaetninger t i l en Laane Plan
for de vestindiske Plantere, pp. 16-17.
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government, the burger councils on St. Thomas, St. John, and St.
Croix, and from Oxholm were in agreement with the committee's
own principles.

The committee had "after further reflection found

several of the points made in the reports to be of such quality
that there was no alternative but to approve them."38
The committee said i t s hope to avoid letting the planters
mortgage their newly purchased slaves to the Crown as security for
the loans had been shown to be impossible to carry out, as the
planters' current indebtedness meant there was no alternative.

The

colonial government had convinced the committee that the yearly loan
repayments by the planters should be ten per cent rather than the
seven-and-one-half per cent suggested by the committee, for this
would allow more of the loan fund to be used again for more loans.
The sum allotted for the loans was that requested by the colonial
government—1,302,644 rigsdaler vestindisk courant (or 1,042,116
rigsdaler dansk courant.) The committee also agreed with the
colonial government's proposal that the interest rate on the loans
should be raised from four-and-a-half per cent to five per cent so
that the extra half per cent "could be used for some useful measures
connected with the loan plan.

OQ

The loan committee in the West Indies was a combination of

OQ

DSA, V6RGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Allerunderdanigst
Forestilling on loans to planters by Committee on the Slave Trade,
April 16, 1793, p. 2.
39Ibid.,

pp. 2-3.
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all the members of the government and the Stadshauptmand on St.
Croix and of the royal council and the Stadshauptmand for St. Thomas
and St. John.

The loan committee was to determine the number of

slaves purchased on each island and by each planter.

The Committee

on the Slave Trade agreed with Walterstorff's interpretation of i t s
own rather vague proposal in the March 19, 1792, preliminary draft
rf

the loan plan sent to St. Croix, in that i t said slaves could

be purchased for the purpose of expanding production on plantations
where a labor shortage had retarded cultivation of the available
acreage, but not for extending cultivation to "land previously
uncultivated which is s t i l l covered with woods and bushes [hidindtil
udyrkede Straekninqer, som endnu ligge i_ Skov og Busk].
The committee agreed with Walterstorff's proposal as to how
much money should be loaned to planters for buying slaves in each
of the five categories listed by him in his report of September 21,
1792 (see above, pp. 164-165).

But the committee did not accede to

his suggestion that wealthy planters should enjoy preference over
poor ones in the granting of loans, insisting instead that no
distinction was to be drawn among those seeking loans.

Yet

Walterstorff, as governor of the Danish West Indies, had been placed

^°DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Plan hvorefter de t i l
endeel Negeres Anskaffelse gitfrende Laan i Vestindien skal indrettes,
April 16, 1793, p. 2. Obviously the land not yet cultivated on
three such densely populated islands was land that was unlikely to
ever be cultivated profitably. In 1792, out of 51,873 acres on St.
Croix, 3,168 1/2 were listed as unused (i Skov og Busk). See Oxholm's
General Extract of December 21, 1792, p. 2.
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in charge of making the on-the-spot decisions as to which planters
were to receive loans, so he would in effect be able to favor
wealthy planters, provided he avoided arousing enough opposition to
call his actions to the attention of the Committee on the Slave
Trade.

And the committee did include a sentence in the loan plan

which said the loan committee in the islands could make exceptions to
the rule that all planters should be treated equally i f such
exceptions were warranted by special circumstances.^
The committee continued to insist that planters who
obtained loans for buying slaves should pledge that they would
maintain the slave population of their plantations for as long
as the slave trade remained open.

Those planters who failed to

do this would not be eligible for new loans.

The committee hoped

thereby to force the planters to improve the treatment of slaves
in general and the newborn in particular, for children henceforth
born on the plantations could be used to offset the expected high
first-year death rate of the new slaves from Africa.^
Though i t endorsed Walterstorff's suggestion that premiums
be awarded for the best sketches of plantation hospitals and
nurseries, the committee made no mention of Walterstorff's proposal
to award premiums to slave mothers for successfully caring for their
babies.

But i t did note that the income derived from raising the

^Plan hvorefter de t i l endeel Negeres anskaffelse gitfrende
Laan i Vestindien skal indrettes, p. 3.
42

J b i d . , p. 4.
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interest rate on the loans from four-and-a-half to five per cent
could also be used for those "projects which appear best able to
promote the growth and maintenance of the slave population [Gienstande,
som s.ynes bedst a t kunde be ford re Negernes Formeerelse og
Vedligeholdelse].
Oxholm had cautioned that "Those who bring slaves [to the
Danish islands] will be Englishmen or Americans who can have no use
for Danish currency, but will require produce or Sterling." 4 4

The

committee accordingly made available bills of exchange which could
be drawn on banks in Amsterdam, London, and Hamburg, though the
planter's debt to the Crown for the loans would be counted in
rigsdaler at the prevailing exchange r a t e . 4 5
The committee wanted the West Indian loan committee to
send yearly reports from St. Croix on the loans granted during each
year and to specify the security obtained in return.

I t also wanted

accurate data on births and deaths on those plantations whose owners
had obtained loans.

46

The royal resolution approving the loan plan and the
creation of a loan committee in the West Indies was issued the day
after the plan was sent to the Council of State.

4 ^Ibid.,

The resolution said

p. 5.

4 4 DSA,

VGRGT, Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger,
August 1 , 1792, p. 21.
4 5 Plan

. . . t i l endeel Negeres anskaffelse, pp. 7-8.

4 6 Ibid.,

p. 8.
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that one per cent of the interest paid on the loans by the planters
would be divided so as to provide half a per cent for covering costs
of administering the loan, with the other half per cent allotted
equally to the royal treasury in the West Indies and for premiums for
the projects proposed by the committee to help the slaves.

47

The plan was sent to the West Indies a few days later, and
the colonial government had i t published in the St. Croix Gazette.
A bookkeeper and a secretary were hired to help administer the loan,
AQ

and the loan committee proceeded to accept requests for loans.

By

October 1 , 1793, the loan committee had received requests from
planters for loans to buy 790 slaves and had, "after careful
investigation of each applicant's request, . . . and the results
that could be expected from granting each loan," approved loans
AQ

for the purchase of 623 slaves.
The loan plan was greeted enthusiastically in the West Indies,
with the only reservations expressed about i t focusing on the risks
of bringing in so many Africans in a short period of time.

Oxholm

^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Royal Resolution
approving loan plan for the purchase of new slaves, April 17, 1793,
p. 11.
48

DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria to
Committee on the Slave Trade from Commissionen paa St. Croix for de
t i l Planternes Understate!se bestemte Laan, St. Croix, August 31,
1793, pp. 1-2.
49DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from
Commissionen paa St. Croix for det t i l Planternes Understate!se
bestemte Laan, to Directionen for den vestindiske Gields Liquidation,
St. Croix, October 14, 1793, p. 1.
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in his report of August 1, 1792, had noted that "no planter wants
to obtain too many new slaves at once, as that involves too many
difficulties, including getting them adjusted to their labor, the
climate and food." 5 0

Commandant Malleville on St. Thomas in a

report on the proposed loan plan wrote:

"Experience has taught

that, in general, buying a large number of African slaves [Bosal
Negere] at one time involves much danger." 5 ^
The loan was not the only "reform" connected with preparation
for abolition and mentioned in the royal resolution of February 24,
1792, and the abolition edict of March 16, 1792.

One approach to

enlarging the field labor force which had been urged by the Committee
on the Slave Trade in i t s December 28, 1791, report on the slave
trade and by the Council of State in the royal resolution of
February 24, 1792, was a reduction in the number of house slaves, who
were considered unproductive adornments which the planters maintained
for purposes of social status.

Both the committee and the Council

of State had favored a special tax on house slaves, the abolition
edict had set a date for removing the head tax on female field
slaves but had not altered the tax on female house slaves, and the
General Customs Department's l e t t e r of instructions to the West
Indian government had requested a report on house slaves and

5 0 DSA,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Vice Stadshauptmand
Oxholms Anmaerkninger, St. Croix, August 1 , 1792, p. 4.
51
DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkonmende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Report from Raadet
paa St. Thomas to colonial government on St. Croix, St. Thomas,
November 19, 1792, p. 2.
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recommendations for an extra tax on them, in hopes of prodding the
planters to make more efficient use of their labor force.
Oxholm believed that instances where planters took slaves
from the fields to work as house slaves were few.

He said the

planters were too mindful of their own interests to do that and
added that during the harvest season, when as many hands as could
be found were needed, planters often "chased their house slaves
out" to help in the fields and a t the sugar mill.

He added that,

unfortunately, there would always be some waste in manpower allocation
CO

which the government would remain powerless to correct.
Walterstorff countered the concern in Copenhagen about the
high number of house slaves by arguing that large numbers were needed
in order to keep the planters' homes clean, for unlike Europe,
"here reigns the greatest conceivable cleanliness."

Since doors

and windows were l e f t open to l e t cooling breezes through, dust
accumulated quickly, and many hands were required for dusting and
polishing the furniture.
the master's children.
than one specific duty:

Slaves also were required to look after
Furthermore, no slave would perform more
"The slaves are universally lazy and three

servants here accomplish less than one in Europe [Overalt ere Neqerne
meget lade oq t r e Domestiquer her forretter ikke saa meget som een i_
53
Europa]."
Walterstorff admitted a tendency for the number of house

5 2 Vice

Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, pp. 19-20.

^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Report by Walterstorff,
St. Croix, September 21, 1792, pp. 9-10. In the United States, too,
house slaves were considered, rightly or wrongly, by their masters
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slaves to grow as female house slaves kept their children in the
great house so that, after a few years, "one can find oneself
encircled by a multitude of useless persons [en Hoben un.ytiqe
Mennesker] who cost no small amount to feed and clothe."

But he did

not believe a higher head tax on "excessive [overfl0diqe]" house
slaves would have much influence in reducing their ranks, for the
masters could easily find ways of avoiding the tax. 5 ^
The St. Croix Burger Council believed four or five house
slaves, not including children under twelve, were needed by a single
white person:

one to do the wash, one to cook, one to serve as man

servant, one as "a woman in the house [en Negerinde i Huuset]," and
5c
one to care for the master s horse.
The royal council on St.
Thomas, expressing i t s own views as well as those of the burger
councils on St. Thomas and St. John, argued that i t was almost
impossible to determine the number of house slaves a family needed,
as the number of children in the family, the income of the family,
and i t s place of residence could change from year to year.

"We

have, therefore, for the time being been unable . . . to determine
the number of house slaves needed."

Perhaps, the council added,

i t would be possible to conduct a survey of house slaves in January,

to be "insufferably lazy, incompetent, dishonest, and impudent."
See Eugene D. Genovese, Roll Jordan Roll; The World the Slaves Made
(New York: Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 334ff.
5 4 Report

by Walterstorff, p. 11.

5 ^Pro Memoria from St. Croix Burger Council, September 5,
1792, p. 2.
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when the tax rolls were prepared.56
In his study of the slave population of St. Croix in 1792,
Oxholm found there were 1,320 house slaves, 877 of them women and
girls.

He thought i t appropriate for a small family to have six

house slaves or for there to be two house slaves for each white
person on St. Croix.

Oxholm supported his belief by providing an

elaborate l i s t of the tasks allotted to house slaves and emphasizing
the need for greater cleanliness in the warm West Indian climate
than was necessary and prevalent in Denmark.Since there were
approximately 4,000 whites on St. Croix, there was no excess of
house slaves.

In fact, i t seemed that more were needed, as many

of the free colored kept house slaves, and as the l a t t e r were included
in the above total of 1,320 for the island, the number of house slaves
available for the white population was even lower than i t appeared
CO

in the census.
The colonial government concluded that the head tax should
be doubled on excessive house slaves, with five slaves allowed for
each home; slaves under 6 or over 50 should not be counted.

Mulatto

women kept as house slaves should also be taxed double, for "they

5 6 DSA, VGR6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from
Royal Council on St. Thomas, November 9, 1792, pp. 4-5.
57p. L. Oxholm, Bemaerkninger ved hosftflgende Tabeller over
St. Croixs Dyrkning og Besaetning, St. Croix, December 27, 1792,
pp. 5-6.
58

P. L. Oxholm, General Extract af 0en S t . Croixs Bebyggelse
og Besaetning af Creaturer og Negere, St. Croix, December 21, 1792,
pp. 1-2.
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serve vanity more than any useful or necessary purpose."

The

government also advised against any tax on slaves who were hired
out to work as artisans, for these were "useful people for the
colony who in respect to their condition hardly feel that they are
s l a v e s . T h e colonial government obviously did not relish the
idea of extra taxes on house slaves, but i t did not, as C. A. Trier
indicated, deliberately misinterpret i t s instructions from Copenhagen
when i t concluded that higher taxes on house slaves were to be imposed
only on "excessive" house slaves, for the Crown had stipulated
clearly that taxes were not to be raised on house slaves that were
necessary for the operation of a household.60

Yet the colonial

government did, by placing each white family's basic need for house
slaves a t a level so high that only a few very wealthy families would
be subject to additional taxes, seek to ward off bothersome inter
ference from the home government, interference motivated by the hope
of improving the productivity of the slave labor force.
The General Customs Department insisted, however, that the
colonial government prepare a more detailed proposal for taxing
house slaves, as i t was unsatisfied with the government's previous
efforts.*^

The government protested that such a task was "very

5 9 DSA,

VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1793, No. 139, Pro Memoria
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department,
December 31, 1792, p. 3.
fiO
See C. A. Trier, "Det dansk-vestindiske Negerindftfrselsforubd
of 1792," Historisk Tidskrift, 7th Series, V (1904-05), 460.
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
General Customs Department to government of Danish West Indies, May 11,
1793, p. 1.
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difficult" and that i t was "quite impossible" to produce a proposal
which was based on convincing evidence.

I t was extremely difficult

to distinguish between the number of house slaves that was necessary
and that which was excessive for each family.

To i t s proposal of

December 31, 1792, the colonial government now added a plan dividing
the number of house slaves into five classes, with the head tax
remaining unchanged in the f i r s t group, consisting of homes with
from one to four slaves, and increasing until, for slaves in homes
with twenty or more house slaves, the head tax would be more than
two-and-a-half times the normal one. 6 ^

This was the last report on

house slaves, and the General Customs Department allowed the issue
of extra taxes on house slaves to fade.
In addition to trying to improve the productivity of the
slave labor force by reducing the number of house slaves, the
Conmittee on the Slave Trade and subsequently the Council of State
wanted to increase the birth rate and lower the death rate among the
slaves, for unless a balance between births and deaths could be
achieved, abolition would lead to a steadily diminishing number of
workers after January 1 , 1803, with prenicious consequences for the
colonial economy and the Danish sugar industry.

6 ^DSA,

Closely connected

VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Pro Memoria
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department,
September 4, 1793, pp. 1-4. The government provided a l i s t of house
slaves in Christiansted which showed there were: 238 homes with 1-4
slaves; 93 homes with 5-9 slaves; 36 homes with 10-14 slaves; 18
homes with 15-19 slaves; 12 homes with 20-29 slaves; 6 homes with
30-39 slaves; 1 home with 48 slaves; 1 with 51 slaves and 1 with 81
slaves.
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with the goal of increasing the birth rate was the need to increase
the number of female slaves, to improve the stability of slave
marriages, and to discourage fornication and adultery by using the
Moravian Brethren to provide more widespread instruction in religion.
The colonial government, the burger councils, and the Moravians
responded with detailed suggestions as to how the goals of the Crown
could be achieved or, in some cases, why they could not.
Regarding improved treatment of slaves in order to lower
the death rate, Oxholm wrote that "a truly humane planter will never
lose sight" of the need to supply his slaves with sufficient food
and clothing, to provide them with proper care when they are i l l ,
and to maintain enough slaves to guarantee that they will not be
overworked.

"Self-interest, habit, and charity, the l a t t e r made

generally prevalent by the influence of the climate, are guarantees
[against mistreatment]."63
Walterstorff pointed to the difficulties posed by the
vagaries of weather and the problems faced by new slaves from Africa
in adjusting to a new climate.

During dry years the slaves' provision

grounds provided l i t t l e i f any food, and there was a shortage of
good water.

Though there was not much hope for improvement when a

drought struck, he believed there was a strong likelihood that the
mortality rate would decline once the slave trade was abolished,
because the population would then increasingly become one that was

6 3 Vice

p. 8.

Stadshauptmands Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1, 1792,
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used to living and working in the West Indies, and thereafter the
"number of deaths would f a l l , coming into a more suitable proportion
with the number of births and eventually falling below the l a t t e r . " ^
Neither Walterstorff nor Oxholm believed mistreatment of the slaves
by the planters was a problem; they were themselves Danish government
officials who had become planters after arriving on St. Croix and
considered, not surprisingly, the death rate of the slaves to be
largely unaffected by the behavior of the masters.
Using the tax rolls for St. Croix, Oxholm provided informa
tion on slave deaths which indicated a lower mortality rate for
slaves living in and near the towns, Christiansted and Frederiksted,
with the highest death rate found in those parts of the island where
the soil was most f e r t i l e and, therefore, where sugar cultivation
was most intensive.

In Dronningens Qvarteer, one slave out of every

fourteen and a half had died in the previous year; in Kongens
Qvarteer, one out of every thirteen.

In Christiansted, on the other

hand, there was only one slave death for every seventy-seven slaves.
Oxholm was struck by the contrast between population growth in the
islands and growth in Europe, for in Europe a surplus of births
generally occurred in the countryside rather than in the c i t i e s .

He

wrote that, on St. Croix, slaves in the cities had less work to do,
and young children were better cared for than on the plantations.
Slaves on plantations near the towns benefited from being able to
improve their living standards by selling eggs, peas, chickens, and

^Report by Walterstorff, September 21, 1792, p. 13.
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hay for clothing and a greater variety of food.

65

The low ratio of female to male slaves was a problem which
had concerned the Committee on the Slave Trade and led i t to recommend
that planters be encouraged to purchase female slaves; the

abolition

edict sought to accomplish this by granting various tax incentives
to those buying females.

The attitude of the committee had been

based on a study of the slave population on plantations mortgaged
to the Crown, a study which led to an exaggerated view of the
shortage of slave women because the plantations studied were not
representative of the plantations as a whole.

Fearing a long delay

and the risk of arousing unwelcome curiosity i f i t sought extensive
data on the slave population before reaching a decision on abolition,
the committee had been forced to rely on incomplete data in reaching
some of i t s conclusions.

Only after deciding to abolish the slave

trade did the Danish government, through the General Customs
Department, request of the colonial government data on the ratio of
female to male slaves and a report on the ratio considered most
desirable by the planters and most conducive to increasing the birth
rate.
Oxholm argued in favor of importing as many female slaves as
possible in order to accomplish an immediate and dramatic increase
in births.

He obviously gave l i t t l e consideration to the Crown's

emphasis on the need to improve family l i f e among the slaves as a

6 5 Vice
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means of improving the birth rate:

he believed that, by providing

the plantations with an excess of females, population growth "will
probably benefit from an increased desire in the male slaves
occasioned by the presence of different objects to arouse their
passions to a greater degree [formodentliq vilde vinde ved den
for0qede l.yst j_ Maendene, naar forandrede Objekter opvakte deres
Lidenskaber t i l en hgijere Grad]." 6 6
The royal council on St. Thomas pointed out the contradiction
implicit in the Crown's goal of fostering stable slave marriages
while at the same time stimulating the importation of many more
female than male slaves.

I t argued that the planters should be

allowed to buy the slaves they f e l t they needed for the successful
operation of their plantations without the government imposing taxes
that penalized them for buying male slaves.

Slave marriages, the

council f e l t , would benefit from having an approximately equal
number of males and females on the plantations, though having a few
more males than females on each plantation, as was the case a t
present, should not prove harmful.

The council warned that "if

there were many more women than men [on the plantations], a natural
result would be that a man would have more than one wife," a situation
in direct conflict with the goal of promoting morality and improving
family l i f e among the slaves.67

6 6 Ibid., p. 17.
^Report of Raadet paa St. Thomas to government of Danish
West Indies, November 19, 1792, pp. 7-8.
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Oxholm concluded after the slave census had been taken in
the fall of 1792 that the proper ratio of the sexes on the plantations
ought to be two women for every man.

He proceeded to praise the

female field slaves, whom he described as "the steadiest and most
faithful workers."

Certain tasks, such as skilled work a t the sugar

mills, were best done by men, but labor in the fields, involving
planting and cutting the cane and carrying i t to the mill, could
be done by women just as well as by men.

He urged that female

slaves comprise from two-thirds to three-fourths of the slaves
imported. 6 8

His insistence on the need to import many more women

than men was not in accordance with the reported needs of the
St. Croix planters, however.

(See p. 172, footnote 29.)

The Committee on the Slave Trade in i t s report of
December 28, 1791, had concluded that the low birth rate among the
slaves was a greater hindrance to population growth than the death
rate, which i t had concluded was not abnormally high, except for
new slaves during their year of seasoning.

The royal resolution of

February 24, 1792, had emphasized strengthening family l i f e among
the slaves, an act which, i t was assumed, would result in the birth
of more slave children and, more importantly, in a higher rate of
survival among the newborn.

But in order to encourage slaves to

marry and build stable family units, the Crown had taken the
seemingly necessary step of banning the separation of married slaves

6 8 Bemaerkninger

ved hosftflgende Tabeller over St. Croixs
Dyrkning og Besaetning, December 27, 1792, pp. 1-2 and p. 6.
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or of a child under six from i t s mother.

This prohibition, i f

carried out, would involve interfering with the planters' property
rights.

The teachers who were to move freely about the plantations

to listen to the grievances of the slaves and to instruct them in
religion posed an equally serious threat to the planters' control
over the slaves.

I t was indicative of the Crown's hesitant approach

to such dramatic reform that neither the ban on separating married
slaves nor the role of the teachers was mentioned in the abolition
edict, but only in the resolution, which was a formal statement of
the Crown's opinion but did not have the legal force of an edict.
Oxholm, in discussing the low birth rate among the slaves,
mentioned venereal disease as a serious problem among slave women.
He added that many slave women, using knowledge that was common on
the Guinea coast, induced abortions by using certain roots and
herbs.

They did t h i s , according to Oxholm, "only in order to

indulge their unrestrained passions, without being hindered by
children [alleene for at f01ge deres 10sagtige Passioner, uden
Forhindringer ved B0rn]."

Another factor responsible for retarding

the growth of the slave population was the ignorance of the midwives,
which resulted in the death of many children in the f i r s t nine days
after birth.

"To overcome all of these difficulties will involve the

challenge of transforming the entire Negro race and i t s nature; even
i f this were possible, i t would take a very long time [at overvinde
alle disse Vanskeligheder vil udfordre a t omdanne heele Neger Arten
og deres Natur; e r dette end gi0rliqt, vil det dog tage en megen lang
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Tiid]." 6 9

Oxholm doubted that i t would be possible to increase the

slaves' birth rate to the point where i t would a t least offset their
death rate, though he was convinced that the gap could be closed.^
Walterstorff believed that secure slave marriages offered
the greatest promise of increasing the birth rate.

But he believed,

as Oxholm did, that creating stable marriages among the slaves
would require time and "a change in the slaves' way of thinking":
The climate and i r r i t a b i l i t y of the nerves, the violence of
the slaves' propensities and mental disorders [Tilbriielighedernes
og Sindslidelsemes Heftiqhed hos NegerslaegtenJ, along with
opportunity and habit have brought about and will for a long
time maintain unrestrained passions and a type of polygamy.
I t i s not unusual to find a male slave, especially among the
drivers, sugar boilers, or artisans, who has three or four or
perhaps as many as seven wives, usually on different
plantations.71
Oxholm cautioned that the excess of deaths over births among the
slaves was not the fault of the planters:

"The cause [for the

failure] should be sought in local contingencies, both physical and
moral, and not in the planters' reluctance or opposition."

j2

Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1 , 1792,
pp. 11-12. See Michael Craton, "Jamaican Slavery," and Richard B.
Sheridan, "Mortality and Medical Treatment of Slaves in the British
West Indies," in Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere, ed. by
Stanley L. Engerman and Eugene D. Genovese (Princeton, N. J . : Princeton
University Press, 1975), pp. 267-69 and pp. 285-90 for a discussion
of promiscuity and the slaves' birth rate.
7°Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1 , 1792,
p. 17.
•^Report by Walterstorff, September 21, 1792, p. 7. Such
relatively unbiased sources as Oldendorp, writing more than twentyfive years earlier, and A. B. Bentzon, in 1802, confirm that polygamy
was common among the slaves on St. Croix.
? 2 Vice Stadshauptmand Oxholms Anmaerkninger, August 1 , 1792,
p. 24.
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Regarding slave marriages, the West Indian government said
i t would be "useless to introduce legal marital relations."
Either most marriages will have to be annuled or the masters'
property rights will have to be limited, and this we dare not
recommend [o£ hertil tflr vi ikke raade]. Each pianter wi11
always find i t in his own best interest to promote regular
marital relations among his slaves, because such a policy will
inhibit the widespread wandering around a t night [which the
slaves engage in] to visit their husbands or wives [on other
plantations].73
No mention was made of the royal resolution's stipulation that
children under six not be separated from their mothers, but i t would
obviously be just as unenforceable, in the view of the colonial
government, as the prohibition on separating married slaves.
Johan Gottlieb Miecke, supervisor of the Moravian missionaries
in the Danish West Indies, having been asked for his thoughts on
legal slave marriages, listed several factors which he thought would
make the success of such unions unlikely.

He said the greatest

freedom the slaves had was that of engaging in relations without
interference from their masters.

They "knew no boundaries of human

order" concerning fornication and frequently ruined their health
unless "though the grace of God a complete change was brought about
in their hearts [durch Gottes Gnade eine qflnzliche Ver3nderunq des
Herzens in ihnen bewtlrkt wird]."^

Even in cases where such a

7 3DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 139, 1793, Pro Memoria
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department,
December 31, 1792, p. 6.

^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, UnterthSnigst Pro
Memoria from Johan Gottlieb Miecke to government of Danish West
Indies, November 15, 1792, p. 5.
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change of heart occurred, married slaves were s t i l l subject to being
separated when the planters wanted to buy or sell a slave, give one
to a friend or relative as a present, or to a creditor to pay a debt;
there were cases where a planter sent a slave to one of his
plantations on another island, keeping the mate behind because i t
served his purposes to do so.

Under such circumstances i t was

difficult for the slaves to form stable marriages.

One thing which

Miecke thought could be done to encourage slave marriages was to make
i t illegal for a slave simply to exchange his wife for another
"according to his pleasure [nach seinem Belieben]."

The state should

do something to establish order among the slaves' sexual unions,
perhaps by having slaves restrict their selection of a mate to
another slave on the same plantation, with house slaves in the c i t i e s ,
whenever possible, also marrying a slave owned by the same master.^
The royal resolution of February 24, 1792, had also called
for the creation of a group of teachers, drawn from the ranks of
the Moravian Brethren, who would go onto the plantations to instruct
the slaves and hear their complaints.

This proposal could be

opposed in the West Indies by arguing that the cost of carrying i t
out was too high and/or that the planters' property rights and
authority over their slaves should not be tampered with.
council on St. Thomas used the former approach.

The royal

After stating that

the plan to put slaves into various Christian congregations, each
headed by a Moravian, "is so benevolent and praiseworthy [velgi^rende

75lbid., p. 7.
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oq prise!iq] that one must strongly wish to see i t carried out,"
the council added:

"There i s reason to believe the arrangement will

involve greater costs for His Majesty's treasury than one perhaps
thought

when drawing up the plan." 7 6

The council agreed that the

Moravian Brethren were best suited to serve as teachers, but noted
that more of the brethren would have to be sent from Europe, for those
presently in the Danish islands were not sufficient to carry out the
task.

Added to the cost of transportation would be that of main

taining the new teachers—providing them with homes, land to farm,
and a salary of at least 300 rigsdaler a year.

If the Crown decided

to proceed with the plan, six teachers would be needed for St. Thomas
and four for St. John.

The council suggested that the expense of

providing land and houses for the teachers could be avoided i f the
l a t t e r lived in the present Moravian missions and, using them as
bases, traveled around the islands teaching religion to the slaves.
The planters and overseers would have to allow the teachers to do
their work without interference and encourage the slaves to
attend church. 7 7
The Moravian leader on St. Croix, Johan Gottlieb Miecke,
also criticized the costs of the Crown's proposal.

He favored

building only two additional missions on St. Croix, one in the center

76|teport of Raadet paa St. Thomas to government of Danish
West Indies, November 19, 1792, p. 1.
7 7 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
Mallevilie, commandant of St. Thomas and
the author of this report, was a Moravian convert.
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of the island and the other at the eastern end, to improve the
Moravians' access to the slave population.

Rather than embracing

what could have been an excellent opportunity to spread the
religious message of his fellows to the very persons he and the other
Moravians had come so far to serve, Miecke adopted a cautious
approach, apparently seeking to avoid anything beyond a minimum of
70
effort by the Moravians.
The colonial government emphasized the need to keep the
teachers from in any way coming between the masters and the slaves.
Having agreed that the" Moravian Brethren were best suited to
instruct the slaves, the government added:
That these [Moravian teachers] should go around on the
plantations in order to conduct lessons will in several
respects not be feasible [ e j vaere gi^rliqt]. The plantation
owners will regard i t as interference with their property
rights, i f someone without their permission were allowed to
live among their slaves and exercise any kind of authority
over the same. Perhaps the slaves would become accustomed
to regarding the teachers in certain ways as a new source of
authority or at least as persons who would be inclined to take
their side against their masters. Among the teachers themselves
there might also be one or another scheming [intrigant] person.
All of these things could cause an action [Gierninq], the
results of which are easier to anticipate [forudse] than to
suppress. We must therefore in a very positive manner declare
ourselves against all instruction in religion for the slaves
which does not take place in public and at appointed times.79
The colonial government agreed with Miecke's proposal that
two new Moravian churches be constructed on St. Croix

so that the

slaves will not have so far to go to "their devotional meetings

7 8 Unterthanigst Pro Memoria 3 November 15, 1792, pp. 8-10.
79

Pro Memoria from government of Danish West Indies to
General Customs Department, December 31, 1792, p. 4.
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[deres gudelige Forsamlinger]."

Though the ideal would be to

establish special mission stations in each section [Qvarteer]
of the islands, which would involve seven new churches on St. Croix,
six on St. Thomas, and four on St. John, the costs of such an
undertaking would be so great that i t was best to s t a r t by following
Miecke's suggestion.

Money for the two new churches and the

Moravians to be stationed there could be obtained by using the funds
set aside for use by the Danish Lutheran mission, for the Danish
clergy did no work outside the towns or among the plantation slaves.
The best hours for instruction in religion for adult slaves were
weekday evenings and Sundays.

The government added that i t assumed

that slaves would not be forced to join Christian congregations i f
they preferred their "fatherland's religion," for such force exerted
over their religious l i f e would be "harsher than the force under
which their physical labor is now expended."** 0
The colonial government, in particular Governor Walterstorff
and Stadshauptmand Oxholm, in cooperation with the planters in the
burger councils, had managed to divert the Crown's call for
humanitarian reforms to ameliorate the condition of the slaves
whenever such reform seemed to affect the vital interests of the
planters.

Furthermore, regarding religious instruction of the slaves,

the Moravian Brethren had shown no enthusiasm for a significant
expansion of their efforts.

The only "reform" which was enthusias

tically supported in the West Indies was the loan for buying slaves.

80... .
* i
Ibid., pp. 4-7.
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The General Customs Department did not press the colonial govern
ment towards implementing and enforcing reforms to help the slaves.
Antagonizing the planters would endanger the continued loyalty of
the islands to Denmark:

the Crown could not hope to compel the

planters to remain subject to Denmark i f the planters, the great
majority of whom were English-speaking, decided to switch their
allegiance to another, more lenient European state.

The highly

volatile siutation in the West Indies in the early 1790s surely
suggested to the Danish Crown that i t was wise not to push the
planters too far.

But in fact the planters were pushed hardly a t

all.
The years passed and nothing was done to help the slaves;
yet the General Customs Department in 1796 praised the planters for
improving the treatment of their slaves, though there was no evidence
that any improvement had occurred.

The department evidently

believed the self-interest of the planters had automatically led to
better slave treatment; noting that four years had passed since
publication of the abolition edict, the department wrote to the West
Indian government:

" I t can in the meantime not be otherwise than

that the way of thinking in the islands in regard to the slave
matter has changed considerably, that the change has been of advantage
to the slaves' living conditions, and that steps are being taken not
only towards improving their physical upbringing but also toward
improving their education, their marriages, e t c . ; similarly, their
numbers must have been increased and the ratio between male and female
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slaves have been improved by the purchase of new slaves." 0 1

The

department added that i t was s t i l l waiting for data collected by
the West Indian government since the l a t t e r ' s report of December 31,
1792, in order to use the data as a basis for arrangements and
legislation which would support "the education of the slaves, their
morality, marriages, and the reduction of the distance between the
slaves and their masters [Formindskelsen af Afstanden imellem dem og
deres Herrer] . . . without offending notions of ownership rights
[uden at st0de an mod Bergreberne om Ejendomsretten].The state
ment regarding a "reduction of the distance between the slaves and
their masters" i s somewhat surprising, as nothing was said about
tampering with this "distance" in the royal resolution of February 24,
1792, or in the abolition edict.

The department requested a full

report on the slave population, including a breakdown by sex, age,
and marital status.

The letter concluded with a request for

suggestions which might "promote the refinement of the slaves
[befordre Negrenes Foraedlinq]; this refinement, to which the
planters' own benefit is very closely connected, will in all
probability effectively enable most of the slaves to withstand the
ferment among their brethren which i s being spread by the current
upheavals [Omvaeltninger]." 8 ^

8 1 DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Kopibog, 1796, No. 234.
Letter from
General Customs Department to government of Danish West Indies,
August 20, 1796, p. 1.
82Ibid.,

pp. 1-2.

8 3 Ibid.,

p. 2.
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As expected by the Crown, the loans to the planters to buy
slaves along with the opening of the slave trade to the Danish islands
to ships of all countries led to a dramatic increase in the slave
population, reversing the trend of the previous decade.

From 1792

through 1796, the number of slaves on St. Croix grew from 22,144
to 2 4 , 3 5 2 . T h i s increase was accounted for by new slaves from
Africa (Kyst-Negere) rather than by an excess of births over deaths;
the slaves' death rate remained much higher than their birth rate,
with a total of 907 more deaths than births during this period:
Slave Births

Slave Deaths

1793

460

606

1794

469

633

1795

463

760

1796

458
1,840

748,
2,747

The increase in deaths was a typical consequence of having more
African slaves in the islands, for new slaves generally suffered a
high death rate during their year of seasoning.

The stable number

of births was another indication that the planters were not yet
reacting to the threat of abolition by improving the treatment of
their slaves, something the Committee of the Slave Trade had assumed
they would be compelled to do by their own self-interest.

The

8 ^DSA,

VGR6T, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population data
from tax rolls (Matrikler) for 1793, 1794, 1795, and 1796.
85

Peter Lotharius Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers
Til stand i Henseende t i l Population, Cultur, og Finance-Forfatning
(Copenhagen, 1797), p. 62.
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traditional attitude of quick profits a t the expense of long-range
prosperity and stability apparently s t i l l dominated the thinking of
the planters.
On St. Thomas and St. John, the number of slaves increased
from 6,162 in 1793 to 6,693 in 1796.

On these islands, in sharp

contrast to St. Croix, slave births apparently exceeded slave deaths:
Slave Births

Slave Deaths

1793

128

38

1794

82

49

1795

89

50

-il
392

54
19Pb

1796

The surplus of births over deaths reflects the fact that the slaves
on St. Thomas and St. John, islands settled long before St. Croix,
were better acclimated and contained in their ranks fewer new slaves
from Africa.

Yet new slaves mainly accounted for the increases.

According to Oxholm, the loans to the planters for buying
slaves had encouraged English slavers to compete with one another
in selling their slaves in the Danish West Indies, and "the larger
number of slaves available for purchase had driven the price [of
the slaves] down to a level much lower than in the surrounding
islands."

Malleville's fears that Danish planters, trying to buy

8 ®DSA,

VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population data
from tax rolls of St. Thomas and St. John for 1793, 1794, 1795, and
1796. The data on slave deaths are probably inaccurate, however,
as the 54 deaths reported for St. Thomas and St. John in 1796
represent a crude death rate of 8.07 per thousand, an unrealistically
low figure.
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as many slaves as possible prior to abolition, would bid up the
price of slaves now appeared unfounded.

The English slavers were

attracted by the security provided by the bills of exchange backed
by the Danish Crown and also preferred the Danish bills because they
could be redeemed in Europe after only three months, instead of
twelve or more months, as was common with the bills of exchange
issued by private citizens in the British islands.

Oxholm wrote

that the desirability of the bills of exchange provided in the
Danish islands also allowed planters there to select the healthiest
and strongest slaves; the unhealthy, weak ones were then purchased
by local merchants who took them to the "western colonies," where
the slaves were exchanged for various articles of trade, to the
benefit of the Danish islands.**?
In the English islands, merchants normally paid from
forty-five to forty-eight pounds sterling for an entire shipload
of slaves, but on St. Croix a similar cargo sold for forty to forty-two
pounds sterling.

Yet this lower price attracted slavers to St. Croix,

because half of the sum paid for slaves consisted of the bills of
exchange given as a loan to the planters by the loan committee.

(The

rest of the money used to buy slaves was provided by bills of exchange
backed by private merchants and redeemable after s i x , nine, or twelve
months.)

The average price of a healthy African slave, male or

87

Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers Til stand, pp. 28-29.
Thus local merchants openly sold slaves to other islands in violation
of the ban on exporting slaves from the Danish islands contained in
the abolition edict.
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female, was 400 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, while in the English
islands a similar slave sold for 450 to 500 rigsdaler vestindisk
OO

courant.
The sums made available for loans had been used up each
year.

As of November 1 , 1796, the loan fund had been used in the

Danish West Indies to buy 2,567 slaves, and planters on the three
islands had purchased 1,932 on their own, making the total number
of slaves imported and kept 4,499.

Approximately 854 slaves had

been landed on St. Croix but, remaining unsold, later had been taken
to other colonies.

Others had obviously been re-exported from

St. Thomas, for this would account for the failure of the slave
population to increase as much as i t should have if all 4,499 slaves
imported and sold in the islands had actually been retained.

On

November 2, 1796, there were 500 African slaves s t i l l unsold in the
Danish islands. 8 9

This was perhaps an indication that the islands

had already absorbed about as many slaves as there was a demand for.
Additional evidence in this regard i s that in the four years from
1793 through 1796, 687,800 rigsdaler vestindisk courant had been
made available to the planters for buying slaves, but as of November
1796, 116,890 rigsdaler had not been used.

Though the land planted

in sugar on St. Croix had increased from 26,604 acres in 1792 to
27,655 acres in 1796, there wasn't much more available that was
suitable for sugar cultivation, as the eastern end of the island was

88Ibid.,

p. 29.

89Ibid.,

pp. 32-33.
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too dry arid mountains covered much of the northern part of St.
Croix. 9 ®
The loan to the planters had encouraged an increase in the
slave population and in sugar production; but the reforms to
ameliorate the treatment of the slaves had been stymied by the
colonial government.

The General Customs Department had not made

more than a perfunctory attempt a t encouraging the colonial govern
ment to support amelioration and had accepted the l a t t e r ' s view that
the property rights of the planters over their slaves were not to
be interfered with by the state.

I t was not clear whether the Crown

would actually abolish the slave trade on January 1 , 1803, in
accordance with the abolition edict, i f faced with strong resistance
from the West Indies when the grace period expired.

9 0 Ibid.,

pp. 34-35, p. 38.

CHAPTER VI
The Abolition Edict Preserved
The Danish abolition edict was promulgated at a time when
the s p i r i t of reform was dominant in Copenhagen under the influence
of Counts Bernstroff, Reventlow, and Schimmelmann.
era had ended by 1800.

Yet the reform

The power of the reform-minded ministers

of state had weakened by then, and the stronger role of Crown Prince
Frederik in policy-making exerted a conservative influence.
Bernstorff died in June 1797, and none of the remaining ministers
of state possessed the authority to replace him.

As a result,

Crown Prince Frederik, then 29, increasingly took control of the
government, in keeping with his desire to rule on his ownJ
The Crown Prince's authority continued, as i t had since
1784, to depend on his position as chairman of the Council of State,
and on the provision that no royal command was valid unless signed
by him.

He also relied on the generally accepted view that as heir

to the throne and as actual regent he should rightly exercise
authority over the monarchy.

By 1805 Frederik had undermined the

authority of the Council of State to the point where i t was only a

^Vibaek, Reform 03 Fall i t . 255ff.
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shadow of i t s former s e l f ; his lengthy stays in the duchies in
1803-04, motivated by fears for the southern border area, and his
more or less permanent residence there in 1805 meant he could not
consult as closely with the Council of State as before, and he
refused to allow the council to exercise authority on his behalf.

2

But by his absence, bureaucrats in Copenhagen, knowing that the
Crown Prince was far away and preoccupied with foreign policy and
military matters, gained authority to act, or fail or act, as they
pleased.
The abolition edict had been predicated on the assumption
that the slave population of the Danish West Indies could be main
tained without further slave imports after January 1 , 1803.

Two

leading West Indian figures, Walterstorff and Oxholm, returned
to Copenhagen in the 1790s and argued for postponing abolition;
Walterstorff became a confidant of Crown Prince Frederik, so that
he was well placed to influence the thinking of Denmark's head of
state.

As i t turned out, a victory for the foes of abolition was

only narrowly averted.
The question of whether Denmark would actually enforce the
abolition edict was f i r s t openly raised following a series of attacks
on the Danish West Indian government published in Politisk og
ph.ysisk Maqazin in the spring of 1797.

2

The anonymous author of

Linvald, Kronprins Frederik og hans Reqerinq, 1797-1807,
pp. 3-9. Christian VII continued to attend meetings of the Council
of State and signed documents placed before him, though both mentally
and physically his deterioration grew steadily worse.
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"Letters from St. Croix" f i r s t described, tongue in cheek, how
customs officials, in order to support their families, accepted
bribes to allow smuggling, thereby contributing to the general
welfare of the colonies.

His language grew stronger as he referred

to the planters as a corrupted and ungrateful class who avoided
paying their debts to the Crown and sought to accumulate wealth so
they could leave the islands as soon as possible.

They realized

the small, mountainous Lesser Antilles were doomed to declining
productivity and eventual ruin in the face of competition from sugar
producers on larger islands in the Greater Antilles, especially
in Cuba ("the Spaniards are not as backward as many believe") and
in mainland areas such as Surinam.^

The April edition of Politisk

og ph.ysisk Magazin contained a second "Letter from St. Croix"
criticizing the St. Croix planters' "pride and arrogance, which i s
usually a result of wealth," and their pro-English sympathies, which
caused them to avoid learning the Danish language even though "they
are born in a Danish colony."

The author argued that their purchase

of smuggled merchandise from the English islands, especially from
nearby Tortola, meant that Danish consumer products could not be sold
in the Danish West Indies. 4
In response to this criticism of the West Indian regime and
the planter class Oxholm wrote his book, De danske vestindiske Oers
Til stand, defending the colonial authorities and arguing that abolition

^"Breve fra St. Croix; f0rste Brev, St. Croix den 16 Januari
1796" Politisk og ph.ysisk Magazin, Copenhagen, March 1797, pp. 257274.
4 Ibid.,

April 1797, pp. 395-401.
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of the slave trade ought to be delayed beyond 1803.

He wrote that

pregnant slaves worked in the fields and carried heavy objects on
their heads; the result was a large number of accidental abortions.
He concluded that the birth rate would continue to lag behind the
death rate, necessitating "a longer period than ten years to attain
the goal of abolition."

5

He believed the vitality of slavery as a

system of production depended on a continuation of the slave trade;
and slavery was a necessary evil.

"Although i t cannot be denied

that slavery in itself i s contrary to the basic principles of
humanity, i t would perhaps be impossible to end slavery, because
of i t s long existence, without devastating consequences for the
cultivation of the colonies."

The best approach, he argued, was to

ameliorate the slaves' condition and to regard slavery as a "moral
evil which must be tolerated because i t cannot be abolished or
corrected without bringing about consequences which would be much
worse and more damaging for the state and i t s subjects."
concluded:

Oxholm

"The colonial system i s a stain on the constitution

[Statsforfatning] of Europe which must out of necessity be permitted,

5 0xholm,

De danske vestindiske Oers Tilstand, pp. 57-58.
Oxholm, unlike Walterstorff, preferred to blame abortions on the
carelessness of the slaves rather than on their supposedly lascivious
inclinations; the important thing for both men, of course, was to
indicate that the planters were not at fault and that increasing
the birth rate was not within their power. In the introduction to
his book Oxholm wrote that he had sold all his property on St. Croix,
so his opinion could be regarded as impartial (Da jeg har solgt
alle mine Eiendomme i hiint Land, . . . saa kan min Stemme mindre
mistaenkes for Partiskhed). Yet the St. Croix slave census taken in
1804-05 by Governor Mllhlenfels listed Oxholm as owner of two planta
tions, Ruby and Diamond, with 235 slaves.
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because i t s rash removal would have the most pernicious influence
on the prosperity of entire nations and destroy many millions of
persons who earn their livings in those industries and branches
of commerce which are supported and maintained by the colonial
trade.
Oxholm's defense of slavery and his comments on the need to
continue the slave trade beyond the deadline set for abolition led
the pro-reform journal Laerde Efterretninger to express i t s fear
that the abolition edict would never be implemented.

In a review

of Oxholm's book, the journal was critical of the continued excess
of deaths over births among slaves in the islands during 1793-96.
Laerde Efterretninger noted that the plan for abolition of the slave
trade, once considered as the f i r s t step of a process leading to
freedom for the slaves in the Danish islands, "seems (if only this
reviewer i s mistaken!) merely to have supplied our islands with
more slaves and our poets, orators, and flatterers with a perfect
opportunity for sonorous phrases [blot at have skaffet vore 0er
flere Slaver og vore Digtere, Talere, Smigrere en ski0n Anledning
t i l klingende Udtryk]."

The reviewer then referred to P. A. Heiberg's

poem, "Fred med Kongerne paa Jorden," stating that the poet's praise
of Crown Prince Frederik for breaking the chains of the Negroes "would
perhaps be a . . . mystery for posterity."

7

^Ibid., p. 10.
^Laerde Efterretninger, No. 10, 1798, p. 154.
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The reviewer in Skandinavisk Museum agreed with Oxholm
that "so long as the planters fail to discourage irregular sexual
liaisons [avvaerge uordentlige Sammenleje] and to encourage
legal marriages, to reduce the amount of work performed by pregnant
women, to subsidize those slave families which have several
children and by other means seek this benevolent goal [of increasing
the number of births], all the government's efforts will be f u t i l e . "
But a time would come when the planters would finally realize that
their own advantage provided a compelling reason for "granting the
slaves fairer treatment and, eventually, full freedom [ a t tilstaae
Negrene stflrre Billigheder og omsider deres fulde Frihed], and for
seriously working to improve the culture and morality of these
unhappy persons, because the planters would have to abandon sugar
O
cultivation i f they continued their present approach.
Despite pressures exerted in favor of continuing the slave
trade, Schimmelmann was not likely to retreat from the position taken
by the Committee on the Slave Trade in i t s report advocating abolition.
For one thing, his s i s t e r , Countess Julie Reventlow, continued after
promulgation of the abolition edict to urge her brother to pursue
policies that would benefit the slaves and to prevent subversion of
his good intentions by others who cared l i t t l e for the welfare of
the slaves.

Thus in 1793 she wrote him:

I have had neither rest nor peace [weder Rast noch Ruhe]
during the past fourteen days . . . . But I must move a heavy

8 Skandinavisk

Museum, I (1798), 400.
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burden from my soul. My dear, beloved Ernst! I can no
longer keep silent about the most important matter of my l i f e .
Oh, I beseech you, l e t your noble zeal for our slaves, for
our previously resolved upon plans, now blaze as much as ever.
I fear that others, now when i t comes to a decision, though
they may not be cold [towards helping the slaves], will yet
behave in a very half-hearted manner.
I cannot possibly l e t myself be turned back with the
wretched statement that our slaves are well-off, well-fed, and
well-clothed; and I become enraged in my soul when I have to
listen to such statements. Without sacrifice from our side,
of course, nothing can be attained . . . . Let us nevertheless
at least make some kind of a beginning. As yet no schools
have been constructed! As yet no Moravians have been hired to
instruct the young slaves in the Christian religion, which for
me i s by far the most important thing. Likewise, s t i l l more
abuses will be permitted and put up with, which will have very
dismal moral consequences [traurige sittliche Folgen]. Of
course I understand fully that one in these terrible times of
madness and insurrection [in diesen schreklichen Zeiten des
Wahnsinns und Aufruhrs] can and may only take action with a
gentle hand. I commit all of this to your wisdom and your
inexhaustible love of mankind [unerschflpflischen Menschettliebe],
which i s always a truthful adviser. You would render me an
inexpressible service of friendship [unaussprechliche
Liebesdienst] i f you were to keep me informed of the results of
your deliberations concerning the slaves [Eurer Berathschlaqiingen
tiber die Neger].9
Julie Reventlow wrote to the Moravian headquarters in Herrnhut,
Saxony, and got her brother Ernst to do the same, complaining of the
reluctance of Moravian missionaries in the Danish islands to baptize
all the slave children on the Moravians' own plantations.

Schimmelmann

himself urged the Moravians to give any surplus earnings on their
plantations to the s l a v e s J 0

Julie Reventlow surely exaggerated the

Q
/
*Bobe, Efterladte papirer f r a den Reventlowske Familiekreds,
VIII, 342-44. Letter from Countess Julie Reventlow, from Emkendorf
in Holstein, to Ernst Schimmelmann, November 28, 1793.
l°Lawaetz, Br^dremenighedens Mission: Dansk Vestindien,
1769-1849, pp. 212-13. The letters in the Moravian archives were
destroyed during World War I I .
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Moravians' commitment to improving the treatment of the slaves.
A leading Moravian convert, Governor Malleville, wrote the General
Customs Department of the need to keep the slaves at a proper
distance from the whites.

He accordingly advised against a proposal

from Copenhagen to allow slaves to participate, along with whites,
in t r i a l s involving other slaves.

Malleville added that slaves were

better treated since promulgation of the abolition edict because of
the planters' realization that their own interests lay in promoting
the survival of their slaves rather than in destroying them by
overwork and mistreatment.^
Schimmelmann had placed his reputation behind the proposal
for abolition and had the support of pro-reform government officials.
Ultimately, though, Schimmelmann's authority and the wishes of other
abolitionists could be negated by Crown Prince Frederik, who was
eager to rule on his own and did so increasingly after Bernstorff's
death in 1797; but Frederik was also mindful of public opinion as
expressed in the Copenhagen press and, not suprisingly, relished
i t s praise.

12

Most importantly, he had to rely on his bureaucracy

l^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 458, 1798, Letter from
Governor Malleville to General Customs Department, March 17, 1798,
pp. 1-3. This was the view which the planter class wished to have
accepted in Copenhagen, and i t is contradicted by data on birth and
death rates and by testimony from an unbiased source reporting to
Schimmelmann on the condition of the slaves in 1802. See below,
A. B. Bentzon's report, pp. 220ff.
1?

Frederik s growing concern about press criticism of the
church, the nobility, and absolutism itself led to a law of Septem
ber 27, 1799, which required writers to submit their material to the
police for examination prior to publication and required special
permission for operating a printing press. The poet P. A. Heiberg
was deported a few months later. See Vibaek, Reform Qg Fall i t .
193-203.
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for data and policy recommendations, and his intentions could be
subverted by opposition from the bureaucracy, which i s precisely
what was to happen regarding abolition of the slave trade.
Sugar production in the Danish islands benefited in the
1790s both from additional workers and from rising sugar prices
resulting from the upheaval on St. Domingue.

Customs duties

collected in Copenhagen from the West Indian trade increased from
13,242 rigsdaler in 1792 to 176,011 riqsdaler in 1799.^ 3

Despite

the increase in the labor force, however, sugar production on St.
Croix actually declined from 1793 to 1796, because of poor weather,
averaging 18.7 million pounds a year.
reached 32.5 million

But by 1800 sugar production

pounds.^

The Schimmelmann plantations prospered during the 1790s,
earning profits of 171,132 riqsdaler in 1793, 85,442 riqsdaler in
1795, and 108,190 riqsdaler in 1797J 5

The price of brown sugar sold

on St. Croix rose from 11.5 Skillinq per pound in 1792 to 18 Skilling
in 1797. 1 6

l 3 Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandels oq
Sukkerproduktions Historie, pp. 60-671 This included duties on goods
from non-Danish islands as well, and duties were raised slightly in 1797.
^Oxholm, De danske Vestindiske Oers Tilstand, p. 39, and
Sveistrup, De dansk-vestindiske 0ers okonomiske Historie, p. 70.
1 5 DSA,

Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv, Pk. 72,
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1782-1800. See Vortrag zur
Generalversammlung for, respectively, 1794, p. 4; 1796, p. 3; and
1798, p. 3.
^Sveistrup and Willerslev, Den danske Sukkerhandels oq
Sukkerproduktions Historie, p. 63. There were 96 Skillinq per
riqsdaler. See Knud Erik Svendsen e t a K , Dansk Penqehistorie
(Odsnse: Danmarks National bank, 1968), I , 13.
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The slave population on the Schimmelmann plantation grew
as a result of the purchase of new slaves, not because of an excess
of births over deaths, for the death rate continued to exceed the
birth rate even on those supposedly model plantations.

The population

of the four Schimmelmann plantations increased from 886 in 1792 to
982 in 1799.

In 1792, adult female slaves exceeded males by 309 to

258, a preponderance which declined slightly by 1799, when there were
345 adult females and 319 adult males, indicating the purchase of
more male than female slaves.

This practice was contrary to the

recommendations of the Committee on the Slave Trade. Data from the
period September 1795 to September 1796 show that twenty slaves were
born and twenty-nine died.
bought their freedom.

In that year, four female mulattoes

But thirty-four new slaves were purchased a t

a cost of 10,080 rigsdaler dansk courant, an average price of 296
rigsdaler.

I t i s not unreasonable to assume that Schimmelmann was

using government loans for a t least part of these purchases, though
there i s no proof that he was.

From September 1798 to September 1799,

twenty-one slaves were born on the Schimmelmann plantations and
thirty-two died.

One mulatto woman bought her freedom, and an old

mulatto male was freed.

This loss of thirteen slaves was more than

compensated for by the purchase of twenty-eight new s l a v e s . ^

Thus

the Schimmelmann plantations continued to suffer an excess of deaths
over births, with only the purchase of new slaves maintaining and,

17

DSA, Grev Ernst Schimmelmanns Privatarkiv, Pk. 72.
Vortrag zur Generalversammlung, 1792-1800.

See
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in these years, increasing the population on them.

If the population

of the slaves on the Schimmelmann plantations could not be maintained,
there was probably l i t t l e likelihood that smaller and poorer
plantations could achieve a balance of births and deaths.
The government loans to planters for buying slaves apparently
ceased in 1799.

The Crown had concluded that the loans had been

misused by a t least three members of the loan committee in the
islands, including Oxholm.

An anonymous pamphlet published in

Copenhagen had accused Oxholm of using the loans to buy large
numbers of slaves and then reselling the slaves individually for a
p r o f i t O x h o l m admitted that he had done so but defended his actions
by arguing that he had merely helped planters acquire the slaves they
needed, a practice which he f e l t justified and in keeping with the
intention of the loan pi a n J 9
Probably prompted by the publicity about misuse of the loans
and about Oxholm's admission of having profited from buying and
selling slaves, the Committee on the Slave Trade wrote the General
Customs Department on May 9, 1799, that "no member of the committee
established in the Danish islands to administer loans to the planters
may, either directly or indirectly, participate or take part in the
sale of slaves."

The committee requested that the department send

^"Berigtigelser ved Hr. Major Oxholms Skrift over de danske
vestindiske 0ers Tilstand," anonymous pamphlet, Copenhagen, 1798,
p. 18.
19
Oxholm, "Urigtigheder i de saakaldte Berigtigelser,"
Copenhagen, 1798, pp. 19ff.
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an order to that effect to the government of the Danish West Indies.
Members of the loan committee, who were all government officials,
were not accused of wrong-doing, as the Committee on the Slave Trade
said i t "had no official report on the matter," but believed the
ban on slave trading for members of the loan committee was justified
because "there seems to be reason enough for such an order from the
very nature of the matter," in effect admitting that the temptation
was too great and should therefore be eliminated.^
The Commission for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt
expressed concern in a l e t t e r to the Committee on the Slave Trade
about the repayment of loans made to planters and the failure of
the West Indian loan committee to send to Copenhagen data on how many
of the slaves purchased by means of the loan were s t i l l alive; as
the slaves were the security used to obtain the loans, there was ample
reason for concern.

The commission therefore urged acceptance of

the plantations themselves as security, even if they were already
mortgaged more than once.

Furthermore, the loan committee had, in

violation of the stipulations put forth in the final draft of the
loan plan, loaned an average of 239 rigsdaler vestindisk courant
to planters for the slaves they bought using the loan, though the
highest sum to be granted for buying an adult male slave was 225
rigsdaler.

The loan plan did allow up to 250 rigsdaler for a female

2°DSA, VGRGT, Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre Indretning
og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from Committee on the Slave Trade to General
Customs Department, May 9, 1799, p. 1 .

slave aged fourteen to twenty-five, but i t seemed proable to the
commission that only a few women in this age group had been
imported, as slaves in this category were seldom available for sale
in Africa.

As of March 1 , 1799, 5,302 slaves had been bought in

the islands with funds supplied by the Crown, with 1,267,000 riqsdaler
vestindisk courant of the 1 ,302,644 riqsdaler vestindisk courant set
aside for loans having already been allocated three years before
the loans were to end.
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The slave population of the Danish West Indies had continued
to grow in the 1790s:

in January 1792, the three islands contained

27,604 slaves; by 1797, the slave population reached 32,851 an
increase of 5,147 since publication of the abolition edict.

The

slaves on St. Croix had increased from 21,546 to 25,884; on St. Thomas
from 4,214 to 4,837; and on St. John from 1,844 to 2,127.^

In 1802,

St. Croix had 27,006 slaves, St. Thomas 5,813, and St. John 2,530.
The slave population of the Danish colonies had reached 35,349; there
were also 3,014 whites and 2,102 free colored.

Though slave deaths

in 1801 were 744 and births only 500, in 1802 594 slaves died while
676 were born, suggesting the possibility of a self-sustaining slave

2 ^DSA,

V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, undated l e t t e r from
Directionen for den vestindiske Gaelds Likvidation to Committee on
the slave trade, pp. 1-7. The colonial government on September 2,
1802, wrote the General Customs Department that an epidemic, a crop
failure and British occupation of the islands had kept planters
from using the remainder of the loan fund. See p . 228 below.
2 2 DSA,

VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Tax Rolls for
1792 and 1797. These figures are probably too low, of course, as
they were supplied by the planters.
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population.^

I t was during the f i r s t five years of the ten-year

grace period prior to abolition that the number of slaves on St.
Croix increased dramatically.

The slow-down in the growth of the

slave population after 1797 indicates that the island's need for
additional slaves was diminishing.
A basic assumption of Schimmelmann and the Committee on
the Slave Trade had been that their plan for "gradual" abolition
would give the planters time to prepare for the day when they could
no longer replace their dead slaves by purchasing new ones from
Africa.

I t was assumed that the planters would, in their own self-

interest, improve treatment of the slaves they presently owned.

The

committee had not taken into account the tendency of many planters
to seek quick profits and abandon the islands for Europe as soon as
possible.

Civic pride was minimal in the Danish West Indies, as i t

was generally in the Caribbean sugar islands.

So long as the planters

could buy slaves, were indeed encouraged to do so with the help of
loans provided by the Crown, they had l i t t l e incentive to seek
improvement in the birth rate or in the survival rate of their slaves,
for slave children were a useless burden in the short run, and main
taining elderly or crippled slaves, who were referred to as ud.yktige
(inefficient or incapable), was similarly onerous.

The continued

excess of deaths over births on St. Croix was evidence that

^ 3 DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, population l i s t s
taken from the tax rolls and sent from St. Croix by Governor
Balthazar Frederik Mtlhlenfels, St. Croix, September 28, 1803.
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amelioration had not yet been widely adopted by local planters.
Population data contained in the tax rolls bear out the
contention that deaths continued to exceed births by an amount
sufficient to insure the decline of the slave population once the
abolition edict took effect, with predictable long-range consequences
for sugar production.

The crude birth rate and crude death rate of

the slaves on St. Croix from 1792 through 1799 and for 1801-1802
are as follows:
Slave Births per Thousand

Slave Deaths per

1792

18.52

20.94

1793

20.77

27.37

1794

20.17

27.23

1795

19.00

31.19

1796

18.81

30.72

1797

19.94

37.85

1798

19.89

26.75

1799

19.51

29.39

1801

18.90

28.12

1802

25.03

21.99 2 4

20.05
Average
(arithmetical mean)

Average
28.15
(arithmetical mean)

An additional source concerning the plight of the slaves ten
years after promulgation of the abolition edict i s a forty-page report

2 ^DSA,

VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Tax Rolls for
St. Croix, 1792-1799, 1801-1802.
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sent to Schimmelmann on July 24, 1802, by Reqerinqsraad A. B. Bentzon,
who had arrived in the West Indies in 1799.

The report, "Concerning

the Slaves on the Danish West Indian Islands (Om Negerne paa de
danske 0er i Vestindien)," gives a detailed discussion of current
problems and demonstrates how l i t t l e improvement, i f any, there had
been in the treatment of slaves since 1792.

Bentzon, who later

became governor-general of the Danish West Indies, was not a planter,
and his account i s free from the obvious pro-planter biases that
affected the reports of Oxholm and Walterstorff.

He warned

Schimmelmann of the grave danger of slave revolt, for the recently
arrived African slaves in particular showed growing signs of unrest
(1^ cte trende sidste Maaneder har man bemaerket hos K.ystnegerne en
Tilb^ielighed t i l Insubordination) which on one St. Croix plantation
had resulted in the murder of a white overseer.

He argued that only

the loyalty of many creole slaves to their masters had prevented
a general slave rising, "the worst of all calamities, a revolt of
the Helots [den vaerste af alle Calamiteter, en Helotkriq]."

Yet

he admitted that creole slaves might secretly harbor rebellious
instincts.
Bentzon placed part of the blame for the restless behavior
of the slaves on the activities of the British under General Fuller
during the British occupation of the Danish West Indies from March

2 5 DSA,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, A. B. Bentzon, "0m
Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," St. Croix, July 24, 1802,
pp. 1-3.
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1801 to February 1802.26

Fuller's administration reduced the slaves'

respect for and fear of the power of the Danish colonial authorities,
according to Bentzon.

Fuller had publicly urged the slaves to come

to him with their complaints and promised them justice; and non-Danish
overseers, usually drawn from the lower classes, displayed open
contempt for Denmark and encouraged disrespect for Denmark among the
slaves.

Yet, Bentzon concluded, a slave revolt could probably be

avoided if the slaves were not so badly overworked and starved that
they saw no alternative to rebellion.

He therefore proposed that

reforms be implemented as soon as possible in order to save the
colonies from destruction.

The suggestions he made show the continued

harshness of slave treatment and indicate the failure of gradual
emancipation to bring about amelioration.

Bentzon argued that

(1) slave rations should be specified by law; (2) the slaves should
be guaranteed garden plots of a specific size and a t least one day
every two weeks to work their gardens; (3) the length of the work day
should be limited; (4) Sundays and four religious holidays should
be set aside as days of rest; (5) after the third month of pregnancy,
no slave woman should have to engage in heavy field work—such as
cutting the cane or digging holes for planting cane—or suffer
corporal punishment, especially whipping; (6) specific rations should
be provided for each baby which survived for three months; (7) efforts
should be made to encourage slaves on each plantation to establish
stable sexual relationships with a partner on the same plantation so

^For details see Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, 1755-1848,
pp. 219-226.
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that they would not have to walk one or two miles every evening
after work to spend the night with a spouse on another plantation,
for this traveling weakened the slaves and diminished their energy
for work in the fields the next day.

" I t i s obvious, moreover, that

this movement during the night of perhaps half the slaves in the
islands provides an occasion for disorder, dissipation, and sometimes
for dangerous gatherings [Pet falder desuden i 0jene, a t denne
Bevaegelse ved Nattetid af maaskee Halvparten af Landets Negere giver
Anledning t i l Uorden, Disipation, og undertiden t i l far!ige
Sammenkomster]."

He added that no law could compel the slaves to

abandon their evening journeys, and he thereby agreed with the state
ment of Miecke in 1792 (see above, p. 194) that i t would be dangerous
to attempt to restrict the slaves' sexual freedom.

Bentzon wrote:

"In compensation for all of the real rights which the slave has lost
he demands with unbending firmness the right to seek out over the
entire island as many wives as he pleases, and force in this matter
will not only prove useless, but, perhaps especially among the
Africans, might result in the most fatal occurrences [Tvang vilde
her e j aleene vaere un.yttig, men endog maaskee isaer hos Afrikanerne
fulgt af de fatal i s t e Tildragelser].
One assumption of the Committee on the Slave Trade was that
encouragement of slave marriages would improve the birth rate, an

^Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien,"
pp. 6-14. Bentzon urged adoption of a policy implemented on Jamaica
in 1792 which sought to keep plantation owners from giving a slave
more than thirty-nine lashes and from repeating the punishment until
the wounds had healed.
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approach to the population problem that was considered particularly
important in view of the fact that the low birth rate was blamed as
the primary cause of the failure of the slave population to maintain
itself.

OO

Bentzon wrote that he had seen successful slave marriages,

whose salutary contributions to population growth and morality should
suffice to convince every slave owner of the need to promote such
unions whenever possible.

Yet many owners failed to do so.

More

serious than the lack of support for slave marriages was another evil:
the continued practice of selling slaves by planters to pay debts,
which not only interfered with family l i f e , but kept the slaves
from becoming more attached to the plantation on which they worked
and lived and from developing a greater sense of self-esteem.

pq
3

Even Walterstorff's proposals of monetary awards to persons who
produced the best designs for ideal slave hospitals and nurseries,
which planters would then be encouraged to adopt by special premiums
from the government, came to nothing. 30
Bentzon's proposals for laws to help the slaves actually
had a dual purpose.

He wanted "to make slavery easier on the slave

and safer for the planter [at qi0re Slaveriet lettere for Negeren og
sikkrere for Planterenl", but he anticipated strong opposition to
any legally binding ameliorative measures not only from "masters and

2 8 Allerunterthclnigste

Vorstellung of the Committee on the
Slave Trade, December 28, 1791, pp. 33ff.
2 %entzon,

"Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien,"

pp. 13-16.
^Oxholm, De danske vestindiske 0ers Til stand, p. 32.
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overseers whose savagery and stubborness [vildhed og egenraadighed]"
the laws sought to restrain but also from "decent-minded, short
sighted men [veltaenkende . . . kortsynede Maend] who fail to realize
that in the voluntary sacrifice of part of their authority lies the
guarantee for the essential power which will remain theirs [ a t i
Resignation af en Peel af deres Magt, ligger Guarantien for den
O]
vaesentlige som er tilbage].
The plans of 1792 for making instruction in the Christian
religion more readily available to the slaves had come to l i t t l e , as
the Moravians resisted assuming responsibility for educating the
slaves.

Only one additional mission station was constructed on

St. Croix. 3 2

The Moravians' exclusive concern was with saving souls.

Indeed, Bentzon thought "Their teaching . . . i s not poorly designed
for a slave, who, in the notion of the enjoyment he can expect in
Heaven, forgets the evil reality bestowed upon him on earth [Deres
Laere . . . er ikke ilde beregnet for Traellen, som i_ Ideen, om den
Nydelse han haaber hisset, glemmer det onde Virkeligheden tildeelte
ham her.]," and he described the Moravians as persons who taught
the doctrine of "unlimited resignation [ubegraensede Resignation]."33

Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien,"
pp. 35 and 37.
J

Lawaetz, Brfldremenighedens Mission:
1769-1848, pp. 133ff.

Dansk-Vestindien,

33Bentzon, "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien,"
pp. 34-35. A Danish Lutheran missionary on St. Thomas showed a t
least some humanitarian concern for the slaves by protesting against
the practice of selling slaves a t public auctions. See DSA, VGRGT,
Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l Negerhandelens bedre
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In 1792 Walterstorff and Oxholm had warned the Committee
on the Slave Trade that i t would be difficult i f not impossible to
increase the slaves' birth rate and lower their death rate to achieve
a preponderance of births over deaths.

Oxholm had again expressed

his doubts in 1797 in De danske Vestindiske 0ers Tilstand. As
January 1 , 1803, the date set for abolition, drew closer, others
began to urge a continuation of the slave trade.

The Commission

for the Liquidation of the West Indian Debt pointed out to the
Committee on the Slave Trade that the continued excess of slave
deaths over births threatened to ruin the plan for establishing a
self-sustaining labor force in the islands. 3 4

A member of the debt

committee who had spent twenty-two years in the Danish West Indies
and also visited the Danish forts on the Gold Coast, Konferensraad
J . F. Heinrich, urged the Committee on the Slave Trade to permit
a continuation of the slave trade to the Danish islands.

He argued

that abolition would result in a declining and overworked slave
population, for the planters would drive their slaves to maintain
the higher levels of production achieved during the 1790s when there
was a steadily growing labor force.

After assuring the committee

of his sympathy with the Crown's goal of improving slave treatment,
he warned that abolition would lead to a deterioration of the slaves'

Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from General Customs Department
to Committee on Slave Trade, June 9, 1798, p. 1 .
3 4 DSA,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, letter from Dikrektionen
for den Vestindiske Gaelds Likvidation to Committee on Slave Trade,
written sometime in 1800, pp. 3-4.
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living standards.

The planters, pressured by their creditors,

would be compelled to work their slaves "without mercy," for the
planters thought only of the next twelve to fifteen years, and "in
that period they will seek to become wealthy enough to return to
Europe." 3 ^

Heinrich suggested that the Danish forts on the Gold

Coast could be abandoned i f their maintenance was too costly, and
slaves for the Danish islands could be purchased elsewhere.

One

or two slave ships a year would suffice to supply the Danish
islands. 3 6
Bentzon, too, urged continuation of the slave trade, as well
as a resumption of the loans to planters to buy slaves, for he f e l t
these measures would make the planters sympathetic to the laws he
proposed to improve slave treatment and thereby make possible a t
some future date a labor force no longer in need of replenishment
from Africa.
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Ten years after the abolition edict he was using the

argument that s t i l l more time was needed for the islands to prepare
for abolition.
In February 1802 a breach was made in the abolition edict's
stipulation that participation by Danish subjects in all aspects of
the slave trade outside the Danish West Indies was to cease with the

3 5 DSA,

V6R6T, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, l e t t e r from
Konferensraad J . F. Heinrich to Committee on the Slave Trade,
Copenhagen, March 11, 1801, pp. 1-4.
36Ibid.,
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p. 38.

p. 6.

Bentzon, "0m Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien,"

228
beginning of 1803.

The General Customs Department at that time

approved the request of two Danish slavers to purchase slaves on the
Gold Coast later in 1802 and sell them in the Danish West Indies
after January 1 , 1803, so long as the ships' captains could prove
that the slaves had been purchased in 1802. 3 8
On July 1, 1802, seventy-five planters, working through the
St. Croix Burger Council, signed an appeal to the Crown urging
continuation of the slave trade during 1803, 1804, and 1805 and
provision for further loans for purchasing slaves.
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In a l e t t e r

accompanying the planters' appeal, the government of the Danish
West Indies showed itself sympathetic with the planters.

The colonial

government said that the Danish islands had not yet obtained a
sufficient number of slaves.

The government agreed with the planters'

contention that an epidemic in 1799 that killed many slaves, a crop
failure in 1800, and confusion caused by the English occupation of
the islands in 1801 had prevented the planters from purchasing as
many slaves as they needed and from making use of the remainder of
the Crown loan for buying slaves.

The government concluded:

"It

would . . . be of great help to the planters if their appeal were
approved.

3 8 DSA,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, l e t t e r from General
Customs Department to Committee on the Slave Trade, February 15,
1802, pp. 1-2.
^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 740, "Til
Kongen," St. Croix, July 1 , 1802, p. 2.
40
DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 140, l e t t e r
from government of Danish West Indies to General Customs Department,
St. Croix, September 30, 1802, pp. 1-2.

The planters praised the loan granted them by the Crown
for buying slaves and said that because of i t the plantations had
acquired the badly needed manpower they had hitherto lacked.
Furthermore, they wrote, the increase in the number of slaves had
lightened the labor of the blacks.

This argument that additional

numbers of slaves served to ease the burden of the slave population
assumes that planters did not use those extra hands to expand
production in order to pay the debts incurred in acquiring those
extra slaves.

Oxholm indicates, however, an increase in acreage

planted in cane did occur between 1792-96 (see p. 204 above).

The

planters assured the Crown that "Most of Your Royal Majesty's
intentions in granting the loans would have been realized, i f only
physical as well as political misfortunes, which were equally
unavoidable and unpredictable, had not combined to place hindrances
in the way of carrying out your Majesty's intentions and stopped
progress on the plantations."

The epidemic of 1799 had reduced the

ranks of the plantation slaves, the crop failure of 1800 "prevented
the planters from making up the losses by buying new slaves," and
the English occupation of the islands and the resultant confusion
in 1801 again kept the planters from fulfilling their intention of
buying more slaves.

Further aid from the Crown was therefore

essential in order to make more improvements on the plantations and
to prevent the destruction of those improvements already made.

In

what amounted to undisguised blackmail, the planters warned that i f
the Crown failed to provide them with aid, "The most harmful
consequences will result not only for these colonics but also for
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that part of the mother country's trade and shipping which depends
on the prosperity of the c o l o n i e s . O n l y by continuing the slave
trade for three more years and providing the planters with loans to
buy slaves during that time could the situation be saved.
The planters' appeal and the colonial government's l e t t e r
were delayed en route, and only in the spring of 1803 did they reach
the General Customs Department in Copenhagen.
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The department

requested an opinion on the matter from the Committee on the Slave
Trade.

The department urged the committee to respond promptly, for

i t would take time to prepare slave ships for the journey to Africa
if the planters' request were granted.

One merchant had already

asked permission to send a ship to the Gold Coast to buy slaves.
The Committee on the Slave Trade, dominated by Schimmelmann,
was thus given a chance to admit that i t s report of December 28,
1791, endorsing a plan for gradual abolition, had been mistaken or
at least premature.

The committee could have conceded that

unforeseen circumstances had made i t necessary to resume the slave
trade.

But i f the committee abandoned abolition in 1803, would the

Danish slave trade ever end?

Would the planters ever feel secure

^"Til Kongen," pp. 1-2. The epidemic of 1799 could not
have been as serious as alleged, as the death rate for slaves on
St. Croix that year was not unusually high. (See p. 220 above.)
^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs
Department's Allerunderdanigst Forestilling on the planters' appeal
for continuing the slave trade, May 15, 1804, p. 2.
AO

DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning, Letter from General Customs Depart
ment to Committee on the Slave Trade, March 31, 1803, pp. 1-2.
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enough to accept abolition without vigorous protest?
In the meantime, an important court decision in Copenhagen
showed a lack of sympathy for the plight of slaves brought to
Denmark from the West Indies.

On May 31, 1802, a Copenhagen court

[Mbenhavnske Hof-og Stadsret) issued a ruling in a case involving
two runaway slaves who had been brought by their owners from St.
Croix to Copenhagen and who had subsequently sought to avoid being
sent back to the West Indies.

The court ruled that, according to

the law of the Danish West Indies, the slaves were the legal property
of their owners and that their residenc-e in Denmark did not affect
their status; therefore, their owners were free to send them back to
the islands.^

This decision came thirty years after Lord Chief

Knud Waaben, "A. S. 0rsted og negerslaverne i Ktfbenhavn,"
Juristen, 46 (1964), 321ff. One of the slaves was owned by Henriette
Schimmelmann, widow of Ernst Schimmelmann's cousin Heinrich Ludwig
Ernst Schimmelmann, who had managed the Schimmelmann plantations and
served briefly as governor general of the Danish West Indies. Waaben
estimates there were at least f i f t y Negro house slaves in Copenhagen,
along with some free colored. August Hennings, a boyhood friend of
Schimmelmann who visited Copenhagen for several months in 1802,
complained that the presence in Copenhagen of about 400 slaves,
presumably from a slave ship, was causing problems. They were
constantly escaping, and some had reportedly broken into Schimmelmann's
summer residence, S01yst. (Der Sclaven-Unfug dauert noch f o r t . Sie
soil en in Seelust eingebrochen. Man rechnet, dass von 400 Sclaven,
die hier in Eisen sind, wtichentlich zwei ausbrechen, so schlecht
werden sie bewacht.). The streets of Copenhagen were not safe, he
wrote, because of the presence of drunken slaves. A bureaucrat from
a provincial town, Hennings probably exaggerated the danger posed by
the slaves. He was obviously astounded by the presence of blacks in
the homes of Danish West Indians. Though Hennings associated with
top government figures, including Crown Prince Frederik and former
West Indian officials, he never mentioned any discussion among them
of the impending abolition of the slave trade. See L. Bobd\ ed.,
August Hennings Dagbog under hans Ophold i Mbenhavn 1802 (Copenhagen:
Nordisk Forlag, 1934, pp. 153 and 155, entries for September 12 and 14,
1802.
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Justice Mansfield had ruled in the Somerset case that slaves could
not be removed from England against their w i l l . ^
Schimmelmann refused to agree to a resumption of the slave
trade.

The trade had been abolished at the s t a r t of 1803 in accordance

with the abolition edict, though, as mentioned above, the sale of
African slaves brought to the Danish West Indies was permitted in
1803, so long as the slaves had been purchased in Africa prior to the
end of 1802.

The committee wrote that i t did not believe i t was in

a position to take a definite position regarding resumption of the
slave trade, as neither the planters' appeal nor the colonial
government's letter contained sufficient grounds for granting the
request.

In particular, there was not enough data available on the

slave population of the Danish islands.

The committee therefore

recommended postponing a decision on the planters' request until
detailed figures on the population of the Danish West Indies had been
received in Copenhagen.

When the population data were available, the

committee promised to study the matter and give i t s opinion on
whether the planters' appeal should be granted.

At that time the

committee would also reserve for i t s e l f the right to express i t s views
regarding other items concerning the present condition of the
slaves. 4 6

Schimmelmann knew i t would take a t least a year to assemble

^Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition,
pp. 244-45.
4 6 DSA,

V6RGT, Vestindisk Journal, 1803, No. 181, l e t t e r from
Committee on the Slave Trade to General Customs Department, April 5,
1803, pp. 1-2.
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the requested population data and send the l i s t s to Copenhagen,
and in the meantime the abolition edict would remain in effect.
On October 6, 1803, Governor Mtlhlenfels sent to Copenhagen
the census figures for 1801 and 1802 obtained from the tax r o l l s ,
indicating St. Croix had only 27,006 slaves in 1802, a figure lower
than the colonial government in 1792 had said was needed before
abolition.^

But these figures were always suspect, as the planters

were thought to consistently l i s t fewer slaves than they actually
held in order to pay lower taxes.
The Committee on the Slave Trade, clearly in no hurry,
finally prepared a report on the future of the slave trade and sent
i t to the General Customs Department on April 9, 1804.

This time the

committee could not merely seek a delay but had to take a stand;
i t did so, strongly, against resumption of the slave trade and loans
to planters for buying slaves.

The committee said i t s unanimous

opinion was that an extension of the period during which slaves
could be imported into the Danish islands would "in no way be
appropriate":
I t would no doubt only strengthen the unfortunately widespread
belief noticeable among the public in the West Indies that the
abolition edict can not or will not be implemented and that, as
a result of repeated postponements, i t will be completely
forgotten [ved qientagne Udsaettelser aldeles skulle gaae i_
Glemme]; and instead of the time thus granted being used by the
planters to prepare themselves for abolition, the result would
perhaps be that they would no longer bother themselves [with
preparing for abolition] but, on the contrary, would l e t

47 qsa, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Population data
sent from St. Croix by Governor Mtlhlenfels to General Customs
Department, October 6 , 1803.
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everything continue in i t s old course, contenting themselves
with the hope that the command of the abolition edict would
never be seriously observed [at Forordningens Bud aldrig
alvorligen ville overholdes]. Experience during the ten years
granted before the edict was to take effect can only confirm
this conjecture [Erfaringen i_ cte ti_ Aar som have vaeret
t i l s t a a e t , fflrend Forordnmgen skulle traede
Kraft, kan vel
ikke andet end stadfaeste denne Formodning.]
Thus, in the Committee's opinion, the only question i s
whether the abolition edict will be maintained or whether i t
will be repealed [Sp0rqsmaalet kan altsaa efter Commissionens
Formeening allene vaere, om ForordnTngen skaT~vedliqeholdes
e l l e r om den ska! ophaevesj, and the committee, far from
having altered i t s detailed, carefully reasoned opinion put
forth twelve years ago regarding abolition of the slave trade
[og Commissionen, langt fra a t have forandret sin for tolv
Aar siden over denne Gienstand fremsatte og udf^rligen
motiverede Meening], considers that, in view of the recent
events on St. Domingue, the abolition of the slave trade i s
now more important than ever before [finder for naevaerende
Tid, efter de sidste Begivenheder paa St. Domingo,
Negerhandelens Ophaevelse mere vigtig end nogensinde f 0 r ] . 4 8
Having given a forceful reaffirmation of i t s original
endorsement of abolition and bolstered i t s belief in the urgent
need for abolition by referring to the threat of slave revolt, a
threat which had been emphasized by Bentzon less than two years
before in his "Om Negerne paa de danske 0er i Vestindien," the
committee softened i t s tone somewhat and admitted that carrying out
this highly important policy might involve serious difficulties
and lead to a crisis for the Danish colonies.

The problems inherent

in so major an undertaking as abolition were exacerbated by the
planters' prejudice and failure to cooperate with the Crown.

In

DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Pro Memoria from
Committee on Slave Trade to General Customs Department, April 9,
1804, pp. 1-2.
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order to avoid or minimize any difficulties arising from abolition,
therefore, " I , Count Schimmelmann, have drawn up and sent to the
committee a plan, which the committee has approved in full [har jeg,
Grev Schimmelmann, udarbejdet og t i l Commissionen indeleveret en
Plan, som denne aldeles har bifaldt].
Schimmelmann 1 s plan argued that i f the West Indian
colonies had not from the s t a r t been subjected to the short-sighted
spirit of speculators, there would now be an oversupply of workers
rather than the present supposed undersupply.

He suggested that

only a long-range approach could solve any labor shortage that might
exist now or in the future, though he professed doubt that the 1802
population figures indicated a shortage of slaves.

The Crown, wrote

Schimmelmann, should take over several plantations in the Danish
West Indies and cultivate them with the goal of increasing the slave
population on them by natural means and of improving the treatment
and "civilization" of the slaves, without altering the workers'
status as slaves bound to the plantations.

This arrangement for what

Schimmelmann called a colonial institute would have as i t s main
purpose the creation of model plantations to show the planters how
slaves ought to be treated in order to guide them to what was
described as a more moral way of l i f e , with greater emphasis on
marriage and family ties and greater personal interest in the
cultivation of the land.

The colonial institute would also achieve

a population growth which would eliminate the need to import any

4 9 Ibid.,

p. 3.
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more slaves and would provide workers to help those planters who
lacked a sufficient number of slaves to cultivate their plantations. 5 ®
The idea for creating a model plantation funded by the
Crown had been the centerpiece of Hans West's "Plan t i l ved e t
enkelt Fors^q at befordre Mark-Negernes Vel" which West sent to
Schimmelmann and the General Customs Department in 1791.

In his

own proposal West had urged that he be placed in charge of the model
plantation.

Yet, in a l e t t e r to Johan Billow, Crown Prince

Frederik's advisor and former tutor, written shortly after sending
his proposal to Copenhagen, West expressed doubts about the
feasibility of his plan and said he would not be distressed i f the
plan were ignored (Jer er . . . aldeles ikke aengsteliq, om min Plan
ikke skulde finde approbation), as i t was for more than a decade.
He admitted he had constructed his proposal "in part because I hope
that the General Customs Department will soon free me from the
difficulties that accompany a teaching position in this part of the
world for a person with a weak chest [deels fordi jeq haaber, at
Kammeret snart vil befrie mig for de Besvaerligheder, der f01qer med
e t Laere-Embede i_ denne Himmelegn for den, der har e t svagt Br.yst]
Though West had privately doubted the feasibility of his own

Cf]

Frederik Thaarup, ed., Udfflrlig Vejledninq t i l det danske
Monarkies Statistik saaledes som samme var i Slutningen af Aar 1813
(Part VII; Copenhagen, 1819), Summary of Schimmelmann's plan of
April 1804 for a colonial institute, pp. 682-84.
^ L e t t e r of August 26, 1791, from Hans West on St. Croix to
Johan Billow in Denmark, printed in Niels Breitenstam, "Hans West,"
Kulturminder, Copenhagen, I (1955), 124-25.
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proposal for a model plantation, Schimmelmann not only adopted
West's basic idea in 1804 but carried i t farther than West had.
Concerned by the failure of the slaves' birth rate to exceed or
even offset their death rate, he was looking for some means of
avoiding a resumption of the slave trade and of staving off the
critics of abolition who said more slaves were needed in the Danish
islands.

Schimmelmann therefore emphasized the role the model

plantations should play in producing a surplus of slaves who could
be hired out as day laborers to planters needing additional slaves.
Marriages were to be encouraged, with female slaves freed from hard
physical labor while they were pregnant and, after giving birth, for
as long as they were nursing their babies.

Married slaves should

(1) be able to inherit their partner's property, (2) never be
separated involuntarily unless one of them had committed a criminal
offense, and (3) enjoy the presence and the respect of their
children, with obedience to and deference for their parents being
inculcated in slave children as part of the Tatter's education.
Although he must have remembered the reluctance the Moravians had
shown twelve years before to undertake a similar responsibility,
Schimmelmann proposed that the slaves should be taught Christianity
by the Moravian Brethren.

Elderly slaves should perform only light

tasks in keeping with their diminished strength, and adequate food,
clothing, housing, and water should be available to all the slaves
on the model plantations.
The colonial institute would be managed by a royal bureau
in Copenhagen, with an inspector stationed on each plantation to
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guarantee proper treatment of the slaves.

With the right care and

with emphasis on marriage and family, the population of the
institute would grow, or so Schimmelmann assumed.

In the meantime,

some of the slaves to work the institute's plantations would have to
be brought from Africa under s t r i c t regulations which would ensure
them against mistreatment on the ships.

Schimmelmann's plan, if

adopted, would thus involve a temporary reopening of the slave trade.
Yet, he argued, the success of his plan would guarantee the long-range
success of the abolition edict of 1792.

Eventually those slaves

brought from Africa to serve on the plantations of the colonial
institute, having done their part for population growth in the
island, would be allowed to return to Africa i f they wished.^ 2
I t i s impossible to judge whether Schirranelmann really believed in
his proposal, far-fetched as i t was.

Perhaps he was simply using i t

to ward off those favoring resumption of an unrestricted slave
trade, a slave trade over which there were no regulations to mitigate
mistreatment of slaves during the Middle Passage.

Yet i t remains

uncertain why the man primarily responsible for the abolition edict
fourteen years earlier now proposed creating royal plantations and
stocking them with new slaves from Africa who would breed, preferably
within the bounds of matrimony, a surplus of slaves who would be used
to alleviate labor shortages on the various plantations in the
Danish islands.

^Schimmelmann's plan, in Udf^rlig Vejledning t i l det danske
Monarkies Statistik, pp. 684-92.
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The Committee on the Slave Trade, seeking the testimony of
an expert, sent Schimmelmann's plan to Walterstorff, who had
returned to Copenhagen and become a close advisor to Crown Prince
Frederik.

Walterstorff finished his thirty-eight-page critique of

the plan on April 21, 1804, and sent i t to the Committee on the
Slave Trade.

He s t i l l owned a plantation on St. Croix, so his views,

not surprisingly, reflected the best interests of the planters.
Walterstorff's need to show deference to Schimmelmann was now
minimal, and after praising Schimmelmann's motives in drawing up
the plan, Walterstorff began to criticize the proposal for a
"colonial institute" as impractical and insufficient for the labor
needs of the Danish islands.

He argued that a t least 6,000

additional slaves were needed on St. Croix, both to secure the
welfare of the planters and to promote Danish foreign trade.
Schimmelmann's plan called for having the Crown purchase as many
as eight plantations with about 1,600 slaves on them and for bringing
in another 1,000 slaves from Africa so that the total number of
slaves on the colonial institute would reach 2,600.

But Walterstorff

believed the institute would need a t least 4,000 more African slaves
in order to be successful, especially if slaves were hired out to
planters as day laborers.

New slaves required very special treat

ment, however, and no plantation could care for more than f i f t y in
one year.

So, even i f eight plantations comprised the institute,

only 400 slaves could be imported each year, which meant ten years
would be required to import the 4,000 African slaves he f e l t the
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institute would need.

53

Schimmelmann's plan had included a proposal that more land
be devoted to growing food for the slaves, but Walterstorff argued
against any reduction in the amount of land planted in sugar cane.
He contended that sugar cane was the most profitable as well as the
safest crop:

" I t i s only as a sugar colony that St. Croix has any

value for Denmark, and one therefore should not seek to curtail
sugar cultivation but rather attempt to extend i t [Pet er ikkun som
en Sukker-Colonie, at St. Croix har noqen Vaerdie for Moderlandet,
og a t man desaarsag paa ingen Maade b#r indskraenke Sukker-Avlingen
men snarere s#qe at udvide den]. 1

ca

Repeating the same arguments he had advanced twelve years
earlier to explain the low birth rate among the slaves, Walterstorff
placed the blame not on mistreatment by the masters but on self-induced
abortions by slave women and the preponderance of males in the slave
population.

In effect, he believed that i t would be impossible to

increase the birth rate and achieve a self-sustaining slave population.
Only a continuation of the slave trade could offset the evil effects
of the slaves' sexual immorality (Lflsagtighed), for the planters were
powerless to compel the slaves to settle into those regular monogamous
relationships which were most conducive to the production and survival

%SA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Walterstorff's
critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a colonial institute, Copenhagen,
April 21, 1804, pp. 1-6.
5 4 Ibid.,

pp. 12-20.
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of babies. 5 5

Yet in a letter to the committee completed one

day after his critique of Schimmelmann's proposal for a colonial
institute, Walterstorff said he thought a natural increase of the
slave population was attainable, but "One would have to be
satisfied with a slow approach to that goal [Man maae vaere
(ZC

fornfrjet med lanqsomt at naerme siq Maalet].
Walterstorff undermined his argument that many more slaves
were needed to cultivate the sugar plantations when he wrote that
Schimmelmann was mistaken in believing that two slaves were needed
for each acre planted in sugar.

On his plantation he had 164 slaves,

with only 130 of them capable of working the 300 acres planted in
cane.

He added: "And my slaves work without any strain [Oq mine

Neqere arbeide uden nogen Anstrenqelse]."

He then raised yet

another point which weakened the view that more slaves were needed:
he rejected Schimmelmann's assertion that married female slaves could
do only half the work of other slaves.

Even when pregnant, according

to Walterstorff, female slaves could perform lighter tasks on the
plantations; and a month after giving birth, a slave woman could be
back in the fields cutting cane. 5 ^
Despite his opposition to much of Schimmelmann's plan and

551bid., pp. 12-20.
5 6 DSA,

VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Letter from
Walterstorff to the Committee on the Slave Trade, Copenhagen,
April 12, 1804, p. 1.
^Walterstorff's critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a
colonial institute, pp. 24-25.

his belief that, unless altered considerably, i t was not viable,
Walterstorff admitted that the plan might work if combined with a
temporary resumption of the slave trade, in accordance with the
CO

desires of the St. Croix planters.

What he really wanted was a

resumption of the slave trade; Schimmelmann's plan was a nuisance
that might divert attention from the real needs of the planters.
Walterstorff warned of the risk to public order of having
unemployed slaves on the plantations of the institute during times
when the planters did not need them as day laborers.

He added that

i t would be important to avoid improving the condition of the slaves
on the i n s t i t u t e ' s plantations to the point where slaves on other
plantations became dissatisfied with their status (Ved a t forbedre
Negernes Kaar paa Institutets Plantager, bjflr haves Hensyn t i l ,
a t man ikke gi0r Negerne paa andre Plantager misfornfrjede).

He

closed by politely conceding that Schimmelmann's plan, though in
need of improvement, nevertheless bore the stamp of philanthropy
/
\ 59
and a gentle s p i r i t (baerer Geniets og Philanthropiens Praeg).
Walterstorff's l e t t e r of April 22 to the Committee on the
Slave Trade urged resumption of the slave trade:

"I am and have

always been of the opinion that the slave trade of the European
nations ought to be abolished, . . . but this desire i s naturally
based on the assumption that the inhabitants of Africa would thereby

5 8 Walterstorff's letter to the Committee on the Slave Trade,
April 22, 1804, p. 10.
5 9 Walterstorff's

critique of Schimmelmann's plan for a
colonial institute, pp. 37-38.
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be made happier." 6 0

Abolition of the Danish slave trade would not

accomplish this, for only 1,000 to 1,200 new slaves were needed
each year in the Danish West Indies, a small number in comparison
with the total number of slaves taken from the Guinea Coast each
year.

The slave traders of Bristol and Liverpool, who had supplied

slaves to the Danish islands in recent years, would continue to
take slaves from Africa and sell them on other islands.

When for

any reason the Danish islands had been unable to buy slaves, the
slave ships merely sailed on to Jamaica and Cuba, and this was
unfortunate for the slaves:

"I am totally convinced that the slaves

on those ships would have been less unhappy if they had been sold
on the Danish islands [Jeg siger med fuld Overbeviisning, a t
Negerne paa de Ski be vilde have vaeret mindre ulykkeliqe vare de
blevne solgte paa de danske 0er].
Having traveled to all of the West Indian islands from
Puerto Rico to Barbados, Walterstorff said he knew from experience
that slaves received the best treatment on the Danish islands.
Indeed, the only complaint he had ever heard about Governor Mtlhlenfels
was that he was too concerned with the welfare of the slaves.
Walterstorff, not satisfied with proclaiming the Danish West Indies
the best Caribbean destination any slave could hope for, added that
the slaves in the Danish islands would suffer i f the trade were

6 0 Walterstorff's

April 22, 1804, p. 1 .
6 1 Ibid.,

p. 5.

l e t t e r to the Committee on the Slave Trade,

244
abolished, for their ranks would thin gradually, leaving fewer and
fewer hands to do the same amount of work.® 2

The implication, of

course, was that slaves presently in the islands would benefit from
prolonging the slave trade rather than from abolition.

Walterstorff

ignored the assumption of the Committee on the Slave Trade that
abolition would lead to improved slave treatment.
Walterstorff noted that the Danish example on abolition had
not been followed by any other nation, but praised the work of the
committee in 1791 as f a i r and just.

Unfortunately, as the planters

had pointed out in their appeal of July 1 , 1802, the ten-year period
during which the islands were to prepare for abolition had been
shortened by events in 1799, 1800, and 1801 which had l e f t the
planters unable to buy all the slaves they needed.

The loan for

buying slaves had also been discontinued, though Walterstorff did
not mention that nearly all the funds set aside for i t had been
loaned out by March 1799.

Nor did he mention the allegations

concerning misuse of loan funds by some members of the loan committee
in the islands, nor the failure of the colonial government to supply
the Crown with data on the slave population during the 1790s,
including information on those slaves purchased by means of the loan.
He tried to explain the failure of planters to buy more of the slaves
offered for sale on St. Croix in recent years by arguing that the
planters had lacked sufficient credit.

^ I b i d . , p. 6.

Walterstorff said that he had
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no self-interest in a resumption of the slave trade, as the slaves
now on his plantation were sufficient to maintain production, and
births on i t normally exceeded deaths; thus, motivated solely by
the public interest, he asked the committee to approve a three-year
extension of the slave trade, beginning with the date the extension
was publicly announced in the islands, and said that i f a resumption
of the trade were permitted, a new royal loan fund to help planters
buy slaves would have to be established.
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Schimmelmann responded to Walterstorff's critique of his plan
for a colonial institute and to Walterstorff's argument in favor of
resuming the slave trade and providing a new loan to buy slaves for
three years by sending a pro-memoria to the General Customs Department
along with a reply to the criticism of his plan.

Schimmelmann told

the department that, although Walterstorff's opinions deserved
attention because of his knowledge of West Indian affairs, i t was
important to avoid further delay in a matter already sufficiently
discussed by both sides.

The committee therefore l e f t i t to the

department to present to the Crown for a final decision the results
of the various studies regarding the planters' appeal for a three-year
extension of the slave t r a d e . ^
Schimmelmann's response to Walterstorff, entitled "Einige

^ I b i d . , pp. 5 , 7-10.
64
DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Pro Memoria from
Committee on the Slave Trade, to General Customs Department, May 1 ,
1804, pp. 1-2.

i;
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Bemerkungen," accompanied the Pro Memoria. He said that i f
Walterstorff was correct in his belief that 6,000 more slaves were
needed on St. Croix, and i f approval were given to import slaves for
three more years, all 6,000 slaves would have to be imported in
three years, a formidable i f not impossible task.

He implicitly

ruled out extending the slave trade for more than three years.
Furthermore, as Walterstorff believed each slave would cost 500
riqsdaler dansk courant, a sum of three million rigsdaler (Thaler)
would be needed.

Even i f the Crown accepted Walterstorff's view

that Crown loans to the planters were essential, i t would be
difficult to provide so large a sum.

And what i f another crop

failure occurred during the three years?

Also, Danish slave traders

could meet only a small part of the demand for 6,000 slaves, so that
most of the money used to buy slaves would go to English slavers
and thus hurt Denmark's balance of trade.

Another problem would be

the sudden infusion into the islands of so large a number of Africans.
And, as many of the new slaves would merely be used to replace a
decline in the slave population, improvement in the treatment of
slaves would continue to be postponed.^
Schiranelmann was trying to ward off the proposals of
Walterstorff, the colonial government led by Milhelenfels, and the
St. Croix planters, but having made his points, he l e f t i t to the
General Customs Department to offer more vigorous and perhaps decisive

6 5 DSA,

V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Einige
Bemerkungen from Ernst Schimmelmann to General Customs Department,
May 1 , 1804, pp. 1-4.
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opposition to the foes of abolition.

Always cautious and tending to

favor compromise, he shied away from an all-out defense of the
abolition edict, and he was aware that a forceful advocate of
abolition was prepared to carry on the struggle within the depart
ment.

Rosenstand-Goiske, who had been the department's secretary

in 1792 when he had strongly endorsed abolition in Borgervennen,
had continued to speak out in favor of reform measures during the
1790s, with several of his speeches being published in Minerva.
Now a commissioner (kommitteraad), he presented an eighteen-page
Betaenkning to the department, arguing against granting permission
for even a temporary, limited resumption of the slave trade.
Rosenstand-Goiske, having no financial interest in the West Indies
or the Danish sugar industry, could allow his moral aversion to the
slave trade always to remain uppermost in his mind, while Schimmelmann
could never quite free himself from the influence of his own invest
ments in the colonies and their produce.

Unlike Schimmelmann,

Rosenstand-Goiske never f e l t a need to convince himself that the
slave trade could be abolished without endangering the prosperity
of the Danish islands and their trade with Denmark.

For him a just

cause assured a beneficent outcome.

6 6 Rosenstand-Goiske praised "gradual" abolition in a speech
printed in the March 1795 edition of Minerva; he joined the
Praemierselskab for den jtfdiske Ungdoms Anbringelse t i l Kunster og
Haandvaerker and gave a speech praising the Crown's decision to allow
Jews to join guilds, published in the April 1796 edition of Minerva;
he lavishly praised "enlightenment" (Oplysning) and i t s value for the
"common good" (Almeenvel), expressing great faith in the role of
education as an agent of reform, in another speech published in
Minerva in May 1797.
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In his Betaenkning of April 24, he began with a reminder
that the abolition edict had "gladdened the hearts of humanitarians
in every nation [glaeddede opl.yste Menneskevenner af hvert Folkeslag
sig]" and added that the Crown, if i t now surrendered to the demands
of the West Indian planters, would disillusion those who in 1792
had applauded i t s humanitarian decision.

Worse, a revocation of the

abolition edict would mean losing the chance to abolish the slave
trade and the horrors i t s continued existence involved, because if
abolition were once delayed, there would always be other excuses for
further postponement.

Rosenstand-Goiske argued that the edict of

March 16, 1792, should stand, as should all royal edicts, unless
there were extremely persuasive reasons for tampering with i t .

He

suggested that only "incontestable proof [uimodsigelige Beviser]"
that the slave population could not sustain i t s e l f and maintain
production in the islands without a continued infusion of new slaves
from Africa should suffice to cancel the abolition edict.

He hoped

that abolition would compel absentee planters to live on their
plantations, for resident planters were more likely to treat their
slaves fairly.

A resident planter was more likely to be "an

attentive and f a i r head of family [en opmaerksom og retfaerdig
Husfader].Rosenstand-Goiske's belief that slaves would benefit

^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Rosenstand-Goiske's
Betaenkning on the planters' appeal for a three-year extension of
the slave trade, presented to General Customs Department, April 24,
1804, pp. 1-3. In an article in Minerva Rosenstand-Goiske praised
the stern and just patriarchal slave master as one who knew each of
his slaves and was present to see both that they did the work
expected of them and that they were not overworked. Yet "Justice,
even when connected with sternness, compels a person to respect his
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from a reduction in absenteeism had some foundation in fact, as
overseers were widely considered more inclined than the slaves'
owners to physically abuse their charges, though he tended to
exaggerate the extent to which paternalism could mitigate the evils
of slavery, especially in the sugar islands with their gang slavery.
The planters had no case, he wrote, i f the following two
questions could be answered in the affirmative:
"Can the cultivation of the islands always be maintained with
the workers presently on the islands and with those they
propagate [Kan 0ernes Kultur stedse vedligeholdes ved de
Arbeidere som Neqerne paa 0erne selv og ved Formerelse
frembringe]?" Do the islands now have a slave population
sufficient for cultivation [Have Qerne for Tiden e t t i l
Culturen tilstraekkeliqt Antal Neqere?]?"b8
Rosenstand-Goiske said the December 28, 1791, report of the Committee
on the Slave Trade had answered the f i r s t question affirmatively,
so he would devote his attention solely to seeking an answer to the
second.

He referred to his a r t i c l e published in Borqervennen

("Brev fra Landet") in 1792, noting that his conclusions on the
potential growth of the slave population had not been publicly
refuted, and then proceeded to argue that no more slaves were needed.
Rosenstand-Goiske's determination to defend the abolition
edict led him to contradict himself, as he wrote in his Betaenkninq

superior in a way that i s perhaps more binding than gentleness when
the l a t t e r i s combined with weakness [Retfaerdighed, endog med
Straenghed forbunden, aftvinger Mennesket en Agtelse for sin
Overmand, som maaskee binder staerkere, end Mildhed, naar den e r
forenet med Svaghed]." See Minerva, February 1805, "Om Negerhandelens
Ophaevelse i Hensyn t i l de danske vestindiske 0er," p. 200.
6 8 Rosenstand-Goiske's

Betaenkning, April 24, 1804, p. 3.
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of April 24 that the planters would save money by raising all their
slaves instead of buying them from the slave ships.

69

But in a

twelve-page follow-up report which he presented to the General
Customs Department on April 27, he calculated that i t cost a planter
seventy rigsdaler more to raise a slave to the age of fourteen than
to buy an adult slave brought in from Africa.

This cost

differential did not deter Rosenstand-Goiske from pressing his
case for abolition, however, as he believed the extra cost should
be "sacrificed on the altar of humanity [ofret paa Menneskehedens
Alter]." 7 0
Rosenstand-Goiske said the islands already had enough slaves,
as indicated by the population figures which showed there were more
slaves present than ever before and by the fact that only half of
the slaves brought to St. Croix in 1803 had been sold there.

If a

real shortage had existed or been expected, he argued, a l l available
slaves would have been purchased.

If there were cases where

individual planters s t i l l lacked as many slaves as they desired, their
problem was presumably the result of failure to care properly for
their slaves and to promote a higher birth rate among them in the
years after 1792.

Planters who had failed to prepare for abolition

from 1792 through 1802 should not be rescued now by a revocation of

6 9 Ibid.,
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p. 9.

DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Rosenstand-Goiske's
Bemaerkninger explaining the assumptions on which he based his
opposition to the planters' appeal for a resumption of the slave trade,
April 27, 1804, pp. 6-7.
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the abolition edict.

Beneath his strident optimism Rosenstand-Goiske

did harbor some doubts regarding the ability of the slave population
to replace itself by reproduction alone; however, he believed i t
would take another ten to fifteen years' experience to provide
proof one way or the other.

The only concession he was willing to

make to the planters was to promise them that if the islands lacked
enough laborers after another ten years had passed, the reopening
of the slave trade could be reconsidered.^
Rosenstand-Goiske had to mention Schimmelmann's plan for a
colonial institute, which had been presented to the General Customs
Department, and he lavishly praised i t s humanitarian s p i r i t [saa
indlysende e t Beviis som den giver om Aqtelse for Mennesket, og for
Retfaerdighed og Mildhed, og saa klare som dens Grundsaetninger ere
fremsatte, og saa mesterliqen som dens Udarbeidelse viser siq),
but said he personally lacked enough knowledge of West Indian affairs
to make any specific comments on i t .
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He was probably suspicious

of i t , because i t would necessitate a limited reopening of the slave
trade, which he so strongly opposed.

To support this contention one

might note that the Forestilling the department presented to the
Crown on May 15, 1804, though generally deferential towards
Schimmelmann's proposals, said there was no need to import slaves

Rosenstand-Goiske 1 s Betaenkning, April 24, 1804, pp. 8-12.
7 2lbid.,

pp. 12-13.
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for his colonial i n s t i t u t e . ^

In commenting on the plan's emphasis

on acquiring productive workers for the islands, Rosenstand-Goiske
resurrected one of the topics discussed at length in 1792 and then
allowed to fade:

he urged imposition of a special tax on "excessive"

house slaves; he thought 3,000 field slaves could be obtained i f
white families limited themselves to two house slaves each.' 7 4
In his criticism of absentee planters Rosenstand-Goiske
provides a clue to his approach to slavery:

he apparently regarded

slavery as acceptable i f the planter lived on the plantation, as i f
he were an independent farmer (Selv-Eierbonde), and looked after the
needs and responded to the complaints of his workers as would a
stern but just head of the household.

The planters' wives should

look after the workers' children during the day, "keeping an eye
on their condition, cleanliness, and taking care of them while their
mothers worked."

Now, unfortunately s "The master and mistress

answer the plaintive slave by saying:
do I have to do with

you?

go to the overseer, for what

"75

Absentee planters had to rely on overseers who consumed a
/

large part of the profits of the plantation, with an average annual
wage of 1,200 riqsdaler plus control of part of the plantation's

^DSA, VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs
Department's Allerunderdanigste Forestilling on the planters' appeal
for a continuation of the slave trade, May 15, 1804, p. 31.
^Rosenstand-Goiske's Betaenkning, p. 16.
75

Rosenstand-Goiske's Bemaerkninger to the General Customs
Department, April 27, 1804, pp. 1-2.
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provision grounds and a supply of Madeira wine.

In order to cover

the expenses incurred by having an overseer and s t i l l provide the
absentee owner with a profit; the slaves had to work harder.

He

suggested that those absentee planters who found i t impossible to
reside on their plantations should sell their land to persons who
would live on the plantations and take a direct interest in the
welfare of the slaves.

Prominent among such absentee planters were

Walterstorff and Schimmelmann, the greatest of them a l l , but
Rosenstand-Goiske did not mention them by name.? 6
He dismissed Walterstorff's argument that, because of i t s
small size, abolition of the Danish slave trade would have no
international impact and would not help Africa.
noted:

Rosenstand-Goiske

"According to such reasoning, no improvement should take

place in Denmark unless i t also occurred in most of Europe; thus
the stavnsbaand 7 7 would not have been abolished, and so forth
[Altsaa efter s l i g Grundsaetning skulle ingen Forbedrinq finde
Sted

Danmark, uden a t den fandt sted over det meste af Europa,

altsaa ikke F0destavnsbaandet vaere ophaevet o.s.v.]."

Unlike

Walterstorff, Rosenstand-Goiske was sensitive to the value of even
a small blow against the evil of the Atlantic slave trade:

"Every

evil that i s abolished diminishes the total quantity of evil for all
of humanity

and benefits the individual saved from i t [Ethvert

haevet Onde formindsker Massen for den hele Menneskehed, oq gavner

7 6 Ibid.,
7 7 For

p. 2 and pp. 10-11.

a discussion of the stavnsbaand see p. 44.
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Individet som undqik samme.l."
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After considering all the evidence,

including population data from the West Indies, the planters'
appeal, MUhlenfels' l e t t e r , Schimmelmann 1 s plan for a colonial
institute, Walterstorff 1 s plea for reopening the slave trade,
and Rosenstand-Goiske's Betankning and subsequent Bemaerkninqer
opposing even a temporary resumption of the trade, the department
sent i t s report to the Crown on May 15, 1804.
The report, forty-four pages long, was a victory
for Rosenstand-Goiske and a defeat for Walterstorff and the
foes of abolition.

Rosenstand-Goiske was able to convince the

rest of the department to support his contention that the abolition
edict of 1792 should continue in force and that Walterstorff's
arguments for resuming the slave trade were seriously flawed.
The department's report presented an overview of the problem,
listing the alternatives available to the Crown.

After discussing

at length and with sympathy Schimmelmann's plan, the department began
i t s criticism of Walterstorff's belief that at least 6,000 additional
field slaves were needed, noting that Walterstorff provided no proof
for his contention.

The only way of determining whether there was an

actual shortage of slaves was to carefully study the population as
i t existed at the end of 1802, based on the tax rolls sent to
Copenhagen in 1803 by MUhlenfels.

The department commented that, as

the figures derived from the tax rolls depended on the word of the

^Rosenstand-Goiske's Bemaerkninger to the General Customs
Department, April 27, 1804, p. 11.

planters themselves, their reliability was open to doubt.

In 1792

Oxholm had reported there were 17,942 plantation slaves on St. Croix,
9,619 of them Creoles and 8,323 African born.

At the end of 1802,

there were 22,404 plantation slaves on St. Croix, 11,328 Creoles and
11,076 African born.

This was an increase of 4,462 in the number of

plantation slaves frum 1792 to 1802.

But in 1802 there were,

according to the tax r o l l s , only 2,753 more African-born slaves than
in 1792, despite the importation of twice that many slaves in the
1790s with help from the Crown loans, and many other Africans had
been imported without use of the loan fund.

The department

expressed skepticism that the imported slaves could have suffered
such a high mortality rate and noted that i f the data were accurate,
there was all the more reason for relying on Creole slaves rather
than Africans.

But the point the department was really interested

in making was that the planters were not giving accurate data on the
number of slaves they owned.

As evidence for t h i s , the department

pointed to the dramatic difference between the slave population as
indicated by the tax rolls for 1799, 1801, and 1802, and St. Croix's
slave imports as shown by the customs ledgers.

The slave population

of St. Croix was reportedly:
Year

Population

1798

26,634

1799

26,399

1801

26,454

1802

27,006

Yet the customs ledgers showed that in 1799, 3,132 slaves had been
imported and retained on St. Croix, 793 in 1800, 61 the f i r s t two
months of 1801, and 1 ,684 in 1802 for a total of 5,670.^
rolls showed 1,845 slave deaths in 1799, 1801, and 1802.

The tax
The

obvious conclusion was that the planters had not registered on the
tax rolls the actual number of slaves they owned.

"There i s thus

good reason for supposing that the number of slaves on St. Croix i s
presently much greater than that given [Per er da vel Aarsaq t i l at
formode, at Antallet af Negre paa St. Croix er nu lanqt st0rre end
det er opgivet].
The department showed i t s bias against Walterstorff and
those seeking a t least a temporary extension of the slave trade when
i t wrote that in 1792 the planters on St. Croix had said they needed
6,309 more slaves before the abolition edict took effect in 1803,
failing to mention that Oxholm had raised the number needed to 8,000
and the St. Croix Burger Council to 10,000.

According to the tax

rolls for 1802, there were 4,462 more plantation slaves on St. Croix
then than in 1792.

Taking into account that more slaves were present

than were listed on the r o l l s , i t was reasonable to assume that the

7Q

Nearly all of the customs ledgers were subsequently
destroyed, though the ledger for 1799 survives and confirms that the
figure of 3,132 slave imports for 1799 i s correct. See Green-Pedersen,
"The Scope . . . of the Danish . . . Slave Trade," pp. 150ff.
8 0 DSA,

VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, General Customs
Department's Allerunderdanigste Forestilling on the Planters' appeal
for a continuation of the slave trade, May 15, 1804, pp. 19-21. Data
were lacking on slave imports for the last ten months of 1801 because
of the English takeover of the island, according to the department,
Allerunderdanigste Forestilling, p. 24.
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planters already had all the slaves they needed.

The harvests of

1800 and 1801 were good, and that of 1802 excellent, indicating
that the present slave population was capable of supplying the
needed manpower.

" I t i s therefore not apparent to the department

why another 6,000 field slaves should be needed [Pet er da ikke
Kamret t.ydeliqt, hvorledes endnu 6,000 Marknegre skulle beh0ves].
The department seized upon Walterstorff's statement—in
his critique of Schimmelmann's plan—that i t was erroneous to
believe that two slaves were needed for each acre planted in cane,
as Walterstorff was able to plant more than 300 acres in cane with
a labor force of 164 slaves, only 130 of whom were "capable"
(see p. 241 above).

Walterstorff's remark that he had enough slaves

and did not fear that their ranks would ever require replenishing
was used to support the department's contention that the Danish
islands had all the slaves they would ever need.

Using Walterstorff 1 s

statement that 130 healthy slaves sufficed to work 300 acres planted
in cane, the department wrote that, as St. Croix had between 27,000
and 28,000 acres of sugar cane, only 11,700 to 12,133 healthy slaves
were needed.

In 1802 the island had, according to the tax r o l l s ,

11,713 healthy adult field slaves and 1,395 artisans, for a total of
13,108.
age.

There were also 2,615 adolescent slaves over ten years of

Walterstorff was clearly mistaken when he said St. Croix

needed 6,000 more slaves, the department concluded.

As final proof,

i t pointed to the experience of the last slave ship to arrive a t

Ibid., p. 22.
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St. Croix before the abolition edict took effect.

The ship had

brought 388 slaves from the Gold Coast to St. Croix in February
1803, in the middle of the harvest, and had been able to sell only
138 of them.

The rest had to be removed from St. Croix and sold

elsewhere. 8 2
The department used Schimmelmann's argument that i f 6,000
more slaves were imported in 3 years a t an average cost of 500
rigsdaler, nearly three million rigsdaler would be paid to foreign
slave traders, as Danish slavers could supply only a small part of
the total.

This outflow of money, besides harming Denmark's balance

of trade, involved a sum that the planters could not raise without
another massive loan program funded by the Crown.
feasible.

A loan was not

Furthermore, i t would be difficult i f not impossible to

obtain 6,000 slaves in only three years, the time limit Schimmelmann,
not Walterstorff, had placed on importing additional slaves.

As a

result, additional years would probably be needed and the abolition
edict would never be implemented.

The department agreed totally

with the Committee on the Slave Trade that granting permission for
a three-year extension of the slave trade would - lead only to a
similar demand from the planters to continue importing slaves after
the original period had expired, until there was a permanent
suspension of the edict.

For the Crown to back away from an earlier

command would encourage the planters to ignore the need to improve
the treatment of their slaves and foster disrespect for royal authority.

82Ibid.,

pp. 22-24.
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The department therefore recommended that the Crown reject the
OO
appeal of the planters and keep the abolition edict in force.
Regarding Schimmelmann's proposed colonial institute, the
department cautioned that i t was not necessary to bring in more
slaves from Africa to work the plantations which were to comprise
the institute.

Importing slaves from Africa would also violate

the abolition edict.

Having just used Schimmelmann's criticism of

Walterstorff's proposal, the department now used Walterstorff's
argument against Schimmelmann's proposal to import slaves for the
colonial institute.

Such a large number of slaves, with all the

"seasoning" difficulties their presence would entail, would be a
burden on the institute.

Furthermore, if slaves from the institute

were hired out to planters as Schimmelmann proposed, those slaves
would be given the heaviest and hardest tasks and would be badly
overworked by the planters, whose interest would l i e in preserving
the health of their own slaves and exploiting those slaves employed
as day laborers.

The department warned against the threat to order

posed by "a mass of raw, unwilling, mistreated and embittered slaves"
created by such exploitation.^

The department did not, however,

reject the proposal that the Crown buy plantations and, by exemplary
treatment of the slaves on them, produce a surplus of slaves who
could be sold to planters in dire need of laborers.

I t sided with

Schimmelmann's view that more land should be devoted to raising food

8 3 Ibid,.,

pp. 25-29.

04
° Ibid., pp. 29-44.
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for the slaves.
The proponents of abolition faced a difficult situation in
the Council of State, for Walterstorff had persuaded Crown Prince
Frederik to favor the planters' request for resuming the slave traded 5
No one knows what happened in the Council of State, but a l e t t e r
from Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg mentions that the slave
trade was discussed for three hours.

I t i s apparent that Schimmelmann

used the arguments of Rosenstand-Goiske to counter the planters'
assertion that they needed more slaves.

Particularly important was

the contradiction which Rosenstand-Goiske had shown between the
large number of slaves listed as imported in the customs ledgers
and the stagnant slave population revealed by the tax rolls.

The

doubts raised in the General Customs Department's Forestilling of
May 15, 1804, concerning the actual number of slaves in the Danish
islands permitted Schimmelmann to convince the Council of State that
more data were needed before a decision could be reached. Only when
such data had been obtained would the proposal to resume the slave
trade be reconsidered.^
The resulting royal resolution of May 25, 1804, was the
most important victory for the Danish abolitionists since the abolition
edict i t s e l f .

In a brief paragraph the Council of State declared:

® 5 Linvald, Kronprins Frederik oq hans regerinq, p. 327.
Christian Ditlev Reventlow noted this in his unpublished diary, entry
for May 16, 1804.
86
„
Bobe, Reventlowske Familiekreds, VII, 65-66. Letter from
Ernst Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg, May 22, 1804.
Schimmelmann wrote: La chambre des douanes avait insiste sur
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Before we make a decision regarding an appeal from some
planters on St. Croix for permission to import slaves for an
additional period, we want our General Customs Department to
obtain, through our West Indian government, more detailed
information and reliable data on the actual population of the
slaves on our islands, which would put us in a position to
judge the pled that more slaves are needed for the cultivation
of sugar there. Investigation into the proposal to purchase
plantations with public funds as well as the manner of
administering such plantations . . . i s postponed. 8 7
By warding off approval of the planters' plea and successfully
countering Walterstorff's arguments, the men who favored abolition
had insured more than a year's delay before the matter could be
reconsidered by the Council of State, as i t would take at least
that long to collect and send to Denmark the detailed population
data needed before the Crown could reach a decision on the future
of the slave trade.

And consideration of Schimmelmann's proposal

for a colonial institute had been deferred indefinitely. 8 8

Vabolition de 1'importation des esclaves sans aucune restriction,
e l l e a cru pouvoir appuyer son avis sur les tableaux fautifs du
denombrement des negres, e l l e a cru pouvoir demontrer par les
contradictions des registres, des douanes e t du denombrement des
negres africains, que le nombre effectif des negres excedoit de
beaucoup celui des listes officielles. Le prince royal penche'
beaucoup pour la proposition de perme t t re 1'^importation pour 3 ans,
mais en dernier re'sultat la resolution a ete prise, que la suplique
des planteurs dans laquelle on demande 1'importation pour un terme
limite", resteroit sans response.
8 7 DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Royal
Resolution on the appeal of the S t . Croix planters for permission to
import slaves for three more years and on Schimmelmann's proposal
for a colonial institute, Fredensborg Slot, May 25, 1804.
8 8 This

victory for abolition in Denmark corresponded with a
revival of the abolitionist movement in England, where in 1804 the
Abolition Committee met for the f i r s t time since 1797; and
Wilberforce's abolition bill easily passed a l l three readings in the
Commons in May and June 1804 before being killed by the insistence
of the Lords on hearing evidence and by the lateness of the session.
But now there was hope for eventual success; for one thing, the
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That Schimmelmann himself was active in campaigning against
the planters' appeal i s shown by a l e t t e r written to him on
November 29, 1829, by Georg Philip Schmidt, Schimmelmann's secretary
from 1803-06.

Schmidt referred to Schimmelmann's work on behalf of

the slaves as "the most beautiful pearl in your l i f e as a Minister
of State [den skj0nneste Perle i deres M i n i s t e r ! i v ] H e added "I
s t i l l remember vividly the struggle . . . to obtain victory for the
good cause against the efforts of Walterstorff, Oxholm and other
plantation owners, and I consider myself fortunate to have been able
at that time a t least to write copies of your excellency's calcu1ations and statements [oc[ jeg skatter mig lykkeliq ved den Gang i_
det mindste a t kunne afskrive Ds. Excellences Beregninger og
Fremstillinger]." 8 ^
Yet Schimmelmann lacked Rosenstand-Goiske's dedication to
abolition as a just cause to be pursued without regard for
consequences.

In his l e t t e r to the Duke of Augustenborg he stated

that he had always regarded the slave trade as something that ought
to be abolished or restricted (elle devait etre abolie ou restreinte),
a position in keeping with his proposed colonial institute's need
for additional slaves from Africa who would be transported to the
West Indies under government regulations designed to guarantee their

despotic French government was moving toward support of the slave
trade,and "support of abolition could almost bear the colour of
patriotism." See Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British
Abolition, 1760-1810, pp. 343-44.
8 9 Bobe',

Reventlowske Famil iekreds, V, 304. Letter from
Georg Philip Schmidt to Ernst Schimmelmann, November 27, 1829.
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well-being.

I t must have been with some reluctance that he

had finally comprehended that the planters had not taken the
abolition edict seriously and, as a result, had not yet changed
their attitude toward their slaves.

He recognized that nothing was

more important than changing the viewpoint of the planters, for
they generally regarded the slaves as agricultural instruments which
one renewed when they were used up. 9 0
The General Customs Department and the Committee on the
Slave Trade used the reprieve provided by the royal resolution of
May 25, 1804, to prolong the time i t would take the colonial
government to gather data on the slave population.

On June 2 the

department sent a letter to the committee, informing i t of the
results of the deliberations of the Council of State.

The post

ponement of further consideration of Schimmelmann's plan for a
colonial institute was not mentioned, however, and nothing more
was heard of the plan.

This undercuts Thorkild Hansen's assertion

that i f the British had not occupied the Danish West Indies in
1807, Schimmelmann's colonial institute would have been established
on St. C r o i x . T h e department asked the committee to suggest the
kind of data needed from the colonial government and the format in
which the data ought to be presented. 9 2

9 ^Bobe,

Reventlowske Familiekreds, VII, 66. Letter from
Ernst Schimmelmann to the Duke of Augustenborg, May 22, 1804.
QT

See Hansen, Slavernes 0er, p. 279.

9 2 DSA,

V6RGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Kommissionen t i l
Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Letter from General
Customs Department to Committee on the Slave Trade, pp. 1-2.
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The committee replied to the department's letter four weeks
later, requesting that the department ask the colonial government
to provide a complete breakdown of the slave population according to
age and to discard the broad categories previously used, such as
boys, girls, and adolescents.

The government should indicate births

by sex and provide a l i s t of deaths in the f i r s t year after birth.
The number of slaves listed under "baptized" should be divided by
congregation; in addition to listing married slaves, a new l i s t
should indicate those couples living together, as well as the number
of births to married and unmarried couples in the previous year
and whether the couples lived on the same plantation.

An enumeration

of the slave huts on each plantation would also be of value, for the
coiraiittee could then determine the average number of persons in each
hut.93

The committee, in requesting such detailed population data,

surely knew i t was handing the colonial government a major task that
would require much time and effort and, furthermore, would be subject
to additional requests from Copenhagen for clarification, ensuring
additional delays before the future of the slave trade was discussed
once more in the Council of State.
In the meantime, the St. Croix planters, having heard nothing
from Copenhagen, sent to the colonial government another appeal for
an extension of the slave trade.

The planters argued that the

colonies could not survive without a yearly supply of slaves

DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
Committee on the Slave Trade to General Customs Department, June 29,
1804, pp. 1-3.
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(Jord-D.ykere).

The slaves' mortality rate was consistently

greater than their birth rate and, furthermore, the island had
never had enough slaves for i t s proper cultivation.

The planters

were repeating the same arguments advanced in 1802:

The Crown's

intention of helping the planters obtain a sufficient number of
slaves had been thwarted by unforeseen and unavoidable difficulties
(Uhaeldigvis, bleve Hans Majestaets landsfaderliqe Hensigter
tilintetgiorde i_ cte seenere Aaringer, ved uforudseete oq uoverstigelige
Forhindringer.)

If the ban on importing slaves continued, the

planters wrote, sugar cultivation, especially of the new and highly
productive Otaheite cane, would diminish.

The inevitable result

would be a'loss of revenue for the Crown and i t s subjects.

The

planters would not be able to pay the debts they owed European,
including Danish, creditors.

Blackmail was s t i l l , as in 1802, a

weapon the planters relied on in trying to gain acceptance for their
views, though this time a new loan for buying slaves was not
mentioned.

Surely, they wrote, "Amonarch who placed his highest

honor in promoting the welfare of his subjects [En Monark, som
saetter sin hgijeste Aere i_ at freircne sine Undersaaters Velstand]"
would not be indifferent to the desire of the island's inhabitants.
Several more years at the very least were needed to import more
slaves and thereby assure the continued prosperity of the colony.

<34

^DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
St. Croix Burger Council to the government of the Danish West Indies,
St. Croix, June 28, 1804, pp. 1-2.
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The planters' use of the phrase "at the very least [ i det mindste]"
lends credence to the suspicion voiced by the Committee on the Slave
Trade and the General Customs Department that a temporary extension
would lead to abandonment of the abolition edict.
Accompanying the Burger Council's letter were seven letters,
all in English, from planters on St. Croix, expressing their
disappointment at the Crown's failure to respond to the appeal
sent to Copenhagen in 1802.

One planter, Joseph Blake, himself a

member of the Burger Council, warned:

"Our Cultivation has already

suffered considerably from the want of Laborers; the Spirit of
improvement which i s so conspicuous in this Colony and the great
industry which characterises i t s inhabitants have as yet been kept
up by hope, but must soon yield to necessity if the difficulty which
oppresses the one and extinguishes the other is not quickly
removed.
A letter from "The Proprietors in Company's Quarter" stated,
regarding the Crown's goal of providing the islands with a
sufficient number of slaves by January 1, 1803:

"We sincerely

lament that the Humane and beneficent Views of his Majesty
have not answered the proposed Purpose; we shall not pretend
to describe reasons for i t , but we believe i t to be owing
in part to the introduction of the Otaheite Cane, which being much

95

Undated Letter from Joseph Blake, member of the St. Croix
Burger Council, to the Burger Council, sent by the Burger Council to
the colonial government along with the Burger Council's letter of
June 28, 1804.
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more productive requires more hands to cultivate i t , particularly
as we find i t does not rattoorP 6 as well as the Brasil Cane, and are
obliged to renew i t more frequently."

97

Letters from planters in

Prince's Quarter, Westend Quarter, and Queens' Quarter also complained
that cultivation of Otaheite cane required as many as 25 per cent
more workers than Brazil or common cane; the Otaheite cane produced
more sugar but had to be replaced every three or four years.
Several themes ran through the planters' letters.

98

One

was

that the colonies would be ruined without the slave trade; a limited
three-year prolongation, as requested in 1802, was not mentioned,
implying that the trade should continue indefinitely.

The planters

also warned that the Crown would suffer a loss of revenue if the
islands' sugar production declined.

They also argued, as had

Walterstorff, that abolition would increase the slaves' workload,
for planters would seek to maintain present production levels with
a steadily diminishing labor force; indeed, the planters of Westend

96 A cane plant's ability to "rattoon" refers to i t s capacity
for growing back each year without replanting.
9 ^DSA,

V6R6T, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. Undated letter
from planters in Company's Quarter to the St. Croix Burger Council,
sent to the colonial government by the Burger Council on June 28,
1804. According to Deere, History of Sugar, I , 19-21, the
Otaheite cane was a major advance in sugar production; i t was f i r s t
planted in the Caribbean on Martinique in the 1780s. Lowell J . Ragatz
demonstrated that sugar production increased dramatically on Jamaica
after the Otaheite cane was introduced there in the mid-1790s. See
his Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean, 1763-1833
(New York: Century Co., 1928), p. 90.
go

Letters from planters of Prince's Quarter, May 15, 1804;
Westend Quarter, March 7, 1804; and Queen's Quarter, April 26, 1804,
to the St. Croix Burger Council.
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and Queen's quarters blamed the excess of slave deaths over births
on the shortage of workers, which necessitated overworking the
present labor f o r c e . "

That the planters could advance such an

argument is evidence of their abiding interest in immediate
production and their refusal to concern themselves with the welfare
of their slaves.

The planters probably hoped their appeal would

receive a better response if they could convince the authorities in
Copenhagen that continuing the slave trade would benefit the slaves
in the Danish islands.

They were advocating their own peculiar

version of "humanitarian" reform.
The calamities referred to by the St. Croix planters in 1802
and again in 1804—the crop failure and epidemic—were exaggerated
and served merely as an excuse for demanding access to the slave trade.
The planters of Prince's Quarter did not even agree with those of
Northside Quarter on when the "epidemic" occurred.^ 0

The planters'

constant references to the harm caused to the slave trade by the
British occupation of the Danish West Indies in 1801 are also
misleading, as British slavers, according to Walterstorff (see p. 243
above), provided most of the slaves bought by local planters and
would surely not have been deterred from continuing to sell slaves
to the Danish colony after i t s takeover by their own country.
The colonial government in 1802 had shown sympathy for the

"DSA, V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse. Letters from
planters of Westend Quarter, p. 1 , and Queen's Quarter, p. 1.
1 0 0 Letters

from Planters of Prince's Quarter, p. 1, and
Northside Quarter, p. 2.
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planters' appeal in i t s cover letter accompanying Til Kongenl
but had refrained from a direct endorsement of the need for more
slaves.

Now, however, Governor MUhlenfels sided with the planters,

stating that, without the slave trade, the slave population would
decline and sugar production would suffer.

Mtlhlenfels added that the

Crown also would lose money if the sugar islands lacked sufficient
"working hands."

He also agreed with the planters that the slaves

working the islands needed the assistance of new African slaves in
order to avoid being overworked.

He blamed the islands' failure to

acquire enough slaves on problems faced by the planters in 1800,
1801, and 1802, the suspension of the loans for buying slaves (Neger
Laanets Ophaevelse), and the English occupation of the islands. 1 0 1
The concern of the planters and the colonial government with
obtaining permission to import slaves once more suggests that, though
some smuggling of slaves into the islands was inevitable, only
regular access to the Atlantic slave trade was considered sufficient
to meet present needs and, what seems likely to have been the planters
real fear, future needs.

Without access to African slaves, the

planters would have to devote more resources to caring for their
present slaves, and as yet there seemed l i t t l e likelihood of a
self-perpetuating slave population on a Caribbean sugar island.

The

f i r s t colony to achieve such was Barbados, an old colony with

1 0 1 DSA, V6RGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 1064, letter from
government of Danish West Indies to the General Customs Department,
July 12, 1804, pp. 1-3.
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relatively few Africans in i t s slave population, and Barbados
managed a surplus of births over deaths only after 1 8 0 7 . ^
On July 5, 1804, the General Customs Department wrote
Governor MUhlenfels, informing him of the Crown's decision to
seek detailed and reliable data on the slave population of the
Danish islands before reaching a decision on the planters' appeal
for resuming the slave trade.

MUhlenfels responded, on October 9,

promising to collect the requested information as soon as possible.^ 0 3
He had already sent the planters' appeal of 1804 to Copenhagen.
As undoubtedly anticipated by the General Customs Department
and the Committee on the Slave Trade, i t took many months for
MUhlenfels to gather the needed data on the slave population.

The

St. Croix slave census was completed by MUhlenfels on July 8 , 1805,
arrived in Copenhagen in the fall of 1805 and was sent by the General
Customs Department to the Committee on the Slave Trade on November 26,
1805.

MUhlenfels now sided more openly than before with the planters,

as he concluded, after a discussion of the slave population and the
number of births and deaths, that i t would never be possible for
St. Croix to obtain enough slaves to work the fields by relying
solely on births.

Slave women continued to induce abortions rather

1 0 2 Richard

B. Sheridan, "Mortality and the Medical Treatment
of Slaves in the British West Indies," in Race and Slavery in the
Western Hemisphere, pp. 288-89.
^ 0 3 DSA, VGRGT, Om Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
General Customs Department to Governor MUhlenfels, July 5, 1804,
p. 1, and Letter from Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Depart
ment, October 9, 1804, p. 1.
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than have children, even though some planters offered them small
presents for each child they bore.

Slavery, which was crucial for

the survival of the Danish sugar islands, kept the fertility rate
of slave women below what i t should be.

In order to maintain

cultivation of the 24,283 acres now planted in sugar on St. Croix,
MUhlenfels wrote, an additional 10,000 slaves were needed in order
to avoid overworking the present labor force of 22,076 plantation
slaves.

Also, the proper ratio of male to female slaves had never

been achieved.

There were 11,601 men and 10,475 women; yet

MUhlenfels argued there should be one-third more women than men.

He

ended his letter by recommending adoption of a slave code to protect
slaves from brutal overseers, for "Protected by wise laws, the slaves
in the colonies would be much better off than in their Father Land,
where a despot could, for his own pleasure or the satisfaction of
religious customs, have their heads chopped off." Even without
such a protective black code, one would probably find in the Danish
West Indies few slaves who would wish to return to Africa if given
the opportunity.^

This was the same man who had been described by

Walterstorff as, if anything, open to criticism for being too
solicitous of the slaves' welfare (see p. 243 above).
The census showed that in the two most densely populated and
productive sections of St. Croix, Prince's Quarter and Queen's Quarter,

^DSA, V6RGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Department, St. Croix, July 8,
1805, pp. 1-4. In 1796, 27,655 acres had been planted in sugar;
by 1804, only 24,283 were.
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there were 205 births in the previous year and 317 deaths.

For

St. Croix as a whole, there were 547 births and 815 deaths J 0 5
Slave births on St. John numbered 58 in 1805, exceeding the 49 deaths.
On St. Thomas there were 107 births and 129 deaths among the
plantation slavesJO 6 Thus the population of the plantation slaves, as
opposed to house slaves and those in the towns, was declining on all
three islands.
Despite the downward trend of the plantation slave population
in the Danish islands, there was s t i l l an ample number of slaves in
1804-05.

There were 2,417 plantation slaves on St. John where there

were only 1,652 acres planted in cane, so there was surely no need
for more slaves on that island.

The plantation slaves numbered

3,344, and there were 2,458 acres planted in sugar cane.

As on

St. John, there was an ample supply of slaves. 1 0 7
In his letter accompanying the population figures for St.
Thomas and St. John, MUhlenfels argued more slaves were needed per
acre on St. Thomas and St. John than on St. Croix because of the
mountainous nature of the two smaller islands.

The difficulty of

working the land on those islands exhausted the slaves far more than
did field labor on St. Croix, which had large areas of flat land.
MUhlenfels noted that St. Thomas had 10,558 acres of unused land

1Q5
Governor MUhlenfels' census of the St. Croix slave
population, 1804-05.
1 0 6 Governor

MUhlenfels census of the St. John and St. Thomas
slave populations in 1804-05.
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and St. John 8,655 and urged that the Crown provide the two islands
with more slaves so that they could be fully cultivated.

Yet on

these old sugar islands, land not planted in sugar by the early
nineteenth century was surely too steep to plant or too severely
eroded

to be productive.

MUhlenfels said St. John needed another

1,000 slaves to plant additional acres in sugar cane.

That island,

according to MUhlenfels, was well suited to produce a regular excess
of births over deaths.

There were no towns on i t in which the slaves

could obtain rum in exchange for eggs and hay, and proceed to under
mine their health by excessive drinking.

On St. John at the end of

the day a slave "went directly home from his work to rest, ate the
food which his wife prepared while he smoked his pipe, and the two
of them then lay down peacefully to sleep [og saa laegger de sig
trygt t i l at sove]."^ 8

MUhlenfels had obviously succumbed to the

planters' ideology.
The St. Croix census data reached Copenhagen in the fall of
1805 and were sent by the General Customs Department to the Committee
on the Slave Trade on November 26.

Eighteen months had elapsed since

the royal resolution of May 25, 1804.

The census of the slaves on

St. Thomas and St. John arrived in the spring of 1806 and was sent
to the committee on March 18.

The victory won by Rosenstand-Goiske

and Schimmelmann in May 1804 had thus provided a delay of nearly two

1° 8 DSA, VGRGT, 0m Negerhandelens Afskaffelse, Letter from
Governor MUhlenfels to General Customs Department, St. Croix,
September 5, 1805, pp. 1-4.
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years before reopening the slave trade could again be considered by
the Crown.
In the meantime, Rosenstand-Goiske and Oxholm debated
abolition in the press, with Rosenstand-Goiske publishing a forty-one
page article in Minerva in February 1805.

He sought to soothe those

who had hoped the slaves would be freed by the Crown, noting that
abolition was not the same as emancipation and adding that the
government could not free the slaves in the immediate future, for
the slaves would f i r s t have to be prepared for freedom by "improved
education and increased morality."

Without such careful preparation,

emancipation would be unwise, harmful to both the slaves and their
masters.

Rosenstand-Goiske was adopting the same stand toward

emancipation as the Committee on the Slave Trade had in i t s report
of December 28, 1791.

He wrote that the Danish government preferred

to move slowly and carefully toward emancipation, and the abolition
edict had been a step in the right direction; the edict had also
ended Denmark's role in the forced transport of Africans from their
homeland.

Another advantage of ending the slave trade was a reduction

in the death rate of Danish sailors, as the "unhealthy" journey on
the slave ships from the Gold Coast to the Caribbean claimed the lives
of many sailors J 09

10 9 Rosenstand-Goiske, "Om Negerhandelens Ophaevelse i Hensyn
t i l de danske vestindiske 0er," Minerva, February 1805, pp. 190-193.
This reference to a higher-than-average death rate among Danish
sailors on slave ships may have been inspired by Clarkson's compu
tation of losses on English slave ships.
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Oxholm's response to Rosenstand-Goiske's defense of the
abolition edict came more than a year later.

He agreed that the

slave trade was immoral, but argued that Rosenstand-Goiske was
mistaken in believing that sugar production could be maintained
after abolition of the slave trade.

He added that so long as the

sale of slaves was permitted within the Danish islands, abolition
of the trade in slaves from Africa and outside the islands would
have l i t t l e effect on slave treatment.

Oxholm said i t was nonsense

to believe that a human being who was subject to sale cared where
he was sold.

He thereby ignored a basic tenet of the abolitionists:

that when new slaves from outside the Danish West Indies were no
longer available, the planters would place a higher value on their
present slaves and, accordingly, treat them better.

Oxholm, as

Walterstorff in 1804, argued that the Danish slave trade was too
insignificant to affect the well-being of Africans on the Gold Coast.
And after providing the standard excuses for the planters' failure
to buy more slaves in 1800-02, Oxholm failed to mention that African
slaves had been legally available for sale on St. Croix in 1803 and
that only 138 slaves out of 388 had been bought by St. Croix planters.
(See p. 258 above.)

Oxholm concluded by urging a reopening of the

Danish slave trade for at least three years or, better yet, for as
long as i t might take to increase the plantation slave population of
St. Croix to 30,000J10

This would require importing another 8,000

TlOOxholm, "Nogle Anmaerkninger over en Afhandling om
Negerhandelens Ophaevelse udi Maanedskriftet Minerva af Februarii
1805, N.y Minerva, May 1806, pp. 129-131, pp. 146-47 and pp. 159-60.
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slaves at least and, with a continued excess of deaths over births,
would involve the indefinite continuation of the slave trade.
Rosenstand-Goiske's reply to Oxholm was published two months
later in N.y Minerva.

He argued that the planters had exaggerated

their need for slaves in 1792 in order to get the Crown to loan them
as much money as possible, and he sought to refute Oxholm's article
page by page.

In response to Oxholm's statement that the slave trade

from Africa to America was no more evil than the continued sale of
slaves within the Danish islands, Rosenstand-Goiske wrote that surely
Oxholm "cannot seriously mean that i t is not a greater burden on a
slave to be transported several thousand miles away from his homeland
in an

enclosed, unhealthy, foul room, uncertain of his fate and

under agonizing fear for his future, than to be sold by one master
to another in the same place?"

He added:

"Is there not an

enormous difference for a peasant, . . . when he i s sold for a
hunting dog, whether he remains in his own country or i s sent, for
example, to Siberia?"

Regarding Oxholm's contention that discontinuing

the Danish slave trade would not really help Africa, as the Danish
islands normally required only 1,000 slaves a year, Rosenstand-Goiske
commented that the fact remained that 1,000 fewer slaves would be
taken from Africa for sale in the Caribbean:
Is the fate of 1,000 persons so unimportant? One should not
forget that the question here i s not what is best for the slave
traders but rather what is best for mankind [Er 1000 Menneskers
Skiaebne saa liqeg.yldig? Man glemme dog e i , at her er ei
Sp0rqsmaalet om Fordeten" for Menneskehandlere, men for
Menneskenel.il 1

mRosenstand-Goiske, "Noget mere om Negerhandelen i
Anledning af Hr. Generalmajor Oxholms Anmarkninger," Ny Minerva,

Rosenstand-Goiske said the Danish islands, even if the
slave trade were permitted, would never acquire the number of
plantation slaves which Oxholm believed they required, for the
islands simply did not need that many slaves.

To allow the slave

trade to continue until 32,000 plantation slaves were present on
St. Croix (Oxholm had said 30,000, not 32,000, were needed) would
in effect guarantee that Denmark, which had provided the f i r s t
example of a European nation ending i t s slave trade, would become
the last nation where abolition actually occurred (og altsaa
Danmark, som qav det f0rste Exempel paa at ophaeve Handelen, skulde
bl ive det sidste, hvor det virkeligen skete.)1 1 2
While Oxholm and Rosenstand-Goiske engaged in their debate,
the Committee on the Slave Trade stalled further action by the
Crown by making a careful study of the census data sent to Copenhagen
by Mllhlenfels.

The St. Croix Burger Council tried once more to get

a response to its petition for a resumption of the slave

tradeJ^

The General Customs Department told Crown Prince Frederik on
November 3, 1806, that i t was awaiting suggestions from the committee

July 1806, p. 23, and pp. 28-29. That he was carefully following
the progress of abolition in England, as Schimmelmann surely was,
seems apparent from Rosenstand-Goiske's comment on p. 3 that Lord
Grenville had been quoted in the British press as noting that Denmark
had already ended i t s slave trade.
112 Ibid., p. 39.
I^ dsA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Journal, No. 840, 1806, Letter from
Burger Council to General Customs Department, St. Croix, July 10,
1806, p. 1.
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before presenting i t s report on the future of the slave trade.

114

The Crown Prince was constantly distracted by the threat of
invasion and, beginning in 1803, he established headquarters near
the southern border at the head of an army corps that eventually grew
to 20,000.

His control over the government in Copenhagen

during his absence.

declined

I t was therefore difficult for him to actively

push for measures he favored, such as resumption of the slave trade,
so long as the threat of attack from abroad persisted.
The General Customs Department and the Committee on the Slave
Trade took advantage of Frederik's preoccupation with foreign policy
and his absence from Copenhagen.

They obstructed the wishes of

the planters and of the Crown Prince by delaying further action on
the slave trade.

As Schimmelmann and Rosenstand-Goiske observed

the progress of the British abolitionists, they were surely
encouraged to hope that British endorsement of abolition would
ensure the survival of Danish abolition.
As Britain had acquired foreign colonies during her conflict
with France and the latter's allies, the threat of overproduction
became obvious.

Such underdeveloped colonies as Trinidad and Dutch

Guiana, if sufficiently supplied with slaves, might produce enough
sugar to glut the market and, consequently, force down the price of

^DSA, VGRGT, Vestindisk Kopibog, Letter from General
Customs Department to Crown Prince Frederik, November 3, 1806, p. 1.
1 1 5 Holm,

161-62.

Danmark-Norqes Historie, VII, Part 1, pp. 119-20,
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sugar produced by the old British sugar islands.

An initial step

toward coping with the problem of overproduction was taken in 1802,
when the British government decided against a massive sale of
Crown land on Trinidad, thereby eliminating a potentially enormous
market for the slave trade.^ 6

An Order-in-Council of August 15,

1805, banned the slave trade to captured colonies.

In 1806

Parliament outlawed the sale of slaves to foreign colonies as well
as captured territories, ending more than half of the British slave
trade.

The remainder of the British slave trade was abolished by

a law signed on March 25, 1 8 0 7 . ^
Denmark's traditional, and profitable, policy of neutrality
was subjected to increasing pressure in 1807.

After a British force

attacked Copenhagen in August and seized the Danish fleet there,
Crown Prince Frederik allied his country with France.

Danish

overseas territories, including the West Indian islands, were
occupied by Britain.

Denmark's future role in the Atlantic slave

trade had been decided permanently.

The British occupation of the

Danish West Indies ended only in April 1815 when Major General Peter
Lotharius Oxholm, the new Danish governor, resumed control of the
islands for Denmark.^ 8

^ P a t r i c k C. Lipscomb, "Party Politics, 1801-1802: George
Canning and the Trinidad Question," The Historical Journal, XII
(1969), 446-47, 462-63.
^ 7 See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age
of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975;,
pp. 443-49, and Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British
Abo!ition, pp. 395-402.
^ 8 Vibaek, Dansk Vestindien, pp. 230-36.

CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
Three considerations influenced Ernst Schimmelmann in 1791
when he began his inquiry into the feasibility of abolishing the
Danish Atlantic slave trade.

First, he was keenly aware of the

unprovability of the slave trade.

Second, he was carefully

following the progress of the British abolitionists and feared that
abolition by Britain, and perhaps France, would endanger the future
supply of slaves to the Danish West Indies.

Third, he was personally

opposed to the slave trade as an immoral enterprise.
The slave trade was always a risky venture, and the various
Danish companies involved in the trade during the eighteenth century
normally staved off bankruptcy by relying on government largesse and
on wars between other European colonial powers.

But the government

tired of the burden, and wars did not last forever.

The committee

Schimnelmann created in 1786 to study the Guinea trade concluded that
nothing but further losses could be anticipated.
no future for any Danish slave-trading company.

There was obviously
This was the main

"economic" motive for abolishing the Danish slave trade.
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desire to avoid further losses from participation in the slave trade
does not suffice to account for abolition; the earlier failures of
Danish slave-trading companies had not given rise to a move to end
Danish participation in the trade.

Also, the Danish government, in

supporting abolition iri 1791-92, could merely have ended active
Danish participation in the trade, sold the Guinea forts, and relied
on foreign slavers to supply the Danish West Indies.

This would have

been welcomed in the colonies, where Danish monopoly slave-trading
companies were traditionally regarded with suspicion and even hatred.
A secondary economic influence on Schimmelmann's thinking
in 1791 was his realization that slaves born in the sugar islands
were more cooperative and dependable than those brought from Africa.
He criticized the West Indian planters in a letter of June 18, 1791,
for failing to realize that their own benefit lay in creating a
stable, self-perpetuating labor force rather than continuing to
depend on the slave trade.

The abolition edict was in part an

attempt by the Crown to encourage the planters to adopt a more
reasonable approach to the long-range needs of the colonial economy.
Schimmelmann's preference for creole slaves was also based on
evidence that they were less inclined than African slaves to revolt.
Schimmelmann's Bedenken showed that he believed the British
abolitionists would soon put an end to their country's slave trade.
He thought the abolitionists' failure in 1791 had resulted from
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their insistence on immediate abolition.

Perhaps other slave-trading

nations, such as France, would join Britain in outlawing the slave
trade.

If they did, Denmark would face strong pressure to abolish

i t s slave trade on dangerously short notice, and the Danish sugar
islands might suffer a serious shortage of laborers.

Schimmelmann

felt the risk of untimely pressure from foreign powers could be
reduced if Denmark soon announced i t s intention to abolish the
slave trade to i t s colonies.

But a period of preparation was

needed to assure a smooth transition and to minimize any problems
for sugar production after the trade ended.
There can be no doubt that Schimmelmann despised the slave
trade.

He devoted five pages of his twenty-page Bedenken to

criticism of the trade, pointing out not only the horrors i t
inflicted on the slaves during the Middle Passage but emphasizing
i t s evil impact on African society as well.

The report of the

Committee on the Slave Trade—a committee Schimmelmann called into
being and dominated—amplified his attack on the slave trade as
inhumane and said the trade was virtually indistinguishable from
murder.

The committee placed greatest emphasis on attacking the

trade as immoral

and uncivilized.

If abolition could be accomplished

without harming the economy of the islands, i t was the duty of the
Crown to end the trade.

Schimmelmann and the committee managed to

convince themselves that abolition would not be harmful.

They were

taking a "leap in the dark," however, as no sugar island had ever

achieved a balance of slave births and deathsJ
By setting a date for abolition, Schimmelmann hoped that
the planters could be induced to adopt a policy of amelioration to
protect their own self-interest.

But amelioration failed, for

the planters did not take the abolition edict seriously and
continued to concentrate on short-term profits.

Reforms to benefit

the slaves were never enforced because the colonial government
advised against any tampering with the property rights of the
slaveholders.

The Crown, fearful of antagonizing the planters,

accepted this advice.
The abolition edict had been predicated on the assumption
that Britain would soon adopt abolition and that the Danish islands
would, by 1803, have succeeded in balancing slave births and deaths.
Neither of these assumptions had proved true when the date came for
ending the slave trade to the Danish West Indies.

The St. Croix

planters appealed for an extension of time for the slave trade, and
Walterstorff convinced Crown Prince Frederik to favor their point of
view.

Schimmelmann, however, refused to abandon his earlier stand

^As pointed out earlier, the abolition edict and the version
of the committee's report published in Minerva endeavored to avoid
inflammatory statements regarding the immorality of the slave trade
so as not to raise unnecessary opposition to abolition. Carol Gold,
because she read only the edict and Kirstein's summary of the report
in Minerva, recently concluded that the Danish edict was motivated
primarily by economic considerations. See Carol Gold, "The Danish
Reform Era, 1784-1800 " (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Wisconsin, 1975), p. 182. A reading of Schimmelmann's Bedenken
and the full unprinted report of the committee, however, reveals
the presence of a powerful humanitarian influence.
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in support of abolition.

In opposing an extension of the slave trade,

Schimmelmann was guided by his long-standing belief that the trade
was immoral.

His own plantations suffered a decline in their slave

population from September 1800 to 1804. 2

Abolition clearly meant

that his plantations might continue to lose slaves.

As his great

wealth was derived primarily from the productive capacity of his
slave labor-force, i t i s apparent that the humanitarian aspect of
abolition was of primary significance for him in 1804.

Yet

Schimmelmann was surely aware that his plantations would probably
enjoy an advantage over others in adjusting to abolition.
Schimmelmann was joined by Rosenstand-Goiske of the General
Customs Department in warding off the planters' appeal.
Rosenstand-Goiske, unlike Schimmelmann, was motivated exclusively by
humanitarian considerations.

He lacked Schimmelmann's gentlemanly

tolerance for the views of others and was prepared to wage a singleminded, uncompromising struggle to protect the abolition edict.
He, not Schimmelmann, pointed out the flaws in the slave-population
data provided by the colonial government and forcefully attacked
Walterstorff's arguments for resuming the slave trade.

Rosenstand-

Goiske was more effective than Schimmelmann as a defender of the
abolition edict in 1804.

2 DSA,

He shares credit with Schimmelmann for

Ernst Schimmelmanns Privat Arkiv, Pk. 73a,
Fideikommisset vedkommende Papirer, 1801-1815. In September 1800
the four Schimmelmann plantations had 948 slaves; in September 1801
they had 932; in September 1804, 913. From September 1801 to
September 1802, fourteen slaves were bom on the St. Croix plantations
and twenty-six died.

compelling the Danish Crown to enforce the edict.

Because of their

efforts, Denmark remained the f i r s t European slave-trading power
to outlaw participation by i t s subjects in the slave trade.

The

example provided by Denmark did not pass unnoticed in Britain, where
the most important struggle against the Atlantic slave trade was
being waged.
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APPENDIX I
Slave Code for the Danish West Indies,
prepared by Governor Philip Garde!in,
September 5, 1733
1.

The ringleaders of runaway slaves shall be pinched three times
with red-hot iron and thereafter hanged.

2.

Slaves involved in a conspiracy shall lose a leg, unless the
owners wish to lower the sentence to 150 lashes and the loss of
an ear.

3.

Participants in a conspiracy, who do not reveal the conspiracy
to a white, shall be branded on the forehead and given 100
lashes.

4.

A slave who provides information about a slave conspiracy shall
receive ten piasters for every slave found guilty, and his name
shall be kept secret.

5.

A runaway slave who has been gone eight days shall be punished
with 150 lashes, one who has been gone twelve weeks shall lose
a leg, and one who has been gone six months shall be executed,
unless his master wishes to lower the punishment to the loss of
a leg.

6.

A black who has stolen something worth four rigsdaler shall be
pinched [with red-hot iron] and then hanged.

Small thefts shall

be punished by a branding on the forehead and 100 to 150 lashes.

7.

Slaves who receive stolen goods . . . shall be branded and
receive 150 lashes.

8.

Those who conceal runaway slaves [Maroon-Negre] shall receive
the same punishment.

9.

A black who in anger raises his hand against a white or
threatens a white or speaks harshly to a white [giver ham
knubbede Ord], shall . . . be punched three times [with red-hot
iron] and then hanged, if the white demands i t ; if not, the
black shall lose a hand.

10.

The word of an honorable [retskaffen] white shall suffice
against a black, and if there should be unsolved questions
[Formodninger] in the case, the black can be tortured.

11.

A black who meets a white on the road shall step to the side
and stand s t i l l until the white has passed him by, under
punishment of a beating [Lusing] by the white.

12.

No slave may be seen in town with a club [Stok] or a knife, nor
may the slaves fight among themselves with clubs or knives,
without receiving f i f t y lashes.

13.

Witchcraft practiced by the blacks shall be punished by a heavy
beating.

14.

A black who i s convicted of having intended to poison someone
shall be pinched three times with red-hot iron, and thereafter
broken on the wheel and placed while s t i l l alive on a raised
platform.

15.

A free Negro who receives stolen goods from a runaway [Maroon]
or a thief or other harmful black, shall lose his freedom, his

possessions, and after a lashing be deported.
16.

Dancing, celebrations, gambling and the like by the blacks shall
be s t r i c t l y forbidden, unless such activities occur with the
permission of the master or overseer and in the presence of the
latter.

17.

No black may sell supplies for cattle or anything else without
a permission card from his master.

18.

Plantation slaves may not stay in town after taps [Tappenstreg],
under punishment of being brought into the fort and given a
beating.

19.

The prosecutor shall strictly maintain observance of these
articles, in accordance with which free Negroes and slaves shall
be judged in court, and this manifesto shall be publicized three
times a year with a beating of the drums J

H0st, Efterretninger om 0en Sanct Thomas, pp. 85-88.
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APPENDIX II
Paul Erdmann I s e r t ' s account of the slave revolt on the Danish
slave ship "Christiansborg," October 8 , 1786, and the
journey to St. Croix, concluding with the sale of the slaves.
Isert described the fears that gripped the slaves as they
were loaded onto the ship:
In their homelands such a multitude of frightful tales are
told about the way slaves are used in America that, if they had
heard them, they were terrified. A slave once asked me, in full
seriousness, if the shoes that I wore were not made of the skin
of Negroes [Neger-Leder]. For he had noticed that my shoes were
of the same color as his skin. Others say that we eat the slaves
and make gunpowder out of their bones.' They can not imagine
that they will only be used in agricultural and other occupations,
since in their homeland so few hands and so l i t t l e time are
needed for the work of sustaining l i f e that i t would be quite

The belief that Europeans intended to eat their black
slaves was widespread in Africa. See Mungo Park, Travels in the
Interior Districts of Africa: performed under the Direction and
Patronage of the African Association, in the Years 1795, 1796, and
1797 (New York, 1813), pp. 231-32, cited in Elizabeth Donnan,
Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America,
Vol. I I , The Eighteenth Century (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1931), pp. 634-35. Park traveled with a
slave caravan from the interior down to the Coast. He noted the
slaves' fear that Europeans were cannibals. The slaves refused to
believe Park when he told them that in America they would be used
as agricultural workers; their belief "that the whites purchase
Negroes for the purpose of devouring them, or of selling them to
others that they may be devoured hereafter" made necessary a careful
watch over the slaves during the journey to keep them from escaping.
Oldendorp wrote that African-born slaves in the Danish West Indies
had told him of their initial fear that they were to be eaten by
white cannibals in America. See his Geschichte der Mission der
evangelischen Brdder, I , p. 361.
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unnecessary fdberflflssig] for them to import foreigners. 2
Now a word about an insurrection [tlberlaufe] of the slaves on
the ship on which I sailed. In the middle of the deck a slave
ship is equipped with a high, strong, wodden barrier [Scheidewand]
which i s called the quarter-deck [Schanze], the side of which
facing the forward part of the ship i s extremely smooth and must
be without any open grooves so that the slaves can not get a grip
in i t with their fingers. On top of this barrier there are placed
as many small cannon and muskets as there i s room for; these guns
are always loaded and are fired every evening to keep the slaves
fearful. There are always guards by the guns; the guards must
keep a close watch on the movements of the slaves. Astern [im
hintertheile] . . . of the quarter-deck are a l l of the women
and children, and outside in front of the quarter-deck are the
men, who can neither see nor get together with the women. The
men are always chained together in pairs, hand and foot.
Moreover, through the rows, as they s i t on the deck, heavy chains
are drawn across their f e e t , so that they cannot stand without
permission; furthermore they must not move from that place except
in the morning when they are allowed up on the deck and in the
evenings when they go back down below deck. However, because
their number i s so great, they can enjoy this motion only every
other day; on alternate days they must remain below, where they
are packed together like herring.
I t was on the second day of our journey, . . . that the
insurrection broke out. I was a t the time alone among the slaves,
joking [scherzte] with some of those from the most civilized
tribes whose own language I understood. Since among such a crowd
there i s always considerable confusion, I was made aware that
something was amiss when suddenly a great stillness began.
Because a t that time the greater part of the crew were eating,
I wanted to go towards the bow in order to see whether everyone
there was a t his post, in case the slaves were thinking of
staging an insurrection. As I reached approximately the middle
of the ship, the door of the quarter-deck opened and the f i r s t
mate started to come toward me. But a t that moment a cry rang
out from all the men that was the most horrible sound imaginable,
which nevertheless bore a resemblance to a cry which I had heard
, previously during an attack in battle. With this cry every man
rose who previously, as usual, had been sitting. Some of them
struck me on the head with the manacles with which they were
chained together, so that I immediately f e l l to the deck. Since
they were also bound together by their f e e t , I was able to crawl
away from them and reach the quarter-deck door. But here I
knocked this time in vain. Then when the crew wanted to l e t me

^Isert, Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln,
p. 306-07.
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in, such a mass of slaves grasped the door that i t was very
difficult for the crew to close i t again. And i t i s the agreed
policy preferably to let some Europeans be killed rather than
allow the slaves to take control of the door, for once they did
they could reach the rear of the ship where a l l of our weapons
were located, and then i t would be simple for them to become
masters of the ship. In the meantime they did not l e t me
remain idly by the door for long, but rather soon made me as
before hit the deck [den Boden suchen]. However, as the crew
a t the rear of the ship learned what was happening outside, they
sought to keep the quarter-deck clear by using bayonets from
above. So, in order to get me into a better place in which to
kill me, the slaves pulled me by my feet to the front of the
ship, where one of them who had grabbed a shearing knife
[Scheermesse] from the slave who was shaving him when the
rebellion began, slashed me across my forehead, cutting the
temporal artery and my ear, and stabbing deeply into my throat.
But because I wore a thick silk kerchief, he remained occupied
with my throat and could not accomplish his purpose a t once,
and a bullet from the quarter-deck came to my rescue, passing
through the slave's chest, a t which he f e l l back and the other
slave who held me l e t go, by which means I once more became free.
The crew fired s t i l l more assorted shots in addition to two
three-pound cannon which were loaded with peas. At this the
slaves as quickly as possible retreated towards the bow of the
ship in order to escape the shots. In this way thus the quarter
deck door was cleared, and as I was s t i l l strong enough I crawled
over there, with a stream of blood marking my progress, for my
right temporal artery had been cut. The f i r s t mate had also
received various wounds, though they were not as serious as mine,
and because he was a better seaman than I , he saved himself by
means of going overboard through a cannon hatch and climbing
back up on the other side of the quarter-deck. In the meantime
the slaves had already in varying degrees hammered off their
manacles, when the crew made a sortie from the quarter-deck in
order to take the slaves, either by conciliatory [Gdte] or
forceful means back down into their chambers. And when the crew
did this, supported by their guns, a number of slaves who had
not been included in the conspiracy went down to their chamber
without any more ado. But the others, when they saw that they
could accomplish nothing, a l l jumped overboard into the sea.
Some boys from the same tribe who lacked the heart for this rash
step were intentionally pushed overboard by their parents. The
crew made sure of the slaves below deck, launched as quickly as
possible the small boats, and took custody once again of as many
slaves as possible, some s t i l l alive, others dead. I t was
astonishing how several of the pairs of slaves, although they had
only a hand and a foot free (they were chained together with the
other hand and foot) nevertheless were able with great skill to
keep themselves above the water. Some were obstinate in the face
of death itself and definatly threw away the ropes which had been
thrown down around them from the ship in order to pull them out,
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and then they sank forcefully. Among the others was a pair
which could not agree: one demanded to be saved, but the other
wanted t o die; therefore the one who desired to drown pulled
the other forcibly with him under water as the l a t t e r screamed
pitifully- The latter slave was saved, though his comrade had
already surrendered up his s p i r i t [Geist].
The chaos lasted for two hours before i t was entirely
quelled. After a count we found that we had lost thirty-four
slaves during the insurrection, all of whom had drowned; whereas
of the Europeans, there were none killed, though two . . . were
wounded.
As for me, I found myself in very awkward condition. For
by that time I had lost so much blood that my strength swiftly
declined to the point where I could not even bind my wound, but
rather merely put a few handkerchiefs around my head in order
a s much as possible t o stop the bleeding . . . .
Isert passed out but was well tended to and had fully
recovered by the time the "Christiansborg" reached St. Croix two
months later.
In that I could not have caused the slaves to suffer much
in those two days a t sea prior to the rising, you may well ask
why they were so incensed against me from the s t a r t of the
insurrection. I learned later that they had believed that,
because I was the last to board the ship, I was the owner of
all the slaves, and that i t would be best to send me to the
next world f i r s t , for then the rest of the Europeans, as
hirelings, would surrender quicker . . . .
One of the ring leaders of the conspiracy was a slave who
had already been in the West Indies and in England and who,
I do not know how, had returned to the Gold Coast, where he
found a place in our service as a boatsman. On the coast he had
gone so deeply into debt that, merely in order to get rid of
him, he was sent to the West Indies on our ship. This villain
[Btisewicht] had persuaded the slaves that they simply ought to
beat the whites to death; then he would soon bring the ship
back to land, even if they were s t i l l far out at sea. He told
them moreover many things both true and false about the West
Indies; for example, that i t was a land of misery [Plage], where
they would have l i t t l e to eat but would be worked hard and beaten.
He was in fact a dangerous person . . . .
Except for this unhappy uprising, we would have made a very
profitable [vortheilhafte] journey, as only seven slaves died
on the way to St. Croix, which for such a crowd of people in
such a situation i s a very small number. There are instances
where slave ships have brought to the West Indies no more than
half the slaves which they purchased in Africa . . . . On the
"Christiansborg" the greatest cleanliness was observed, and the
slaves had to go up onto the deck every other day and move about
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as much as space permitted. By means of ventilators . . .
the slaves were provided with as much fresh a i r below deck as
possible. In the evening, before they were allowed back down
in their quarters, a l l the chambers were well fumigated with
dampened gun powder [rflucherte man a l l e Kammern mit anqefeuchteten
Schiesspulver wol ausj. The slaves' food consisted for the most
part of products from their native land, such as maize, wild rice,
and yams . . . .
A few days after our arrival at St. Croix the fate [Schicksal]
of our slaves was decided. They had been brought ashore, cleaned
[ausputzen] in the best manner possible according to the way of
their homeland, permitted a l l kinds of liberties, . . . so that
they were persuaded that they had arrived in a paradise. But
appearances deceived. The day of their sale arrived. They were
placed in rows and ranks . . . . The door was opened: an army
of buyers rushed in, and scrambled away, like maniacs, with
those male and female slaves whom they had noticed in previous
days, when the slaves had been on display, and brought them
before a seller in order to agree on a price. The whole thing
occurred in such a fury, that I myself soon became frightened
. . . . After four hours most of the slaves had been purchased.
The remaining forty-eight slaves consisted mostly of f r a i l
[Gebrechlichen] or aged Negroes, who were sold the next day
through the bank for 200 thaler each. The sum price for all the
slaves sold amounted to more than 97,000 thaler.3

^Isert, Reise nach Guinea und den Carabaischen Inseln,
pp. 309-20.
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APPENDIX III
Slaves purchased in Africa by Danes, 1778-1789
Number of Slaves

Year

1,197
1,021
475
2,508
1,831
1,999
2,428
2,087
1,227
993
633
714,

1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788
1789

17,1131

Number of ships used in the slave trade, 1778-1789
Year

Ships

Year

Ships

1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784

3
2
1
5
5
7
8

1785
1786
1787
1788
1789
1790
1791

8
3
4
2
2
1
12

^"Udtog af Forestillingen t i l Kongen angaaende Negerhandelens
Afskaffelse," Minerva, April 1792, p. 53.
2Ibid.,

p. 54.

APPENDIX IV
Slave deaths on Danish ships sailing
to St. Croix and on St. Croix prior to sale, 1778-87
Name of
Ship

Name of
Captain

Number of
Slaves
bought in
Af ri ca

Slave Deaths
On St. Croix
On. journey
to S t Croix
prior
to sale

Slaves sold
Total on St. Croix
deaths

Christiansborg Westmarker
304
27
16
43
261
Fredensborg
Terents
421
102
41
143
276
Rio Volta
Hammer
472
77
24
101
371
Acra
Aseni us
440
10
3
13
427
Christiansborg Hiorth
576
10
13
23
379
Ningo
West Bohn
476
22
16
38
438
Rio Volta
Hammer
469
71
7
78
391
Acra
592
230
27
257
Mtfller
155
Christiansborg Hiorth
457
120
5
125
132
Fredensborg
Terents
540
26
4
30
510
Gehejmeraad
Beck
250
102
103
1
147
Guldberg
Gehejmeraad
Holm
331
41
1
289
42
Stampe
- Greve
Boldt
2
2
296
Schimmelmann
Uppernavik
5
201
3
8
193
Wall0e
—
Greve
115
Schroder
2
2
Bernstorff
Christiansborg Berg
457
49
51
406
2
Ada
Higgins
120
0
119
1
1
893
Total 6,106
167
1,060
4,905
SOURCE: Government of Danish West Indies, Report on Slave Trade, October 15, 1787.

Slaves sent
for sale
elsewhere

173
180
199

552

APPENDIX V
Lists of slaves from Africa sold on St. Croix, 1778-1787
Name of Ship

Christiansborg
Fredensborg
Rio Volta
Acra
Christiansborg
Ningo
Rio Volta
Acra
Christiansborg
Fredensborg
Geheimeraad
Guldberg
Geheimeraad
Stampe
Greve
Schimmelmann
Uppernavik
Greve
Bernstorff
Christiansborg
Ada

Name of Captain

Date of Arrival

Women
70
74
109
77
135
72
68
39
30
130
44

May 24, 1778
Feb. 10, 1779
March 18, 1779
May 22, 1779
Dec. 6, 1779
Aug. 29, 1780
June 2, 1781
Aug. 30, 1,781
Oct. 12,1781
Nov. 16,1781
Feb. 29, 1784

Men
121
155
206
244
292
196
169
48
18
269
64

Holm

June 1, 1784

125

61

71

32

289

59,472

Rasmus Boldt

Nov. 27, 1784

106

70

82

38

296

61,302

Walltfe
Schroder

March 9, 1785
Jan. 11, 1786

67
51

75
37

29
21

22
6

1

193
115

38,893
24,410

Berg
Isaac Higgens

Dec. 18,1786
June 28, 1787

160
51

96
27

86
22

64
19

6
4

406
119

97,440
27,061

2,342

1 ,214

927

606

49

5,089**

of some rounding off, the sums from each sale
add up to a few riqsdaler less than this total.
SOURCE:

Boys
43
31
41
72
69
112
95
25
52
55
21

Girls
27
16
15
34
56
58
59
43
43
56
18

Babi es
2
3
4
4
3
3
6
11
2

Total
261
276
371
427
552
438
391
155
143
510
147

Amount of
sale in
rigsdaler

Niels Westmarker
Johann Terents
Andreas Hammer
Erich Asenius
Jtfrgen Hiorth
Niels "West Bolin
Andreas Hammer
S. A. M/611 e r
Jjirgen Hiorth
Johann Terents
Niels Beck

Total
a Because

Number of slaves brought to St. Croix

53,311
56,248
81,759
89,789
112,601
92,540
86,400
25,870
28,592
121,286
33,155

1,090,132a

^Total does not include babies,

Government of Danish West Indies, Report on Slave Trade, October 15, 1787.
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APPENDIX VI
Excerpts from the report by the government of the Danish
West Indies to the General Customs Department on the condition of
the Danish slave trade with suggestions as to ways in which the
slave trade might be improved, October 15, 1787.
Because the investigations made with regard to the slave
trade indicated that the excessively low prices which are paid
for slaves in the Danish West Indian islands in comparison with
prices paid for slaves in the colonies of other nations have
had not a small influence in making the slave trade unprofitable,
we believe that the following circumstance i s well deserving
of attention: that most of the Guinea Company's [Baltic-Guinea
Company] expeditions took place in war time, when the French
islands had virtually no supply of slaves, except for what the
Danish Guinea Company or Portuguese ships could supply them,
which meant that prices for slaves had to be higher in the
French colonies, where there were more buyers J
In calculating the outcome of each individual expedition,
i t is possible that the profits of the return cargo have been
included, and this naturally must have favored the sales made
on the French islands. Indeed, with regard to the cargo, a
noticeable difference results depending on whether a ship i s
loaded with brown sugar or with partly refined [daekkede]
sugar, coffee, and indigo.2 The majority of the slaves who
have been brought to St. Croix come from Fort Christiansborg.
The ships have had a t r i p of three or four months' duration,
with considerable illness and fatalities among the slaves. Also,

The Baltic-Guinea Company was created only in 1781; from
1777 until 1781 there was no "Guinea" company, though Danish merchants
enjoyed a monopoly on the slave trade to the Danish West Indies in
those years.
O
'•Unlike the French islands, the Danish West Indies produced
only brown sugar. For production of semi-refined or clayed sugar
on the French islands, see Deerr, History of Sugar, I , pp. 232ff.
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because of slave risings [overlflb], especially on the ships
"Christiansborg" and "Acra" in 1781 and on the former also this
past year, a considerable number of slaves have been lost. On
the other hand the ships destined for the French colonies sailed
for the most part from Upper Guinea fOvenkysten] which involves
a trip of six to eight weeks; the slaves on these ships are
healthier because of the shorter journey, and they haven't
been locked up in a crowded f o r t , often without a roof, in rain
and f i l t h ; this is especially the case a t Fort Fredensborg.
But however much lower the price in the Danish colonies
might have been than in the French colonies, we are s t i l l
convinced that the company might have profited from the cargoes
of slaves sold here on St. Croix, if the Company had always
supplied i t s f o r t s , lodges, and ships with enough merchandise
of the right kind and of dependable quality; if i t had used
suitable ships . . . for the slave trade, and if the ships were
economically and quickly fitted out; if the Company's captains
had imposed neatness, economy, cleanliness, and vigilance on
board their ships, so that neither sickness nor rebellion had
caused a loss for the Company, if the captains had been active,
. . . and experts at business; if the Company had sent i t s
expenditions to and from the most appropriate places--we know,
for example, from reliable sources that during the war one
could buy on the Gold Coast a fine male slave for 120 gallons
of rum, and a fine female slave for 100 gallons of rum; and,
finally, if the cargoes brought to St. Croix had been properly
balanced as to the numbers of men, women, boys, and g i r l s .
But if the employees of the Company who are concerned with
the details of the trade have not followed the so-very-necessary
rules listed above in every trading operation but especially in
the Guinea trade, then one should not be surprised that the
Company has suffered losses on i t s expeditions, but rather that
the Company s t i l l exists.
From the year 1778 until today 5,089 slaves have been sold
for the Guinea Company on St. Croix, namely: 2,342 adult male
slaves; 1,214 adult female slaves; 927 boys; and 606 g i r l s . All
of these were delivered for 1,090,132 riqsdaler vestindisk courant
or 214 rigsdaler apiece.
The report estimates the slaves brought to St. Croix cost
the company about 653,948 rigsdaler vestindisk courant, so that
slave trading should have yielded a profit of 436,184 riqsdaler.
The poor condition the ships of Captain Westmarker and Captain
Terentz were in when they arrived a t St. Croix in 1778 [because
of disease on board] . . . naturally reduced very much the profit
on the slaves sold here.
But what has been of particular importance in making the sale
of slaves unprofitable on St. Croix was that the Royal Guinea
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Trade Management [den kongelige Guineiske Handels Direktion]
gave instructions on April 17, 1781, that of the slaves on the
four ships then en route to St. Croix from Africa—the "Rio
Volta," "Aira," "Christiansborg," and "Fredensburg"--only a
limited number could be sold on St. Croix so that there would
remain on each of the ships between 250 and 300 of the best
slaves who were to be taken to St. Thomas to be sold there or,
as circumstances might dictate, be sent on from St. Thomas for
sale elsewhere; these instructions were not removed by subsequent
letters of September 3, 1781, and March 26, 1782, but rather
were made into a general rule. This step naturally has caused
great discontent [Misforn0ielse]; indeed, i t has led to a feeling
of hatred for the company among the St. Croix planters, who
believed the purpose of the company was to supply this colony
frequently with good slaves. Other merchants were in effect
barred from participating in this particular branch of commerce
because of the company's monopoly on trade with the Danish f o r t s ,
especially Rio Volta, where the best slaves are and where there
was no danger of being seized by the privateers of the warring
powers.
Everyone who knows the least bit about the slave trade i s
aware that i f , out of a cargo of 400 to 500 slaves, one removes
250 to 300 of the best, the remainder must be rather wretched
material [uselt T0j] and can not be worth close to 50 per cent
as much as the choice ones. We might also add, for we know i t
with certainty, that nothing but the most extreme need for slaves
can have induced the residents of St. Croix to purchase these
rejects . . . . Many have belived that the losses which the
Company has suffered in the French islands because of rejection
of a certain number of slaves, unreliable debtors, often poor
return cargoes, and the Guinea Company ships' long stopover and
the costs that such a delay runs up, can have appreciably reduced
the difference between the sales price of slaves on the French
islands and the sales price on St. Croix.
We have stated all of these details [Omstaendiqheder] without
holding back anything because government servants ought not fear
to speak the truth, and as we never suspect and even less cast
aspersions on the motives [Hensigter] of others, so we are not
ashamed t o mention certain errors that have been committed
whenever we happen to discover them and when we must mention
them so that we can give the correct reasons for the lack of
success of one or another branch of commerce.
I t cannot be denied that 214 rigsdaler apiece i s , in view of
the difficulties and risks associated with the slave trade, not
a concordant price. But if one wants, in addition to what has
already been pointed out, further proof that this price i s not
the result so much of local conditions on St. Croix as of a
combination of abundant bad luck and the poor condition of the
slaves brought to St. Croix due to illness or rebellion on board
the ships, then one can consult the enclosed Table A for more
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detailed elucidation.^ From i t one can see that the mortality
rate, especially during the journey from the Gold Coast to
St. Croix, has been particularly great on most of the ships
[see Appendix I I I ] . This then is also proof that the slave
cargoes have not been good, healthy ones. . . . The two ships
previously used in whaling, the "Geheimeraad Guldberg" under
command of Captain Beck and the "Grev Ernst Schimmelmann" under
command of Captain Rasmus Boldt, will in particular be found to
have suffered losses of about 40 per cent of the total number of
slaves on board. The doctors appointed to this island have also
noted that in general the surgeons on the ships of the Guinea
Company are ignorant and unskilled. The planters easily pump
[udfritte] information from the crew members and learn whether
there has been a slave rising on board; and when they find out
that there has been, they become less inclined to purchase slaves
from that particular cargo.
When one adds the value of the select slaves that are sent
away from St. Croix for sale on St. Thomas to the value of the
slaves sold on St. Croix, i t becomes apparent that the actual
price of slaves arriving here has ranged from 220 to 240 rigsdaler
apiece. 4 In the future, according to our best judgment, healthy
and well-assorted slave cargoes will continue to be delivered
here for between 230 and 240 rigsdaler apiece.
I t i s certainly important to guarantee the Danish West Indies
a regular supply of good slaves. This matter deserves the
greatest support of the General Customs Department [here referred
to as det kongl. vestindiske Kammer].
The enclosed Table B shows that the supply of slaves to
St. Croix with the ships of the Guinea Company does not amount
to more than 508 slaves per year; one should also note that in
1782 and 1783 not one cargo of slaves was brought to St. Croix.
As this colony needs a t least three times the aforesaid number
of slaves each year, we cannot see that any loss for the planters
and residents would result were the Baltic-Guinea Company to be
freed of all duty [Forpligtelse] to transport slaves to St. Croix
in exchange for the Company's renunciation of i t s monopoly on the
slave trade from Danish Guinea. 5

^In fact Table A, here used as Appendix I I I , shows that nearly
a l l slaves brought to St. Croix were sold on the island and were not
taken on to St. Thomas, as the colonial government charged.
^This i s merely an attempt by the government, based on i t s
false assertion that the better half of each slave cargo was withheld
from sale on St. Croix, to show that prices for slaves on St. Croix
were higher than they actually were.
^Actually, the Baltic-Guinea Company had no legal duty to
supply slaves to St. Croix; i t could and did sell slaves whereever
prices were best. The "duty" which the colonial government refers
to was a moral one only.
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We propose (1) that all Danish ships and vessels, including
those based a t St. Croix (but not those from St. Thomas, because
they are less likely to be Danish-owned), be allowed to visit
all places on the Guinea Coast, including the Danish forts and
establishments, for the purpose of buying slaves which they
should be allowed to sell anywhere they desire; (2) that such
ships be permitted to load, a t any place in or outside of the
King's states and colonies, the most suitable cargo with which
to conduct trade on the Guinea Coast, in return for paying a
double tax [Recognition] on each slave brought to St. Croix in
instances where the consignment [Partfliet] has not sailed
diectly from the King's European states or from St. Croix, or
has visited foreign states during i t s journey; (3) that in
regard to every type of cargo (with the single exception of
slaves) which such ships might contain when they reach St. Croix,
the ships are to be treated according to the customs regulations
of the colony.
Because the English captains are in general better acquainted
with the slave trade, have less fear of the influence of the
climate on their health, and therefore work with greater pleasure
and energy than most Danish captains; also because i t is of such
great importance for the outcome of an expedition that the
captain understand the trade and be able to speak the most common
language [English] on the Gold Coast [er det paa Kysten meest
giaengse Sporg maegtig] and that he not become so i l l or
uncomfortable as a result of discouragement or yearning for his
native land that he neglects to look after the best interests
of the shipping company, we would think that in order to promote
the slave trade an exception could be made to the rule which
requires that a captain be a native-born Danish subject [indf0dt
dansk Undersaat] and that, on the contrary, the following rules
could be accepted, by which in addition Danish f i r s t and second
mates would be made into [klaekket] good captains for the
slave trade: The captains of all Danish ships sailing
to the coast shall hold Danish citizenship [danske Borger],
but the f i r s t and second mates, as well as half the crew
. . . shall be the King's native-born subjects; and neither
the captains nor more than one-third of the crew shall be the
subjects of warring powers.
I t will be the responsibility of the party concerned
[Vedkommende] when granting sea-passes to ships, especially on
St. Croix, to make sure that all the owners of the ship for which
a pass i s requested are really Danish citizens and subjects, and
no foreigner, neither directly nor indirectly, has a share in the
consignment. Such careful study of each request for a sea-pass
would mean less dependence on oaths--the sacred nature of oaths
was only too seldom respected during the last war--and more
dependence on local knowledge about the capability and situation
of the person requesting a pass, and the trust which his
assurances deserve. I t can presumably be l e f t up to the governor
general or to the discretion of the West Indian government to
decide against granting a pass to a ship based solely on the
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circumstances of the case, without being responsible to anything
other than their own duty and the royal government in those cases
where a pass must be denied.
The slave trade is of such great importance and promises
such a steady and certain circulation of capital for those who
understand i t and have the aptitude for entering i t that we do
not venture to advise that foreign ships be permitted to supply
St. Croix with slaves . . . for i t is certain that the Americans
can sail with less expense than most other nations, especially
ours, and would therefore soon undersell the Danish merchants
if their ships were permitted to transport slaves to St. Croix.
On the other hand, we feel compelled to recommend that the
following encouragement might be granted to domestic ships,
including those registered on St. Croix: for every slave
brought t o St. Croix and sold here, the ship should be allowed
to take t o foreign places i n or outside of Europe the following
quantities of sugar: for an adult male slave, 2,000 pounds;
for an adult female slave, 1,000 pounds; for an adolescent
[halvvoxen] male slave, 600 pounds; for an adolescent female
slave, 400 pounds.
The purpose of these humbly proposed regulations i s to make
the needs of this island a result of new trade freedoms for
His Majesty's European subjects. We find no reason to adopt
the view that the Guinea Company ought to have other privileges
with regard to the slave trade. One might wish, however, to
instruct the Guinea Company, in case a pressing shortage of
slaves should develop on St. Croix, to transport slaves to St.
Croix f i r s t and offer them for sale there in return for being
allowed either to take out the amounts of sugar listed above to
foreign places or t o bring into the King's European states a
similar quantity of foreign sugar; we do not see how such an
encouragement could involve any appreciable harm for other Danish
merchants . . . .
We have not had to dwell on the harmful influence and unsteady
course [ustadige Gang] of monopoly privileges, because the fate
of the many monopoly trading companies created in Denmark has
demonstrated the value and usefulness of freedom of trade, and
the patriot can now, with hopeful anticipation, look forward to
less splendid [gl imrende] but happier times for the s t a t e . 6
The Government of the West Indies, October 15, 1787
Walterstorff

Lindemarm

Colbi0rnsen

%y the time the colonial government made i t s report, the
Baltic-Guinea Company had been replaced by a new company enjoying
similar privileges.

APPENDIX VII

Slave Population on S t . C r o i x , 1780-90

Slaves

Bi rths

Deaths

780

22,409

398

625

781

22,687

470

623

782

22,448

407

1,118

783

•21,809

383

983

7m

21,808

518

485

785

21,922

437

816

786

22,081

444

658

787

22,460

487

561

788

22,525

419

656

789

22,021

426

1,278

790

21,847

366

731 a

a DSA, Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt General toldkammer,
Doltumenter vedkomrnende Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning o<| Ophaevelse, Negernes Antal paa S t . Croix for Aarene
fra 1780 t i l 1790 incl- The data are imperfect, of course, but
suffice t o indicate that a preponderance of deaths over births
was normal and, occasionally a t least, enormous.

APPENDIX VIII

The Slave Population on the Four Schimmelmann Plantations, 1772-83
Slaves Purchased

Year

Men

Women

Boys

Girls

Total

Births

Deaths

1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
| . per
year

385
383
378
372
358
350
336
343
346
349

311
315
316
318
314
313
321
329
318
326

125
133
138
149
157
166
172
171
177
174

153
167
164
167
173
179
191
187
198
179

998
996
1,005
1,000
1,008
1,024
1,030
1,040
1,027
982

33
27
31
29
27
23
31
33
28
24

34
31
25
45
41
29
50
34
39
71

28
2
0
10
19
22
35
17
0
1

360

318

156

176

1,011

286

399

1343

a DSA,

Vestindisk-guineisk Rente samt General to!dkammer, Dokumenter vedkommende
Kommissionen for Negerhandelens bedre Indretning og Ophaevelse, Tabelle (lber die Neger
auf den Grclfl. v. Schimmelmannschen Plantagen. There are some minor discrepancies in
the yearly totals. The large increase in deaths in 1782 was caused by smallpox and
measles epidemics, according to the report of the Committee on the Slave Trade, p. 33.
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APPENDIX IX
Married Slaves a t Friedensberg and Friedensthal
In 1792 there were 220 married black couples in the Moravian
congregations at Friedensberg and Friedensthal on St. Croix.

In

three instances both husband and wife were free, and thirteen
marriage? involved male slaves and free Negro women.

Of the 204

marriages in which both partners were slaves, 128 of the couples
had different owners or lived on different plantations,

while only

76 had the same owner and lived on the same plantation.

The

preponderance of the former group suggests a surprising degree of
slave mobility, though part of the explanation might be that slaves
from different plantations met f i r s t a t one of the missions and
subsequently married, so that this group of slaves might not be
representative of the population as a whole.

But, if the data

from the Moravian missions were only partially applicable to the
rest of the slave population, they would nevertheless provide ample
explanation for the slaves' desire to engage in those "night visits"
on neighboring plantations of which Walterstorff complained. 1

^DSA, VGRGT, Dokumenter vedkommende Negerhandelens bedre
Indretning og Ophaevelse, Verzeichnis derer Neger Ehe-Paare, welche
. . . zu Friedensberg und Friedensthal auf St. Croix . . . ehelich
mit einander Verbunden worden . . . , St. Croix, November 15, 1792,
pp. 1-7.
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APPENDIX XI
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- S o n f l e til S a i i t n a r f 03 f t n ' g t /
t»c

03 ©itljcrt/ J>a-iHi5

uft &M$r $>m,' © ^ n i u t n t y
marjfrn q$ ^l^iiO-or#, fan

&\p

<mc vntteriujt:

21t, i $m|7<|t til i)e DniflcenbijiOjbcr, foiu fcTqc mtb <Slaoc$anE>cfcti pan Sit}(ten af (5) itturn 03 mcl> Dc bee fie&tc SfZcgrca DuctfeiTtf til ©or(2?ePin?i|Fc
!0cr, eijfaa i iSelMfjtnini} nf, (it Det i adc JpcnfceiiDn- manttc uatc uclijictni;
be ofl fiamilijt, oiti ^itfotjcl af tujc SRcjcc fca Guinea- funSc mitwcs 0$
SSore SScfiinbifPe 0ert ©grfuiufl i Siben ijefhibes mcQ Wv&ciberc, fom, yaa
;0crne ftbte 05 opbroriite, vare fro tinmen mi en af unuit til Sli-frlSet, inu
niclc<)iieii og tern, utiicr (wilPo be ffiilfe nrCcibe, {jaw Q3i Intel tiiiJcrfr'Si',
(morlcbco o(j naar bcttc mantle tlioe inuelijt. SJetibciiiic Uiibct-feKfiecr Hot
btevit fat iibcn foe "Juiul, «t bet fan Mioc niuclijt 05 cc |oi:tn't(aj}ti".t for 25ere
9 3 c f t i n b i | F e > 0 c r <11 u u b o e v r e3 n b f i o 6 n f n t ) t J J l i j r c , i t a o r t r i f l f l i i j
cce Meonc forfyuebt mci) tifflrrcPMi.1t Qlntal i Set fov gocmcrclfcn forncSn? 5°t;
foIQ; rniar iliitk-rftettelfer foe Cf 5>Iniiraf]crC£iere, font ba-fil traiigc, fimiie
Siecco mufliflt, o<] ber fergeis fornt frcnmte 3Z«jrcnc& '•JGjjtcfMer, Diterelf?
03 ©#&eli<|£cb.
jjotaltfaa at fretts 33or: 93cjlinii|Te i&ep&bcfftf uiMf i>«it <?if(in:rii]cti&ci>,
(tteti 6c oare 03 tee i'^enfcenCt til iftcflK# Sllfavfcf, 01) fotomjibec «t gi«c

91et

Sttegreo "Silforfel uncbuenbig, cr bet at 53Si tin ti[ (juur OTiinbe (Eftorrrtuini)
fuuDfjiorc £>or attmiaabigflc 9Mie om en SDeel (icrfjcn firrcubc, fem nil lie.fceoer firiip at Oefienbtgiereo, og (ier»cb fnalebes Otjbe 03 Oefale:

1.
®eb SBcnnnbclfcn af %irct 1803 vitfc 93', (it nt SJegerfmnbfl forSSore
Ittrterfaatter |M opfiure pan be 5lfvifaiitTe .Sijfler, 03 cllera (>uor bcir fimDe
ftnbe ©tcb tibeii for S3ore iScfibbelfer i iUeftiiibien, fnalcbes, ntefterbette
SibanniioUBIi'6i!igeii97eiiev cflcc Sicgevinbe entcii pnn £ijflcn cller pan anDre
franmcbe ©teber mane ocb eller for SSore Unberfnattcr inDfie&i'O, i 5i3orc litis
bcrfantt.Ttf ©fiOc fores, eller til 33ore SJeflinbitT'e 0:t ti( Gaff] inbfcrcs, .03
at almob'bctte gorOub flribeitbe .Ijanbd \¥al cftec Scmic 'iibaufoca fom ulouUg.
2.

Smibfertib, fra tut af ticm[if| og iubtil llbgatigeii af 9laret 1802, niaae
bet uccre tiffo&t for a((e Stationer uben J^orlY'tcI 03 tinber atfc {Jfoge at iubfere
SJ?c;)i'c og Olcgcrinber fra .Stiffen til 33orc iSeftinbiffe $<t.

3gor b( fiinbe 03 frifFe 9?egre 03 jyfcgcrinber, fom i benne "Jib fanlcbes
iiibfored til SSorc SJJe|linbi|T'e 0cr, IkoilgeSSi, at fi'lfloiibcQ.VirtifcinnegiiP.fre itiaae t cgne cller fremmete ©fi6e iiibcit eet 9lar fraSjnbforielcn libfavo fra
i0erue til fremmebe &tcbcr i eller uben for (Suropa, ucnilig for (jocr «o;cit
(Reger eller Ofegeritibc 2000 Q)b. Orntto, 03 for (iucr (mluuoxcii bet (wlue,
nemlig 1000 "))b., tibeu gocfpicl i J&enfeciibe til .8iennci)c; intn for iSctti
intet
CDen i gorotbningeme af 9 9fpril 1764 03 is SJfno i777» ^oiffet
feenbe til 9iener£anbelen 6creet for fMcffeii {iwoed, Dcftemte 3(f<jiet »cb ©ln«
tterfl Snbfarfcl, utile SJi allcmaabigfl flanfFe eftcrgiue for be 9?egerinber,
fom (icreftcr iiibforeu; liuorimob af be ©ttffre, font for iubfortc 9?cgre eller
Sicgerin&er ttbforet) til fremmebe ©teber, eclccggce i tibgaaenbe Solb i 9>i'0» '
cent nicer, ettb bcc uu cr paa&u&et.

5>
33ibere utile 93i, i JpenfTflt til bet retregorfcolb niellem ^ienneite, fra 33 e=
flUnbelfciv af 91«ret 1795 03 for ben fulgenbc 'Sib cftergioe £op|1faiteit of be
SJlcgcD&uiiiber elfer 9)iger, font ar&eibe paa $>lnntagenie, og iffe ere J?mi03
Sfagcrinber, (luorimoti frn fainme $i& at regne bemte 2lfgit)C (tteggco &o&r,elt'
af allc 9>laMage-5ft<mbfc3Zcgre.

6. Itfc

6.
l!t>fov|H of Oicjjre D<J Wcqeriittci1 fca SQorc StVfHirtifFc .flcr fcvfnl\-:< fro
nil af part Dct flritii<!cftc, 03 miBtaflcfl frn Scire luuhifi alfciu* N-, )Vtr- (Vvcnc
fctjt'c nt utujAae, fault ftc, £tn(Pc 9Sor @fncra(s(3cuumi.ur cq ri'ViiUnui )va
be SScfiinbiff'f $tr j mcflet cufcfte SilfretDe eftcc Omfraiti;](H'Ccnic
tvcc
f?3 bcfcict til nt (n&c iiijflnnf.
J&vorrftcr nt(c 03 cn&ttcr fmine vibe (T3 nt tftte 03 forfjoftc. f;1iwt pna
S3m (Errt £(iviflinnts&org tifi 5>oc ivongcligc 9icfit)cntc; = <£/t(ib jiu'frujjauii
ten 16 231ni'tii 1792.

ilnbcu SSoc ^oitflclifle ^aanb 03 £<$.

Schccl.

Hagerup.

Trant

llofenfhnd Goiikc,
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